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Abstract 
Privatization continues to be one of the debated topics among scholars and policy makers for 
decades now. This study will assess the results of the biggest privatization program in the Middle 
East; Egyptian programme. In the study, the impact of the Initial Public Offering privatization 
mode on the State Owned Enterprises will be assessed for 61 companies over a period of 16 years. 
The objective of the study will be achieved by examining two key aspects; first, the impact of 
privatization will be assessed by comparing pre to post privatization performance. Secondly, in 
order to relate the impact of privatization to the transaction itself, the performance of the privatized 
companies will be assessed in comparison to a fully private set of companies. The analytical 
framework that will be used to analyse the performance of IPO privatized companies will be done 
by examining the profitability, operating efficiency, the sales, employment level and leverage.  
By applying various statistical models and techniques, the results of the study indicated that the 
privatized companies post treatment examined a significant positive change in profitability, and 
operating efficiency and a negative impact on the leverage and employment level. Further, by 
relating the performance of the privatized companies to that of private companies the study 
concluded that the privatization brought in a significant increase in EBIT and ROE while not 
having significance for ROS, and ROA for the profitability measures. Further, there was not 
significant change for Sales Efficiency and significant for the Income Efficiency; While the results 
of the leverage measures indicated that the privatization treatment TD/TA to be not significant and 
on the contrary to the TD/TE. The results of the Employment measures and Sales were significant. 
The comparison relative to the private gave interesting results where the DID coefficient was 
significant for the EBIT, ROE, the employment, sales, the leverage and the Income Efficiency; 
While the results was not significant for ROS, ROA, Sales Efficiency.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
 
Privatization as an ideology has been dominating the scene of economic reform for the last three 
decades all over the world. The spread of the idea gained pace with more than eighty countries 
adopting privatization programmes and more than 6500 State Owned Enterprises being privatized 
(Hinnawi and Ahmed, 1995). The phenomenon spread from the UK, the pioneer in privatization, 
to smaller economies and less developed countries as an effective tool for economic reform. 
The conceptual idea behind privatization is preliminary extending the ownership base of State 
Owned Enterprises through selling or leasing assets, forming partnerships, or contracting out 
management. The privatization transition in most cases will lead to efficient company operations 
due to the change in objectives of the companies and due to the pressures being put on mangers 
by markets to improve performance.  This will consequently be reflected in the profits of the 
companies and the maximization of the shareholder’s wealth. Therefore, it clear that privatization 
can play a crucial role in any economic reform programme.  
The government decision to implement a privatization program will for sure have a predefined set 
of objectives that need to be achieved by adopting this tool of economic reform. The objectives of 
any privatization program (Eytan Sheshinski and Luis F. López-Calva 2003) are mainly:  
 To reduce the overall budget deficit 
 To create competitive markets 
 To extend the ownership base 
 To develop capital markets 
11 
 
The common objectives of any privatization programmes mentioned above highlight the fact that 
the privatization programme is usually being used by centrally planned economies to move 
towards a more liberalized market. 
The Egyptian experience shows that after adopting a centrally planned economic policy for more 
than 2 decades, the government decided to move toward an open market model in the mid of 1970s. 
The Egyptian economic reform faced lots of obstacles and inconsistency in outcomes over the last 
2 decades due to lack of vision and clarity. The phenomenon of economic reform became an 
inherent activity in the Egyptian economic life through which the government aimed to achieve 
economic stability. However, it cannot be denied that the Egyptian government didn’t have a broad 
and clear economic reform policy till the early 1990s with a central focus to privatize public sector 
and to move toward a market based economy (Omran, 2002). Although the economic reform 
started with minor step toward a more liberalized market approach in the mid-1970s, the economic 
reform is viewed by researchers to embark only toward the early 1990s.  
The 1990 economic reform policy was based on the concept of giving the chance to the private 
sector to drive the economic development. Therefore, the government launched a major 
privatization programme and the first step was to cut subsidy to the State Owned Enterprises. 
Thereafter, the government started by putting a program to start the privatization of around 314 
State Owned Enterprises. The first company group was privatized in the year 1994 which 
represented a drastic change in the Egyptian economy. The Public Enterprise Office was the 
government agency which drove the whole restructuring program. The major role of the office was 
to set the privatization plans and to monitor the restructure of such plans. The Egyptian government 
took several steps to show its commitment toward privatization. That was clearly evident in the 
issuance of the Public Business Sector Law in 1991 where it was a solid commitment from the 
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government toward economic liberalization, enhancement of the private sector participation in the 
economy and to proceed with the privatization program.  When the law was issued, it was 
estimated that the public sector accounted for around 75% of the gross industrial production and 
to around 56% of the non-oil exports; (Dultz, Oliver, 1998). 
Upon the issuance of the law, the publicly owned companies were transformed somehow into 
independent business entities. Further, a management framework was established to gradually 
eliminate the ties between the goals of the publicly owned companies and to exert some pressures 
on the companies to run as profit driven organization by reducing the ties with the overall macro-
economic objectives of the government.  
The publicly owned companies that were chosen as the first batch to undergo privatization were 
chosen according to the following criteria: 
 The industry had to be strategic  
 The company needed regulatory reforms 
 The company had to be large in size 
By adopting this strategy and criteria of selection, the government kept the major companies 
looking after utilities, banking and Insurance, and Oil and Gas as part of the government activities 
(Omran, 2002 and Roads, S, 1997).  
The issued law has highlighted that the privatization program should be implemented with the 
following restrictions: 
 To encourage the competition in the economy 
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 To encourage the public to participate in the economic development through participating 
in the  IPOs of privatized companies 
 Transferring the private sector experience in management to the public sector. 
The publicly owned companies which are being prepared for privatization are called affiliated 
companies and they are organized under the umbrella of the holding company. The affiliated 
companies’ management is responsible for running the company on daily basis and to ensure the 
performance of the company is enhanced. The goal of this structure was either to prepare the 
company for privatization through proper restructuring and present value maximization or to 
prepare it for liquidation. The intention of grouping affiliated companies was to club the profitable 
and unprofitable companies and to create a sectorial mix rather than concentrating the companies 
in sub sectors and also to end any monopolistic tendencies (Weiss, Dieter, and Ulrich Wurzel, 
1998).The Law was the cornerstone that triggered the whole privatization and restructuring in the 
Egyptian economy, by creating a level playing field for both publicly owned and privately owned 
companies. Further, the law sets clear rules for the publicly owned companies: 
 Profit maximization 
 No direct or indirect subsidies to those companies 
 No soft loans. 
 Full autonomy in operations and decision taking. 
Also the law freed the companies from pre-set prices and sensitivities of moving prices, and it gave 
the management the freedom to hire the needed labor force without considering any access (Omran 
2009). 
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From different perspective, it is worthwhile mentioning that there are some legal weaknesses in 
the Egyptian privatization law (Tesche and Tohamy, 1994). A major weakness was nominating 
government ministers as heads of the Holding Companies. This in one way or another will affect 
the relationship with the government and will keep the government intervention present in the 
privatization process. Another weakness was the fact that there is no timeframe on how long should 
the affiliated company continue to incur losses before the holding company takes the decision to 
liquidate the company. 
The model adopted by the Egyptian Government is based on having Holding Companies with 
affiliated subsidiary companies. At the point when the Holding Company feels that the subsidiary 
company is ready for privatization the decision is then taken and the process will then start. It is 
mainly the role of the Holding Company is to prepare the companies for privatization. The relation 
can mainly be seen from an agency theory point of view where the directors of the Holding 
Company are agents who work on preparing the companies for privatization. The government is 
in the position where it is encouraging the director to implement the policies for privatization.  
1.2 Research Objectives and Hypotheses 
 
This thesis examines the privatization programme of Egypt and assesses the impact of change of 
ownership on performance of Egypt’s privatized companies. The thesis will have the following 
goals: 
1. To assess the impact of Egyptian privatization program on the performance of IPO 
privatized companies pre- and post-privatization 
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2. To compare the post-privatization performance of Egyptian IPO privatized companies with 
matched private companies in the same sector. 
In order to achieve the objectives shown above for this thesis, there are two main hypotheses to be 
tested: 
Hypothesis 1: Privatization of Egyptian companies through IPO will result in the improvement of 
the performance of those companies following privatization. 
Hypothesis 2: Privatization results in improvement of performance relative to private companies' 
performance   
1.3 Importance of the study 
 
The Egyptian economy has been very well known until the nearly the end of the twentieth century 
to be one of the regional economies managed through a big set of State Owned Enterprises where 
they have governed more than 70% of the economy. The State Owned Enterprises did not 
demonstration any sort of efficiency in delivering their objectives to the Egyptian economy. This 
incapability to serve the economy’s objectives was the main reason to trigger the ambitious reform 
programme. The Egyptian government was sure that the role to be played by the private sector in 
the economic reform will be vital and that’s why the government started the privatization 
programme to increase the private sector participation in the economic development. Also, another 
reason was to benefit from the efficient management of the private sector in running the State 
Owned Enterprises. This research work is intended to study the impact of the privatization as a 
transaction on the performance of privatized companies in Egypt.  
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There are several studies done to inspect the impact of privatization on the privatized companies 
among which the work done by Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias V. (1994), Dewenter, K. 
and Paul H. M. (2001), Boubakri, N. and Jean C. (1998), D'Souza, J. and Megginson, W. L.. 
(1999), Omran (1999) and Boardman, A. and Aidan R (2002). All of these studies have concluded 
that the privatization as a transaction has a positive impact on the overall financial performance of 
privatized companies when compared to their performance pre-privatization. Further, all of these 
studies have taken a generic assessment of privatization transaction and didn’t consider assessing 
any given mode of privatization. On the contrary, this research work will examine only the 
privatized companies in Egypt through an Initial Public Offering which is considered different to 
the above studies in the time spam taken, the jurisdiction as a transitional economy in Middle East 
and Africa, and the mode of privatization used. Therefore, this study is expected to shed light on 
the importance of the governing level of ownership whether it is partially or fully owned by the 
private sector which was not covered in the above mentioned empirical studies.  
Another, contribution of this study is to assess the impact of privatization transaction and other 
contributing factors on the privatized companies by comparing them to pear private ones in similar 
sector. This will even give a deeper understating of the real impact of privatization programme in 
Egypt on the company performance. Boubakri and Cosset (1999) in their study examined the 
privatization transaction though market adjusted measures without going deeper to the sector level 
analysis due to the data availability which this study will cover. The outcome model will offer an 
understanding of the impact of privatization, Size, Gearing and government ownership on the IPO 
privatized companies versus a fully private company performance. Considering the privatization 
through IPO is an important factor in executing this analysis due to the fact that the companies 
privatized through an IPO are usually bigger in size and have more strategic importance to the 
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country. It is evident that this analysis will offer a better understating on the benefits gained by 
privatization programme in Egypt as the comparison is done with a fully private and efficient profit 
driven company within similar sector. 
1.4 Data 
 
The dataset used to analyse the above mentioned hypotheses pertained to the duration from 1994 
to 2010 when the full privatization programme in Egypt was put on hold. This timespan represent 
the full privatization programme in Egypt. The dataset collected represent annual financial and 
operational figures drawn directly from the following sources: 
1. General Authority for Investment 
2. Capital Market Authority 
3. Cairo & Alexandria Stock Market Exchanges 
4. Kompass Egypt Financial Year Book 
The sources mentioned above were used to collect both the privatized as well as the private dataset. 
For the pre privatization data, the prospectus of each company was an important resource for 
gathering reliable data. This is the main reason that the pre privatization data was limited to three 
years to ensure that the published data from the prospectus was used.   
All the companies that were privatized in Egypt are around 282 companies through different modes 
of privatization; Table 1 below shows a description of all the privatized companies in Egypt and 
the different modes of privatization: 
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Table 1  Privatized Egyptian Companies and the Mode Used to Privatize 
Mode of Privatization  Number of Companies 
Asset Sale 44 
Liquidation 34 
Lease Contract 25 
Anchor Investor 85 
Employee Shareholders Association 33 
IPO Majority 38 
IPO Minority 23 
Total 282 
Source: The Egyptian Exchange Monthly Bulletin September 2011 
As shown above in Table 1, the IPO privatized companies are 61 companies including both the 
partially and fully privatized companies. This constitutes the full data set of the companies used to 
examine the impact of privatization and to test the two hypotheses mentioned in the previous 
section. Those companies were then matched with control group of fully private companies from 
similar sector and with comparable asset base. The set of the matched companies included a set of 
a similar 61 companies which bring the total number of companies used in this study to 122 
companies.  
1.5 Analytical Framework 
 
The first hypothesis in this research work examines the pre and post privatization performance of 
the IPO privatized companies. The hypothesis states that: 
Privatization of Egyptian companies through IPO will result in the improvement of the 
performance of those companies following privatization. 
In order to examine this hypothesis, the following tests will be used as an analytical framework: 
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1. The parametric t-test, 
2. The non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test  
3. The proportion test 
Those tests will shed light on the change in performance of IPO privatized companies before and 
after the privatization transaction taking place.  
 As for the second hypothesis, stating  
Privatization results in improvement of performance relative to private companies' performance   
The analytical framework used was the DID model which estimates the impacts of a ‘treatment’ 
on ‘units’.  In this research, ‘treatment’ is the effect of privatization and units are companies, either 
that received the treatment, i.e., were privatized, or were already private (the control). 
1.6 Constraints of the Research 
 
While conducting this study, there were some limiting factors that need to be highlighted. As 
emphasized above, this study covers the IPO privatized companies, the data set covered only 3 
years pre privatization and 3 years post privatization. Analysis of more number of years post 
privatization might assess the impact of privatization over a longer period of time which can fine-
tune the performance of privatized companies. In addition, this study considered only the 
companies privatized through an IPO and this might limit the generalization of the outcomes. 
However, all the IPO privatized companies in Egypt were considered as part of this study.  
The matching process was based on the best match within similar sector and size in a given 
timeframe, as some of the companies were actually delisted at some point of time. The second best 
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match was taken during the period that the privatized company was listed. In addition, this research 
work didn’t include the financial services sector, it only focused on the all the other industrial, 
commercial and services sectors. This was done to avoid the fundamental differences between the 
financial sector reporting requirements compared to other sectors.   
1.7 Organization of the Thesis 
 
This section of the thesis will shed light on the method this thesis is organized. Each of the chapters 
and their purpose as part of the thesis will be discussed briefly. The thesis is divided into three 
main parts,  
1. Part 1: Chapters 2 and 3 present a theoretical framework of privatization and a description 
of the Egyptian economy.  
2. Part 2: Chapter 4 presents a full literature review of the privatization and its impact on 
companies’ performance.  
3. Part 3: Chapters 5 to 7 introduce the methodology used, and the empirical results of the 
study.  
This all will be concluded by a final chapter highlighting the conclusions of the study and 
recommendation for future research.  
Part 1: 
Chapter Two: Privatization in Theory 
In this section of the thesis, the research introduces the conceptual ideology of privatization. 
Further, the importance of the privatization as a reform tool is discussed in depth and how it was 
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implemented in different developed as well as developing countries with all the controversy voiced 
about it.   
Chapter Three: A description of the Egyptian Privatization Program  
This chapter presents a full historical background of the Egyptian privatization program starting 
from the early nineties until date and thoroughly discussing the different changes in economic 
policy moving from a centrally planned economy to a more liberalized economy. This chapter will 
also discuss the reasons behind the change in the economic policy overtime and the driving reasons 
behind it.  
Part 2 
Chapter 4: Privatization in Literature  
This section of the thesis will provide a detailed discussion of the literature done on the impact of 
the privatization transaction on the performance of companies and also those studies that have 
compared the performance of privatized companies with State Owned Companies. In addition this 
chapter will also review the literature on the impact of ownership and size on the performance of 
the privatized companies.  
Part 3 
Chapter 5: Research Methodology 
This section of the thesis will discuss the entire methodology to be used in this thesis including: 
1. Research Objectives 
2. Hypotheses to be tested 
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3. Econometric Tests used 
At the end of the chapter the analytical framework to be used will be justified and discussed in 
length.  
Chapter 6: Pre and Post Privatization Comparative Analysis 
This chapter represents the results of the first set of tests used to achieve the thesis purpose. The 
analysis will cover both the performance of the partially and fully privatized companies in both 
stages pre and post privatization.  
Chapter 7: Privatized and Private Companies comparison 
This chapter introduces in details the results of assessing the impact of privatization, size, gearing 
and government ownership on the performance of privatize as well as the private (control group) 
companies.  
Chapter 8: Discussion 
The discussion chapter will present the detailed discussion of the results obtained by testing the 
hypotheses in chapter 6 and 7. Each of the tests results will be thoroughly discussed and analyzed 
to present the researchers view on the results.   
Chapter 9: Conclusion and Recommendations  
This chapter sets out the final conclusion of the study and the possible research to be done to 
complement the work done in this thesis and to extend to understand better the impact of 
privatization on performance of companies.   
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Chapter Two: Privatization In theory 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Privatisation remains to be a disputed topic among economists and politicians where setting the 
border line between limit and function of the government and the private sector, (John Stewart 
Mill, 1848). 
The Privatisation programmes have been commenced in many countries globally. There have been 
three different groups that have implemented privatization programs across the world. The first 
categories of countries that have adopted privatization include those countries with transition 
economies in Central and Eastern Europe. This group started the program after 1989, the year of 
the fall of the Soviet Union. The intention was to enhance the process of instituting a market 
economy. Further, the second group of countries include privatisation programmes carried out in 
developing countries as a direct result of the influence of international financial institutions, such 
as the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). The third and last group include 
the privatisation programmes carried out by developed countries. The most comprehensive 
programs were carried in the United Kingdom in the 1980s and 1990s (Bishop M.R., Kay J.A. 
1989.). 
In some countries the process of privatisation is sometimes referred to as de-nationalisation or 
disinvestment. The privatization process includes the transfer of property from public or 
government as an ownership structure to private sector. It also includes transferring the 
management of any service or activity from the government to the private sector.  
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2.2. Definition of Privatisation 
 
Privatisation is defined as "the deliberate sale by a government of the State Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) to the private sector or the sale of SOE's assets to private economic sectors" (Megginson, 
W. L., and Jeffry N., 2001). 
The way privatisation is defined varies from one researcher to another; for instance: 
 Letwin, Oliver (1988) defines privatisation to be the transfer of State Owned Enterprises 
to the private sector.  
 Plane, P (1997) and McLindon, M.P (1996) defined the privatization to be the process of 
transferring the State Owned Enterprises to the private sectors through a partial or full sale 
of the government assets to the private sectors. 
 Beesley, M.E. and Littlechild, Stephen (1989) defined privatisation to be the as the sale of 
at least 50% of the shares of State Owned Enterprises to private shareholders.  
 Farinos, J., and Jose, C, (2007) settled that privatisation is defined not only to be the transfer 
of State Owned Enterprises equity or assets to private sectors, but also to include the change 
in management style from a communist/socialist style to capitalist style or to open market 
style 
The Privatisation of State Owned Enterprises signifies one critical task within the general 
framework of the economic transition process. A successful privatisation programme will 
eventually lead to an increase in productivity, creating stable enterprises, reducing the level of 
unemployment, improving working conditions and more secure employment. To have a successful 
privatization program, there are six preliminary steps that need to be followed. The steps for a 
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successful privatization program include the following (OECD Report 2003 and Robert Grosse 
and Juan Yañes1998): 
1. Favourable Investment Climate 
Governments should establish the needed legislations that will eventually create an attractive 
investment conditions that will attract foreign as well as private investors.  
2. Addressing Ownership Structure and Debts 
The government should clearly put in place a robust mechanism that will resolve the concern of 
ownership structure and debts. This step will be vital for high value companies with foreign 
investors’ interest. 
3. Addressing  Redundant Labour 
The third step to ensure a smooth privatisation process is to address the possible lying off of some 
workers as a result of privatization. This can be easily done by establishing a fund for this purpose 
that will compensate those workers on fair basis.  
4. Strong Infrastructure Sector 
Enhanced Infrastructure is a key enabler for a better privatization process.  
5. Advisors 
To achieve an effective privatization program there should be highly skilled advisors to assist in 
the privatization transaction.  This will give more confidence to investors on how the governments 
are handling such complicated transactions.  
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6. Labour Unions 
Unions play a vital role in enabling a smooth implementation of any privatization programme. 
They tend to get buy-in of all the workers and act as a link between the government and workers 
and at a later stage between the private management and the workers.  
Based on the above discussion, it clear that privatization works on shifting the burden of doing 
business from the government to the private sector by reducing the ownership level or by just 
commercialising the activities of State Owned Enterprises.  In order to achieve this objective there 
should be efficient market mechanism to ensure that privatization will take place through the best 
privatization process given the nature of business to be privatized. There are several methods of 
privatization ranging from management contracts, voucher programmes, operating, leasing, 
financing, or selling all or part of the privatized companies’ assets to the private sector. 
Nevertheless, the definition of privatization shouldn’t be limited to the fact of transfer of ownership 
from government to private. Privatization definition should capture also the fact of moving from 
monopolistic model to a more competitive or regulated economic model. Through the movement 
from monopolistic model to a more competitive model issues like efficiency and cost reduction, 
customer satisfaction, quality enhancement will be addressed. 
2.3. Objectives of Privatisation Programs 
 
In order to achieve the wanted outcomes from any privatization program then there should be a set 
of defined goals and objectives that need to be achieved. Setting the proper goals and objectives 
at the beginning of any privatization program enables a successful and a smooth implementation 
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of the program.  There is a multidimensional goal and objectives of any privatization program that 
can be summarized to be: 
1. Expand the ownership of companies 
2. Economic Objectives 
3. Financial Objectives 
4. Social Objectives 
5. Political Objectives 
The following section will highlight the importance of each objective in ensuring the successful 
implementation of any privatization program. 
2.3.1. Expand the Ownership of Companies 
 
Extending the ownership of State Owned Enterprises is an important objective of any privatization 
program. The broader share ownership that can be implemented through any privatization program 
is an efficient way of building strong capital markets and especially in developing countries. In 
addition, it can also be used as a motivational driver within companies to enhance efficiency and 
improve performance by giving a certain percentage of company shares to employees (Williams, 
J., & Nguyen, N, 2005). The implementation of this objective requires governments and State 
Owned Enterprises to take certain steps to ensure achieving the goal. This includes encouraging 
the public to participate in any IPO for such government entities. Also, this will require the use of 
a transparent and fair procedure in the privatization program as well as promoting the benefits of 
privatization through media (Vickers, John and Yarrow, George, 1988). 
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2.3.2. Economic Objectives 
The economic objectives of any privatization program will affect directly the efficiency level as 
well as quality of service provided to the public. 
2.3.2.1    Efficiency Enhancement 
Any government while implementing a privatization program will always have the objective of 
enhancing efficiency. This will always enhance the overall efficiency of the economy in delivering 
services and also will directly impact the competitiveness of the economy in the local and 
international markets in delivering services and commodities.  
Promoters of any privatization program will always tend to market the idea of enhancing the 
efficiency of privatized companies and boosting the economic development of the country by 
creating competition. Therefore, enhancing competition will tend to affect the market forces to 
allocate the resources efficiently among different alternatives in an optimal way (Barro, R., 1991). 
2.3.2.2      Enhancing Quality of Service 
The monopolistic position of many of the State Owned Enterprises will tend to directly affect the 
cost of delivering the service as well as the quality of service delivered to the public. The 
government subsidy plays a vital role in maintaining a poor service quality in certain sectors. In 
some sectors it cannot be avoided to have a natural monopoly and this call for a strong and 
independent regulatory body to ensure the efficiency of privatized entities and the quality of 
service delivered to the public.  
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2.3.3. Financial Objectives 
 
Decision takers to promote privatization usually argue that it will help in rationalizing the public 
expenditure and will eventually lead to reduce the burden on the government budget. This will 
mainly happen by giving way to the private sector to finance and operate privatized entities. In 
many cases when the privatization takes place the government will tend eliminate or reduce 
subsidy in some cases. Also, once privatized, companies will tend to have their own budgets that 
will enable them to increase capital expenditure without the need to get any help from the 
government thus relieving the government budget from this burden.  
2.3.4. Social Objectives 
 
Social objectives tend to be very sensitive once discussing the privatization programs in any 
country. Privatization usually observed in some countries in a negative way when viewing it from 
a social dimension. In all countries the human resources is the fundamental factor that leads to 
economic development. Therefore, increasing employment opportunities and using the optimal 
workforce needed is seen to be an essential requirement for any privatization program. The 
privatization program should by all means improve the economic environment within the economy 
to help in incentivising the creation of job opportunities through the help of the private sector. The 
privatization is used to deal with excess labour by developing them through required training to 
meet the requirements of the private sector.  
Further, it should be noted that the Social objectives will also include encouraging the private 
sector to effectively participate in the overall economic growth. The private sector will be in a 
better position to assess the sectors where growth potential is evident. To achieve this, privatization 
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programs should be built around sectors where the participation of private sector will enhance 
competition. Also, it should ensure the flow of funds to those sectors to ensure positive growth 
potential and movement toward more commercialized management approach.   
2.3.5. Political Objectives 
 
Privatization programs will tend to attract local and foreign investors to invest in former State 
Owned Enterprises. Also, it will help developing and strengthen capital markets. One advantage 
of privatization is the ability to reduce corruption and fraudulent activities made by government 
officials and by politicians (Ashour, A; Hendy, M; Hnafy, A; and Ezzat, M. 1988). In order to 
achieve this, governments should always facilitate the involvement of foreign investors in all 
privatized entities and to continually develop capital markets to attract more foreign investors.  
2.4. Drivers of Privatization 
 
Boutchkova, M. and Megginson, W. L. (2000) revealed that privatisation is linked to an increase 
in sales, income and productivity of the company and also to efficiently reducing the size of the 
labour force. They have shown that the privatized companies of less than 2 years will tend to have 
labour productivity growth similar to that of State Owned Enterprises. Nevertheless, the companies 
that are privatised for 3 or more years will tend to have a significant improvement if compared 
with their State Owned counterparts. This section will highlight the needed for privatization and 
also it will touch on the benefits versus drawbacks of privatization. 
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2.4.1 Justifying Privatisation Transaction 
 
There are many explanations to describe the need to privatize State Owned Enterprises. These 
explanations are as follows: 
1. Privatization will tend to eliminate corruption in State Owned Enterprises. 
2. Privatization will assist in enhancing cost reduction within the privatized companies. 
3. Privatization will help the government to shift operational risks to private sector.  
4. The privatized companies will have access to the latest technology and best management 
practices that will result in a more efficient use of resources.  
5. Human resources development is a key outcome of privatization; where labour will have 
better chances of developing.  
Although all of the above-mentioned reason justifies the adoption of privatization; still there are 
some opponents for privatization as an ideology. They see that privatization still have some 
drawbacks that need to be highlighted. The following table will set a comparison between 
proponents and opponents of privatization (Bjorvatn, K., and Tina, S., 2005).  
Table 2   Proponents and Opponents of Privatization 
Proponents Views Opponents Views 
Any Private companies will create value by 
marketing its products to consumers. Further, 
private companies will tend to serve the exact 
need of the customers. The ability of the 
customers to pay will drive the ability of 
Private companies are seen to have one goal, to 
maximize profits. Opponents view private 
companies serving the needs of those who can 
pay, rather than the needs of the majority. 
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private companies to serve their customers 
better (Varouj A., Ying G., and Jiaping Q., 
2005). 
Governments usually run businesses to 
address social objectives and it is not possible 
to have a purely profit driven organization 
managed and owned by a government.  
Returns from private enterprises will go to the 
bank accounts of small number of owners rather 
than being available for the government to serve 
the public needs of a wider category of 
population.  
Politicians tend to use national industries to 
serve their needs rather than creating overall 
value for the economy.  
In natural monopoly situation, it is not possible 
get the needed outcomes of privatization. 
Governments tend to improve the 
performance of a State Owned Enterprise in 
cases where the service provided is socially 
and politically delicate 
When a company is privatized, the public will 
not be able to properly control or regulate the 
entity. Further, private owner will be selective in 
providing the service and might exclude those 
who are poor or in remote areas.  
Privatized firm will tend to have easy access to 
financial markets to raise funds. 
The public companies will be backed by the 
credit rating of the government and thus can 
easily raise funds. 
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2.4.2 Forms of Privatization 
 
There are various forms of privatization that the government can use as a tool to disperse the State 
Owned Enterprises. The privatization tools that the government can use include, deregulation, 
contracting out, vouchers, management contracts, joint ventures, private infrastructure 
development and operation, asset sale or long-term lease and financing contracts. The government 
choice from different forms of privatization is vital as it contribute to either having a successful or 
unsuccessful privatization program.  Governments will tend to use more than one form to achieve 
certain objectives. Consequently, setting clear objectives for any privatization program will assist 
in choosing the most suitable e privatization form that will help in achieving the needed outcome. 
The following section will shed light on different forms of privatization. 
2.4.2.1    Deregulation 
 
Primarily, deregulation is conceptually based on decreasing the role played in any economy by the 
government represented by the public sector for the private sector.  This objective is ultimately 
done by strengthening policies favouring the free markets within an economy. Deregulation is 
ideally eliminating public regulations in a specific sector or industry to allow for competitive 
forces to act in a market (AKTAN, Coşkun Can, 2003). 
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2.4.2.2     Asset sale 
 
Asset sale is another form of privatization. In this form of privatization, the government sells assets 
of a certain industry to private sector. The private sector in this case runs the industry with an 
objective of maximizing profits. This form of privatization is usually used when it is not possible 
to use any other form of privatization (Hanke, 1985).  There are different ways of implementing 
this type of privatization under an asset sale form of privatization; the government might sell the 
assets to private sector with an intention to lease it back at a future date. Another way of 
implementing this form of privatization is the employee buyout; where the employees within the 
same company will buy it out. 
This form of privatization gives flexibility during the negotiations phase and it is also easier and 
faster to implement if compared to other methods. Further, in this method the government will 
have the ability to assess the seriousness and commitment of the buyer and whether he will deliver 
what he promises or not.   
2.4.2.3    Vouchers 
 
In this form of privatization the government distribute to citizens vouchers that will represent 
potential shares in those State Owned Enterprises. This mode of privatization was used for huge 
privatization programs that took place during the 1990s in transition economies in Central and 
Eastern Europe. This mode of privatization gained it publicity as it is more appropriate for 
economies moving from planned to open market as it distribute the benefit of privatization to a 
huge number of citizens. Therefore the State Owned Enterprises will tend to pass faster to private 
sector and will develop the community involvement in the market economy.  
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In this mode for privatization the vouchers are distributed free of charge or for a nominal price and 
it usually used for the privatization of huge industrial companies, housing, agricultural companies 
and land. Further, some governments used to issue vouchers which are tradable and other issued 
ones that are not tradable. Some of these vouchers were given a monetary value while others were 
just dominated in points as a mean to curb the increase in the money supply and inflation (Bridge, 
G., 1977). There is some major drawback of this mode of privatization which is the failure to create 
revenue to the government if compared to selling the assets to the highest bidder (Ellerman, M., 
1998). Also, it doesn’t bring new management techniques or technology. It also tends to give even 
more power to the same executive management who are running the State Owned Enterprise to 
have more controlling power after voucher privatization. 
2.4.2.4 Public-Private Partnerships 
 
This mode of privatization is similar to a Joint venture agreement where two or more companies 
enter into a contractual partnership agreement to achieve a common business target while sharing 
accruing profits, losses and any associated risks. This type of partnership can take place between 
two or more private companies, or between a private company and a public enterprise the latter 
will constitute what can be called “private sector joint venture agreement” or “public and private 
joint venture agreement”. This type of partnership can be done locally in an economy between the 
private sector and the government or internationally through an international company and the 
government. This mode of privatization is used by some governments in privatizing companies 
offering product development, general trade, technology development, consultancy services, 
human resource development, oil and gas, and mining.  
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2.4.2.5    Contracting-out 
 
Contracting-out or outsourcing is the activity of engaging a private company to deliver goods or 
services to the government. Under this mode of privatization although the service is provided by 
a private company, the government remains completely accountable for the provision of services 
and government continues to control management decisions, while the private company will  
perform the service. 
This type of privatization is used to privatize services such as public transportation, public safety 
services, computer centres services and maintenance (Savas. E. 1987). This form of privatization 
is efficient and effective as it initiates competition and reduce the dependency on the government. 
Also, it gives more flexibility to respond to the changing needs of citizens (AKTAN, Coşkun Can, 
2003). On the other hand, this form of privatization might have several drawbacks, like the 
possibility of having a biased process of tendering and awarding. It also, social implication as it 
promotes lying off of employees from State Owned Enterprises.  
2.4.2.6     Management Contracts 
 
This form of privatization gained publicity among governments of the developing countries in the 
last two decades. In this form of privatization, the government will transfer the management of 
state owned enterprises to a private investor for a defined time period against an agreed fee. This 
will enable the government to ensure a more efficient way of managing the State Owned 
Enterprises. This mode of privatization is used mainly in the hotel management, healthcare 
facilities, and public transportation (Shirley, Mary M &Xu, Lixin Colin, 2001).  
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The Management contracts are usually used when the government is in the process of privatizing 
a frim and needs experienced management to operate the company for a limited time period to 
uplift the performance. Further, it used to in capital intensive projects where the government prefer 
to limit its role to injecting capital and transfer the management to private sector.  
This form of privatization possesses lots of benefits. It assists in transfer of skills from the private 
sector to the public companies. It also provides access to capital markets for financing the 
operations of those entities and also creating new markets (Abdel-Khaliq, G. and Hana K., 2002; 
Ramsey S., 1998 and Abdel Shahid, S, 2002). On the other hand, this form of privatization has 
drawbacks like the liability of paying the contract fee even if the company is losing. Further, the 
financial strength of the owner plays a key role in the success of this form of privatization. Also, 
it is complex process to structure those contracts and owner will lose the control over the daily 
activity of the business (Hegstad, S. and Newport, I., 1987).  
2.4.2.7     Leasing contracts 
 
Another form of privatization is the Leasing Contract where private investor leases the facility or 
assets from the government against a predefined fee paid to the government. Also, the agreement 
defines the responsibilities of each party towards the other. Therefore, this form of privatization 
transfers the management and operations of a State Owned Enterprise from government to private 
sector (Bjorvatn, K., and Tina, S., 2005). 
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2.4.2.8      Financing Contracts 
 
This form of privatization is considered to be a bit complex if compared with the aforementioned 
forms. In this form of privatization, the investor is expected to provide full funding for the project 
(Shirley, Mary M &Xu, Lixin Colin, 2001).  There are different types of leasing contracts: 
 The Lease Build Operate (LBO) 
 Build Transfer Operate (BTO) 
 Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) 
 Buy Build Operate (BBO) 
 Build Own Operate (BOO) 
The private investor will then recover his investment by selling the service to the government or 
to the public.  
2.4.3 Privatisation Methods 
 
Privatisations methods are the means by which the government can privatize State Owned 
Enterprises. There are various methods by which government can privatize; this section will shed 
light on all of these methods.  
2.4.3.1    Mass Privatisation 
The Mass privatisation refers to implementing a privatization program through mass participation 
from all possible entities such as citizens, and mutual/pension funds. Many of the privatization that 
took place in different countries used the mass privatization model through public offer of shares. 
In this model, governments can sell fully or partially a State Owned Enterprises by use of 
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certificates, as the main means of payment. The use of this method is relatively simple and fast if 
compared to other methods (Saul S., John B., Giovanni U., and Jamrs W., 2007). Nevertheless, 
this method in practice leads to the transformation of capital only and it doesn’t induce further 
investment locally or internationally. Further, this method doesn’t allow for an efficient 
distribution of State Owned capital due to the prevalent use of vouchers as the main means of 
payment (Grosfeld I. and lraj H., 2003). 
2.4.3.2     Direct Sale to the Private Sector through the Stock Market 
 
This method of privatization is appropriate to be used with State Owned Enterprises characterized 
by being stable with long term feasibility. Further, this method can either be implemented by 
offering fully or partially the shares of the company (100% of the shares or >51%) for public 
subscription. In order to have a successful Public Offering, there should be available enough 
audited financial information of the company. Also the size and level of activity within the capital 
markets as well as the availability of the liquidity within the market plays a vital role in increasing 
the chance of having a successful offering (Wahish N., 2006 and Butler S., 1988).  
2.4.3.3     Sale to an Anchor Investor 
 
The sale to a strategic investor is the perfect choice when the government is confident that the 
investor will be capable of providing the essential financing, management efficiency and 
technology to the State Owned Enterprise. The main advantage of this method is availability of 
funds and specialized management team needed to transform any business. On the other hand, this 
method tend to limit the investment opportunity to big investors and to exclude the small ones. 
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Also, it does not support the concept of expanding ownership base and thus benefit will be passed 
to a limited number of investors. In addition, usually this method is coupled with high possibility 
of having problems with staff (Abdel Shahid, S., 2002). 
 2.4.3.4    Tender 
 
Tendering method of privatization requires the announcement of pre-tendering conditions and then 
the tender is floated and the government will then receive bids that meet the pre-set conditions. 
The method is widely used in privatization of state capital and it provides an inflow of capital to 
the government. However, it can be misused due to the lack of transparency.  
2.4.3.5     Small-Scale Privatisation by Auction 
 
The auction method of privatization was used by many developed countries to privatize State 
Owned Enterprises. In this method the auctioneers will bid the value of the company in an open 
public bidding process. There are two types of bidding; common auction where the bidders will 
increase the price till the highest bidder wins the auction. The other type is the special auction 
where the government progressively reduces the price till it gets the first bid. 
This method of privatization helps to avoid transparency issues and will ensure that the bidder with 
the highest bid will buy the company.  It also ensures that inflow of capital will happen as the 
bidder will pay in cash and not in vouchers (Aknazarova J., 2007).  On the other hand, auctions 
don’t give importance to assessing the viability of future plans of the investor. 
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2.4.3.6      Other Methods of Privatization 
 
There are several other methods of privatization, one of which is offering the shares of the 
company to sale to its employees at market price. Another way is allocating partially the shares to 
the company employees. Those methods of privatization are usually used for low profitably 
companies or for companies with productivity issues. This is used to encourage employees to 
improve performance when they own the company shares.  Other privatization method includes 
the debt-swap where the company debt is transformed into shares in favour of the creditor.  
2.4.4 Benefits of Privatisation 
 
The privatization programs will help governments to boost economic development through a 
structured reform programme. It will also help governments to increase the overall productivity of 
the privatized sector by enhancing efficiency and the introduction of new technology and transfer 
of knowledge. Further, from a strategic level, privatization will tend to force companies to 
concentrate more on core activities and knowledge. In addition, at the operational level, 
privatization will boost efficiency and cost reduction by ensuring that operation is done by the 
most productive, cost-effective measures (Willner J., 2003). Moreover, Privatization removes the 
burden of providing noncore services from the government and it shifts it to the private sector 
along with the financial risk associated with providing the service (Buxton, A., 1992). In addition, 
the profit maximization is an enough motivation for privatized companies, when compared to 
public ones, to improve performance and thus will eventually lead in reducing the bureaucracy 
from the economy.  
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2.4.5 Drawbacks of Privatisation 
 
The disadvantages arise in the short term and they cannot be avoided. In general terms privatization 
will affect the employment levels and will eventually create social tensions in any society.  Further, 
one of the disadvantages of privatization stems from the fact that once privatization program is 
initiated people will tend to have high expectations of how it can resolve issues and improve 
economic performance (El Rashidy, A., 1996). Therefore, the expectations level should be set a 
realistic level because privatization is only one tool that can be used to improve the overall 
economic performance. Further, sometimes the privatization is viewed as a tool used by the 
government to repay part of its debt.  
Privatization programs might also be faced with the lack of enough government tools needed to 
regulate the transformation toward open markets. Countries like Russia faced the same issue when 
initiated its privatization program. Also, countries like the United Kingdom faced the same issue 
at the early stages of the privatization program the Thatcher-era. 
Some opponents of the privatization program see privatization as not being able to incentivise 
capital investment in the newly privatized companies; the privatized rail-track leasing is an 
example of this issue (Sutter N., and William L. M., 2006). In addition, the abuse of the 
monopolistic position in some of the cases might also be a disadvantage of privatization as the end 
user will be the loser in this case.  
2.4.6 The Washington Consensus  
 
The Washington Consensus is referring to a set of concepts and economic concepts developed and 
backed by internationally well know economists and economic organizations/ countries like the 
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International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the European Union and the United States of 
America Stiglitz, Joseph (1999),. The Washington Conesus promotes certain economic phosphides 
related to free trade, floating exchange rates, free markets and macroeconomic stability. It was 
developed covering ten fundamental principles as articulated by John Williamson in 1989, Stiglitz, 
Joseph (1994): 
1. Lowering the government borrowing, fiscal discipline 
This is mainly related to the policy shift in directing the public spending of subsides to the 
provision of the growth opportunities and the elevating the poor services primary 
education, primary health care and infrastructure investment. 
2. Reforming the taxation system 
The concept here is stressing on the need to have a moderate marginal taxation rates. The 
interest rate is one of the very strong economic tools to be determined by the market and 
should be moderate in real terms to enable a stable economic growth.  
3. Liberalizing interest rates 
4. The liberalization of interest rates will reinforce the economic development across 
the economy and will enable a more sustainable economic growth. 
5. Exchange rates 
The exchange rates should be competitive to allow for a more favorable economic 
environment. 
6. Liberalizing trade 
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The liberalization of trade especially imports and eliminating any barriers, like licensing 
and trade protection. 
7. Liberalizing inward foreign direct investment 
This will also allow for a more competitive economic setup and will allow the economy to 
create more employment opportunities.  
Privatizing the State Owned Enterprises 
8. The privatization of state owned enterprise will enable the creation of a more 
efficient economy on the long term.    
9. Deregulation 
The deregulation of markets will enable competition which is term will work as a catalyst 
to improve the overall efficiency of the economy. So the market barriers should be removed 
except for those that protect the safety, environmental and consumer. 
10. Property rights 
The legal security of property rights is very important as it work on enhancing the overall 
innovation and knowledge across the economy. 
The abovementioned ten fundamentals of the Washington Consensus were used as the basis for 
the economic reform policies adopted in Latin America, South East Asia and other countries Shair, 
Osama Abu (1997). 
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2.4.6.1 Implications of The Washington Consensus. 
 
The adoption of the Washington consensus as articulated in the above ten principles highlighted 
that there was a full support from the World Trade Organization and North Atlantic Free Trade 
Association to lower or evening eliminating any trade barriers, Stiglitz, Joseph (1997a). Further, 
the IMF also changes its policy to promote the fragmental principles of the Washington Consensus 
and linked receiving any financial support to implementing market reforms. This will result in 
countries specializing in goods or services that they have competitive advantage in. therefore, the 
developing countries will only be producing primary goods Amsden, Alice H., Jacek Kochanowicz 
and Lance Taylor (1994).  
2.4.6.2 Washington Consensus Critic 
 
Some economists argue that based on the strategic trade theory, the free trade is not always in 
favor of the developing countries Stiglitz, Joseph (1994). A very stringent implementation of the 
free trade and comparative advantage can result in the developing economies will end up producing 
only the low growth and the price volatile primary products Stiglitz, Joseph (1994).  In order for 
countries to promote new industries, an incubatory phase is required for both selective tariffs on 
cheap imports in order to protect the industry. An example of this policy, it he Brazilian 
government support offered to Embraer which help Brazil to become one of the successful airplane 
manufacturers, Ramamurti Ravi (1996a).  
To lower the overall government borrowing is not always the right solution. The Implementation 
of certain farcical rules can result in an avoidable economic hardship Stiglitz, Joseph (1996). For 
instance, the fiscal consolidation which took place during the great depression resulted in lower 
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economic growth rate and didn’t result in reducing the debt to GDP ratio, Ramamurti, Ravi (1991). 
In the case the governments need to lower spending, this will result in higher poverty rates as the 
welfare support programs will also be affected. Nevertheless, it is always advisable to be more 
cautious and reduce the overall structural borrowing to be within acceptable levels, Amsden, Alice 
(1997).  
China adopted a very unique model. The Chinese firms have invested around $110 bn in the 
developing countries in Africa and Latin America in the last decade Chirwa, E. (2004). This is 
more than what was invested by the World Bank. The Chinese approach involved huge 
investments directed towards the infrastructure projects and public sector investments. This in turn 
is showing that the economic development might need at a certain stage an intervention to enable 
the huge returns rather than leaving it to the free market forces, Ramamurti, R. (1997).  
The Washington consensus adopted privatization as one of the ten fundamental principles. The 
privatization as a tool has strong capacity to enhance the overall efficiency and quality of services 
offered to the public Stiglitz, Joseph (1996). Nevertheless, a major drawback of privatization when 
adopted without a strong regulatory regime is the fact that in key public sector industries might 
not be delivering the expected outcome. This is evident as the implementation of privatization 
policy doesn’t take into consideration the social objectives, Amsden, Alice (1997). A clear 
example on this fact is the Bolivian experience in privatizing the water sector which resulted in 
the water being cut off from the poorest citizens, Helleiner, (1994).  
One of the key critics that the Washington Consensus got was the fact that it ignored the need to 
redirect the public spending toward the enhancement of the public sector initiatives related to 
primary education, primary health care and infrastructure van Cranenburgh, Oda (1998). The 
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Washington Consensus focused more on the market oriented policies and less on the government 
needed interventions Berg, Elliot (1994). Many of the scholars have linked between the macro-
economic crisis of Latin America in 1980s and South East Asian crisis in 1990s and the 
implementation of the Washington Consensus, Cook and Kirkpatrick, (1995). Further, it should 
be noted that the credit crisis that took place 2007 has clearly indicated that the free markets can 
create instabilities and high unemployment in the long run, Christian Wolf (2009). The impact of 
the financial deregulation might have been potential threat to the financial markets.  
2.4.6.3 Pro Washington consensus Views 
 
The above-mentioned ten policy fundamentals of the Washington Consensus showed a strong 
economic validity. In broader terms, it can’t be denied that the tax reform and sustainable growth 
borrowing among other principles will lead to an economic development of nay economy Cornia, 
G.A. and G.K. Helleiner (1994). Further, introducing privatization alone with enough competition 
and regulation will also result in potential befits to the nation. For such policy proposals, it is very 
easy to undermine the whole policy proposal when things go wrong. This is what has happened 
when the South East Asian economies were in great difficulties in the 1990s Stiglitz, Joseph 
(1996). Under such circumstances, economists will be tarnished and such reform policies will tend 
to be unpopular Stiglitz, Joseph (1996).  
On the other hand, it should be noted that any similar broad reform policies require a diligent way 
of implementation, Bennell, Paul (1997). The way each country adopt and implement such policies 
will define to a great extent whether they will be successful or not. Further, the timing of adopting 
such reform policies will also have an impact on the expected results. In general, the 
implementation of free trade is sound economic policy Ramamurti, R. (1997). However, limited 
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trade protection might also help some economies diversify. Choosing the right sector to protect in 
order to diversify is very crucial Kumssa, A. (1996). For instance,   if African countries try to 
protect the car industry, it is very probable that they will fail as the economy as whole doesn’t 
possess the fundamentals to enable such a huge industry. On the on the contrary if they protect the 
primary product processing, they will tend to get much better results.  
As similar concepts applies to the privatization. It will all depend on the industry the government 
is trying to privatize Kolodko, Grzegorz (1999). The UK experience in privatization is 
unmatchable when it comes to the privatization of British Telecom; however, the privatization of 
British Rail was a bit more controversial privatization transaction. The only difference between 
the two transactions is the fact that the social benefits associated with each industry are different 
as one of the then is a natural monopoly Martin, S. and D. Parker (1997).  
Therefore, it should be noted that a one solution won’t be fit for all the economies Lorch, Klaus 
(1991). Developing a structured economic policy for developed countries will definitely differ 
from that for a developing country. Using a universal prescription might be of help to drive 
economic reform and define the areas that need improvement but it does really mean that it should 
be implemented as it is Babai, Don (1988).  
The deviations of the Washington Consensus from the initial intention set by John Williamson led 
to the evolvement of the post Washington Consensus lead by Stiglitz. Joe Stiglitz is one of the 
loudest critics of the Washington Consensus. In his book he favored the gradual liberalization of 
trade and diligent implantation of privatization. However, he didn’t object the implementation of 
other reform policies. The next section will highlight the views of Stiglitz on the Washington 
Consensus.  
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2.4.6.4 Privatization in Washington Consensus 
 
Privatization is considered to be the one of the most noticeable manifestation of the Washington 
Consensus. The privatization as a policy has been in the center of attention for most policy makers 
since the early 1980’s (Cook, 1997). The World Bank has been pushing the privatization as one of 
the economic reform tools to all the countries applying for loans. About 70% of the structural 
adjustment loans granted during the 1980s contained at least one privatization aspect (Cook and 
Kirkpatrick, 1995). The African countries have been a clear example. The Washington Consensus 
had more focus on privatization as a development remedy. This view of the privatization drove the 
emergence of the Post Washington Conesus which combined the privatization as a tool with need 
to have better regulation and competition policy and frameworks (Kolodko, 1999). 
The World Bank has not always been pro market approach; the relationship with the private sector 
has been always a hesitant relationship, Cook and Kirkpatrick, (1995). The turning point came 
with the Berg Report (World Bank, 1981) which put the blame for the failure to implement 
development plans in the sub-Saharan African country on the governments due to the excessive 
intervention of the governments.  The report at the time recommended the introduction of 
competition and enabling a more prominent role of the private sector. The privatization as a policy 
wasn’t yet introduced , the main focus was the need to reform the SOE , market pricing as well as 
the elimination of the subsides. The report at that time gave more weight to the competition than 
ownership type as a key enabler for reform (World Bank, 1983). 
Till the early 1990s the scope of privatization an economic tool for economic reform was still 
limited. The World Bank came to the conclusion that the public sector reform was unsuccessful 
(Shirley and Nellis, 1991). At the time, privatization was not seen more than a tool to enhance 
50 
 
efficiency. The shift in perception came with the 1992 publication: Privatization: the lessons of 
experience (Kikeri et al, 1992). In this publication, a great emphasis was put on ownership as a 
key driver for a sustainable performance enhancement. Unlike the commercialization which was 
considered to be a short-lived solution. Privatization was considered as a reform approach that will 
not be reversed. This shift was further boosted by the World Bank empirical study of 1992 that 
concluded that the privatization of monopolies can result in welfare gains (Galal et al, 1995). This 
has opened the door to include privatization as integral part of economic reform policy of so many 
countries and it included the privatization of almost everything. Further World Bank publications 
during the 1990s have reinforced this idea. The idea of privatization was introduced in the literature 
as unquestionably beneficial for all countries.  The publications didn’t extensively address the 
reasoning behind the policy shift and the objectives to be achieved (Cook 1997). The assessment 
was more inclined toward the implementation rather than how the outcomes of this transition relate 
to the initial objectives set. It was very common at that time the World Bank assessment is done 
based on the speed of implementation and the number of privatized entities.  
As governments continues to face policy failures in different economic areas, the privatization at 
that time was used a cure to all economic issues. The privatization program in all the developing 
countries have been very optimistic and burdened with many objectives. In some of the cases those 
objectives used to be contradicting like mixing the long term development objectives with the short 
term fiscal fixes. It has been always the case that the privatization as a transaction had a clear goal 
to maximize the private sector and national ownership. Critics have always stressed on the fact 
that the Washington Consensus the simplicity of implementing privatization policy and also the 
possible gains of this transaction Cook (1997); Heald, (1992). On the other hand, the World Bank 
also discovered that the efforts to boost privatization hasn’t been delivering the structural 
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adjustments needed, Helleiner, (1994). In the review of the Washington Consensus, Stiglitz studied 
the outcomes and recognized that that privatization wasn’t well planned: “From today’s vantage 
point, the advocates of privatization may have overestimated the benefits and underestimated the 
costs”, Stiglitz, (1997a). From Stiglitz’s point of view, most countries preferred to have a solid 
regularity setup before moving to the privatization phase; however, privatization was pushed as 
the reform was taking place and there was a worry how long it will continue to be allowed , ibid, 
(2000). This resulted in a very tricky situation where the key enablers of privatization were not set 
in place before embarking on such a key policy. 
The post Washington Consensus as per Stiglitz (1994) work is stemming from the fact that the 
Washington Consensus treated privatization as an end in itself rather than a tool to reach an 
economic reform. The Washington Consensus also didn’t touch on the fact that there is a need to 
set first a clear competition policy to enable the change to take place. Further, according to the 
earlier work done by Stiglitz (1994), privatization in theory shouldn’t be only based on the 
competition assumption, the information imperfections is also an important matter to be 
considered. 
On the other hand, it can’t be denied that in practice, privatization results in significant benefits. 
Those benefits as discussed earlier in the thesis ranges from increasing the transaction costs of 
securing government protection and subsidy to selecting the efficient entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, 
Stiglitz (1998b) claims privatization is not the most prominent policy tool; the chines economy has 
been examining a rapid growth without the help of any privatization program.  
It is important to mention that the privatization policy should be coupled with competition to 
ensure that the market structure will enable an efficient implementation of the privatization 
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program. Stiglitz (1998b) argues that the economic policy reform require the liberalization, 
privatization and above all a macro economic adjustment. He also stresses on the fact that subsidies 
and protection, under very definitive situations, are required and useful policy tools.  The 
privatization is only a way that reduces the dependency on such tools. Further, Stiglitz (1998b) in 
his study stresses on the need to balance the relation between the government and the markets 
whichever of them will have the competency to deliver the service efficiently, then it should be 
given the opportunity to deliver. Therefore, the privatization will have a bigger role where the 
governments are less capable but this should also be coupled with the competition policy 
requirement 
2.4.6 Summary of the Discussion: 
 
This chapter summarized the different definitions of privatization and especially when it is 
involved with decreasing the involvement of the government in the business activities to offer 
services or goods to the public and enhancing the role of the private sector in these activities. The 
direct result of this policy will be the evolvement of a strong free market economy. Privatizations 
programmes will always work on the widening of the ownership base of State Owned Enterprises. 
This chapter put forward the different objectives of the privatization programmes. This included 
the financial, social, political and economic goals. These objectives cannot be achieved without a 
clear roadmap as defined in the steps to ensure a successful implementation of any privatization 
programme. Further, the chapter elaborated on the various forms of privatization, including the 
vouchers, contract management, leasing contracts, deregulation, contracting out, and joint venture. 
In addition, the different method of privatization were also discussed including the mass 
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privatization, sale to an anchor investor, direct sale, IPO , tendering, auctioning and sale to 
employees.  
The form and method of privatization that any government can use depends on the objectives set 
by the government at the beginning of any privatization programme. Therefore, and as shown in 
the chapter, this chapter set the hypothetical framework for any privatization programme by 
offering an overview of the privatization.  
The next chapter will shed light on the Egyptian experience in privatization and also will study the 
economic development that the Egyptian economy has passed through for the last 60 years.  
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Chapter 3: A Description of the Egyptian 
Privatization Program 
3.1. Privatisation Program of Egypt 
 
The prevailing economic conditions at the beginning of the 1990s where the public sector was 
controlling more than 75% of the overall economic activities led to the International Monetary 
Fund enforcement of economic reform in Egypt against funding the economic activities. One of 
the enforced economic reform polies is adopting privatization of the State Owned Enterprises.  
Therefore, the Egyptian government started the privatization program in the early 1990s. The very 
early steps of privatization took place in 1991 when the Egyptian government decided to stop 
subsidizing the State Owned Enterprises and also removing subsidy decision from the control of 
the direct minster (Field, M., 1995). The second step to restructure the public sector was done also 
in 1991 when the government grouped all the 314 State Owned Enterprises in 27 groups each 
under the direct control of a holding company. 
The initial success of the Egyptian privatization program didn’t last so long as the government 
decided to keep control over the important State Owned Enterprises and to privatize only the small 
ones. Although, the downsizing of the public sector was considered to be an important indicator 
of the Egyptian economic reform program, the government was not willing to change until the 
Ministry Public Enterprise Sector and the Public Enterprise office was established in November 
1991.  
The following sections of this chapter will shed light on the privatization program adopted by the 
Egyptian government over the last two decades.  
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3.2. Fundamental Requirements of the Privatisation Program in Egypt 
 
In order to have a successful privatization program there should be some steps that will pave the 
way for that success. In the Egyptian case, the privatization program required reinforcing the 
market and exposing the State Owned Enterprises to the real market forces. In order to implement 
an effective privatization program in Egypt there should be five fundamental requirements that 
will create the favourable economic environment: 
1. Creating a competitive market 
2. Liberalizing the exchange rate system. 
3. Setting a clear pricing policy for privatised entities. 
4. Developing a legal framework in which privatised companies operate 
5. Setting a Fair Human Resources Policy for privatised companies 
In the following section, a brief description of each element will discussed. 
3.2.1. Creating a Competitive Market 
 
The common characteristic of most of the State Owned Enterprises is that they operate in a 
monopolistic environment where no competitive pressure is present to enhance performance. 
Further, under the government ownership there was no motivation to improve performance and no 
penalties in case of underperformance. Therefore, the market forces will tend to put pressure on 
the State Owned Enterprises and will make them reorganize themselves to improve their 
performance. As a matter of fact, this was one of the objectives of adopting the Open Door Policy 
in the mid-1970s. Also, the Egyptian government followed this by issuing the anti-monopoly law 
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and also allowed the private sector to contribute in important industries like the heavy industry 
(Vandewalle D., 1995).  Additionally, the Egyptian government in the 1990s followed those 
positive actions by introducing the unified tax law and double taxation prevention which played a 
significant role in assisting the creation of competitive market. 
3.2.2.     Liberalizing the Exchange Rate System 
 
In order to promote a viable privatization program, there should be a liberalized exchange rate 
system where market forces will tend to set the exchange rate. This means that prices of goods and 
services will in the long run reflect purchasing power parity. The liberalized exchange rate system 
will also include the interest rate and the taxation. As a matter of fact, liberalizing the exchange 
rate system is the basis of any successful privatization program (Josef C. Brada, 1996).  
3.2.3. Setting a Clear Pricing Policy 
 
In order to achieve efficiency in an economy there should be a clear policy on how prices will be 
set for a privatised service or sector. A clear policy on how prices of privatised companies will be 
set helps investors to direct their capital to the right investment opportunities. Although there might 
be several ways of setting policy, there is one viable way of setting prices which is through the 
interaction between privatised companies and market forces. Setting the clear pricing policy is a 
prerequisite for a successful privatization program in economies like the Egyptian economy.  
3.2.4. Developing a Legal Framework 
 
The appropriate legal framework is an essential prerequisite to initiate a privatization program. All 
the state Owned Enterprises in Egypt operate under the Law No 203 and other applicable laws.  
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To implement an efficient legal framework those Laws need to be revised and decreed (Hendy, M. 
1996). Further, the overall legal system performance and setup will have a direct impact on the 
privatization program. For instance the time court decision takes to be issued; robustness of 
ownership law and profit distribution regulations. All of these legal frameworks need to be either 
developed or revisited to ensure a successful privatization program 
3.2.5.     Setting a Fair Human Resources Policy 
 
The human resources policy is considered to be the cornerstone in setting an efficient procedure 
in any State Owned Enterprise. This is one of the main issues that the promoted inefficiency in the 
State Owned Enterprises where the employee is hired with a permanent contract that is not linked 
to any performance measures. Therefore, there will be no motive for the employee to perform 
better in the absence of the threat of losing the job. To succeed in privatization a key requirement 
is to set a fair Human Resource Policy linked to performance.  
The conclusion that can be drawn from the above discussion is that the Egyptian privatization 
program will require fundamental changes in terms of promoting market approach and 
deregulating many sectors and moving from a centrally planned economic model to a market based 
one. 
3.3. Poor Performance of State Owned Enterprises 
 
The performance of the State Owned Enterprises can be easily explained by the Agency Theory. 
The theory under consideration shed light on the existence of goal conflict when parties with 
different goals participate in the same business (Jensen M., and Meckling W., 1976). The two 
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parties involved in this theory are the principal and the agent; where the principal has hired the 
agent to perform an activity on his behalf against a benefit that he pays him. As for the principal, 
he will benefit from the agent only to the extent of the agent is willing to act efficiently on the 
goals set by the principal. Further, the agent may have other goals than the one set by the principal 
and here arises the conflict of interest between the two. Therefore, the principal should have 
techniques to ensure that the agent will not pursue his own goals. 
In the privatization process, the public are the principal and the agent in this specific case is the 
manager running the State Owned Enterprises. Most of the research done in this area indicates that 
the performance of the State Owned Enterprise will tend to improve once the owners interest and 
the mangers’ interest become one (Aussenegg, W. and Ranko J. 2002, Grigorian, D., 2000). 
3.4.  Views on the Egyptian Privatization Programme 
 
The opponents of the privatization programme in Egypt view it as being the only resource to bring 
economic development. The poor performance and the losses that the State Owned Enterprises 
incur had always supported their views on the issue. One of the major reasons behind the poor 
performance is the regular appointment of fresh graduates to work in those companies without any 
study on the human resources requirements (Omran 2001). 
On the other hand, the adversaries of the privatization program view it to be a failure that will help 
bureaucratic sector, the public sector, to maintain its economic power and will lead to more 
discrepancies in income distribution. Further, they view privatization will fail as the private sector 
is hesitant to enter into the heavy industries and they are only concentrating on services and light 
industries where risk is less and profits are reasonable.   
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3.5. The Goals of Programme 
 
As it was mentioned above, the Egyptian government shifted to the privatization program and to 
the private sector practically to run the economy due to the failure of the public sector to drive 
economic development. The view was that the privatization is the basic solution to implement 
economic reform. The anticipated efficiency gains were thought to be achieved through efficient 
utilization of assets and improving labour productivity (Mohi-eldin M., Sahar N., 1996). Further, 
the government planned to achieve broader ownership base of State Owned enterprises through 
privatization (Hassan, M., 2001). Additionally, the Egyptian Government objectives from 
implementing the privatization program included also several macroeconomic benefits to the 
economy. Among these is the inflow of cash to the government treasury through the increased tax 
income and interest savings on debts of those companies as well as the cash sale of the companies 
which will help in financing the government deficit by reducing its debt (Jones, L., 1991). 
3.6.  Approach of the Egyptian Privatization Programme 
 
In the initial phase, the privatization method that the Egyptian government adopted to privatize the 
State Owned Enterprises was public offering. This was done through the two major stock markets 
in Egypt, the Cairo Stock Exchange and the Alexandria Stock Exchange. The Egyptian 
government by choosing this method aimed to boost the image of privatization and to enhance the 
market activity. 
Later, the Egyptian privatization programme passed through different phases where the 
government used a number of methodologies to divest its share in the State Owned Enterprises. 
As mentioned above public offering through the two major stock exchanges was the first to be 
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adopted. Then it was followed by the sale to a strategic investor through auctioning and finally, 
the selling of the State Owned Enterprises to Shareholder Associations. Liquidating some of the 
State Owned Enterprises was also used as a privatization method (Mckinney, B. M., 1996). 
Table 3   Methods of Privatization in Egypt 
Particulars Number of Companies Sales Proceeds LE Million 
Majority Public Offering 38.00                           6,064.00  
Minority Public Offering 23.00                         11,003.00  
Liquidation 34.00                                     -    
Asset Sale 44.00                           3,437.00  
Anchor Investor 85.00                         32,208.00  
ESA 33.00                              932.00  
Leasing 25.00                                     -    
Total 282.00                                    53,644.00  
Source: Egyptian Exchange Monthly Bulletin, September 2011 
The table above highlighted the privatization decision starting from 1994 and till 2010. It should 
be noted that the start of the program faced several difficulties and it was noticed to be slow. By 
the year 1996 the privatization program gained some momentum due to the appointment of a new 
cabinet. The privatization program was a on the top of the agenda of the new cabinet and as soon 
as they started announcing it, it started to gain international investors attention. Also, as a step to 
strengthen the stock market, the government inclined to fully privatize companies rather than 
partially. As a result, the value of the privatized entities increased and the overall market 
performance improved till the end of 1998. At that time, the privatization program faced the 
difficulty of the liquidity shortage in the markets and the Asian financial crises which affected the 
overall stock market performance. 
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3.7.  Accomplishments of the Programme 
 
The ultimate goal of the Egyptian government by adopting the privatization program was to 
increase the role played by the private sector in the economic development and to develop the 
overall economic performance. To this end, the Egyptian government started by preparing 314 
State Owned Enterprises as potential companies for privatization. The companies offered a striking 
investment opportunity to local as well as international investors. The privatization program then 
started by fully privatizing 3 big companies, Coca-Cola, Pepsi, and Al Naser Boilers. The sale 
happened as result of direct negotiations with strategic investors who bought the companies during 
the period from 1991 to 1996. 
Other companies were also privatized later in a group approach where around 4% to 25% of shares 
of different State Owned Enterprises were offered through the stock markets. Those companies 
offered during the period were the most profitable, the main reason is that the government in order 
to publicize the privatization program has offered them at a discount and for most of the offerings 
oversubscription was always evident. By the year 1996 and as a new cabinet was appointed, with 
a top agenda item to promote the privatization program and to bring it back on track. The new 
cabinet started by internationally publicize the program where many key international investors 
showed interest. Also, the new cabinet started and for the first time to sell 51% of its stake in State 
Owned Enterprises through the stock market. The stock supply increased and the market 
performed better allowing for speedier privatization of State Owned Enterprises.  
Nonetheless, the privatization program didn’t maintain the same momentum as it faced some 
difficulties toward the end of the last century. One global problem that affected directly the 
ambitious privatization program of Egypt was the Asian economic crises which spread its affect 
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to most of the Asian economies as well as the economies of Russia and Brazil. As the Egyptian 
economy was becoming more and more Liberalized, the consequence of the crises affected directly 
the stock prices and a sharp decline took place. The bad performance of the stock market was 
coupled by a number of terrorist attacks on touristic places which negatively affected the 
performance of the economy at the time. All of the above-mentioned factors had a severe negative 
impact on the investment climate and foreign direct investment shifted from Egypt to other 
developing markets. Unlike the beginning of the privatization program where the offering used to 
oversubscribe several times, the offerings that took place toward the turn of the century failed to 
cover the subscription which was a clear indication of a poor market performance. On the top of 
those reasons come the liquidity shortage and the long selling procedure and lack of proper 
investment information from the holding companies to contribute to the overall slowness in the 
privatization program. 
In order to address those issues, the government formed the Ministerial Privatization Committee. 
The committee toward the end of 1998 adopted a more market approach in the privatization 
program. This decision of the committee ensured bringing back the privatization program on track. 
Also, due to the global; economic issues at the time, the Committee focused more on selling the 
State Owned Enterprises to strategic investors and put on hold the IPO method. Several companies 
were privatized in that period and in different industries ranging from agriculture, food and 
beverages and milling to real estate and construction. 
Furthermore, in early 2001, the scope of privatization included and for the first time huge 
infrastructure utilities like airport, electricity and telecommunications through either direct 
acquisition or Build-Operate-Transfer method (Abdel Shahid, S., 2002). Also, financial services 
and oil and gas companies were for the first time on the privatization program. To gain back the 
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trust of investors in the privatization program, the government had to succeed in selling three of 
biggest utility companies, the Telecom Egypt, Greater Cairo and Canal Electricity Companies. The 
government was required to sell 20% of Telecom Egypt to public and 10% to a strategic investor 
and to sell 20% of electricity utilities to public to prove that privatization is back on track. 
Following this step, several other companies were privatized through public offering in the period 
between 2003 and 2006. This included 20% of Alexandria Mineral Oils, 30% of Nasr City Housing 
and Reconstruction, 20% of Sidi Kerir Petrochemicals, 40% of the Suez Iron and Steel and 100% 
of Shibin el - Kom Spinning and Weaving and Farta for paper and cardboard among many others. 
In addition, there was another major sale that took place in 2006 which was the sale of 100% of 
the biggest department store in Egypt Omar Effendi to a strategic investor 
3.8. Impediments of the Programme 
 
The Egyptian privatization program faced several issues during the span of 20 years. The issues 
that the privatization programme faced during the period can be summarized in 4 major categories 
(Massaad, N., 1996) and (Khattab, M., 1998). The major issue are the difficulty in performing a 
financial restructure of the companies, unemployment, the power exerted by the Holding 
Companies in each sector, the stock exchange. The following section of this chapter will shed light 
on each of these difficulties that have faced the privatization program. 
3.8.1.    Financial Reform 
 
In order to improve the performance of a State Owned Enterprise, there should be a financial 
restructuring process where the debt is reduced to help company turn to profitability as a 
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requirement of pre-privatization. Most of the State Owned Enterprises suffer from having short 
and long term debt to the extent that they cannot service the interest and repay the debt. Balance 
sheet restructuring is very crucial to ensure that a State Owned Enterprise is ready to be privatized 
and also to attract investors who will not be interested in investing in company which is not 
financially viable.  
3.8.2. State Owned Enterprises’ Employees 
 
The size of the labour force working within the State Owned Enterprises is considered to be around 
1.3 million employees. This huge labour force count is considered to be one of the major obstacles 
facing the Egyptian privatization program due to its political sensitivity (Qandil, A. , 1998). The 
State Owned Employees view their job to be more secure than those in the private sector. The early 
stage of the privatization program witnessed reducing the overall work force in the State Owned 
Enterprises by around 2%. Even though the reduction is very minimal, but when seen with other 
factors in the economy like the increase in the size of jobseekers per year and the failure of the 
private sector to create more job opportunities, then this is considered to be a major obstacle facing 
the privatization programme. 
3.8.3. Powerful Holding Companies 
 
When the holding companies were formed back in the early 1990s, they were given the 
responsibility of getting the companies ready for privatization and also, on deciding when the State 
Owned Company will be ready for privatization. The slow decision taking within the holding 
companies as well as the slow restructuring of those companies delayed the overall implantation 
of the privatization program. Further, the agency problem also is evident in this relationship as the 
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mangers in the holding companies will have their own goals which are different from the goals of 
the government. They tend to prolong the process of privatization to secure their future as they 
will tend have less security if the programme is implemented. 
3.8.4. The Stock Market Role 
 
There is no doubt about the benefits that the privatization program will bring to the stock markets. 
However, during the mid-1990s the stock markets witnessed sharp decline in stock prices which 
made the government think of slowing down the privatization program to avoid further 
complications. In the next year the government took the decision to offer the shares of the State 
Owned Enterprises to the Public and to the employees. This led after some time to the rise of the 
stock market as the small investors were enticed by the quick capital gains and the big investors 
were encouraged to speculate on the stock market. 
3.9. Summary of the Discussion: 
 
The Egyptian economy went through a major change that made the 76% of total investment which 
was owned by the private sector before 1952 revolution turn to create the public sector which 
owned and governed the economy of Egypt for decades.  The application of Law 258 in the year 
1956 was the early steps of creating a centralized economy through the nationalization of all 
private companies and establishing the State Owned Enterprises. The State Owned Enterprises 
shortly monopolized all the economic activities and for more than 3 decades continued to control 
more than 80% of the investments in the economy. A turning point in the economic history of 
Egypt took place in 1974 when the government started what is called the “Open Door Policy” 
where the government stated to reduce the dependency on the Public sector and promoted the role 
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of the private the sector. The government worked on attracting the foreign direct investments to 
the economy and to liberalize the financial system to support the government initiative to increase 
the involvement of the private sector in the economic development. When the private sector started 
contributing to the economic growth the Egyptian government realized that the State Owned 
Enterprises were of less efficient and viable if compared to their private peers. The weak 
management of the State Owned Enterprises was the main driver for such poor performance, and 
these entities at one point were considered as the main contributor to the overall government 
budget deficit. At that point, the government turned to the International Monetary Fund to assist, 
and this was the time that the economic reform programme was enforced on the Egyptian 
government by the International Monetary Fund. The Egyptian government were forced to 
introduce a comprehensive privatization programme and to reduce subsidy to the Public Sector. 
The privatization programme was implemented starting from 1991 as an integral part of the overall 
economic reform programme. The Egyptian programme followed a gradual approach to dissolve 
this sector where different methods were used.  
The next chapter will focus on the literature review on empirical studies done on privatization. 
This will include studies done on the Egyptian Privatization programme as well as those done on 
other developed and developing countries.  
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Chapter 4: Privatization in Literature  
4.1. Introduction 
 
The Privatization as an economic reform tool has been part of the policy kit used by many countries 
for the last decades. Since the beginning of the use of privatization, researchers have generated 
enormous empirical studies that examined the effect of privatization on the financial performance 
of the former State Owned Enterprises. The studies examined indicators at different levels, starting 
from the company and the economy and internationally. The studies also covered privatization 
experiences from developed as well as developing countries.  Up to date research in this area was 
more focused on the frim performance itself post the privatization. This chapter of the thesis will 
review all the empirical studies done till date that influences the hypotheses defined for this 
research. 
4.2. Company Performance Pre and Post Privatization 
 
This section will summarize all the literature that is related to the performance of privatized frim 
after the transaction of privatization taking place and comparing it to the period before the 
transaction taking place on the overall performance of companies.   
Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias V. (1994) in their study examined the performance of 61 
privatized companies from across 32 different industries from18 countries. The sample covered 
the privatized companies in the period from 1961-89. The study compared three years average post 
privatization financial and operating ratios to a similar period pre-privatization. The study tested 
the significance in median changes in post versus pre-privatization data set. Further, the 
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researchers used binomial tests for the companies changing as predicted. The result of the study 
proved that there is a statistically significant post privatization increase in sales, operating 
efficiency, profitability, investments, and dividend payment. Also the study showed a significant 
decrease in leverage. The research also showed no proof of any downsizing of the labour force as 
a result of privatization. On the contrary, the results showed that the median of employment level 
has increased by 10%. Also, the results showed that there were major changes in the managerial 
level. The study concluded that the privatization improves the performance of companies when 
compared to the pre-privatization performance.  
Dewenter, K. and Paul H. M. (2001) in their study they tested the impact of privatization on the 
frim performance by examining the performance change in a data set of 63 large high-information 
companies from developing countries privatized during the period from 1981 to 1994. The 
comparison of performance pre and post-privatization was done over a short-term period and a 
long-term period as well. In addition, the researchers have tested long-run return performance of 
privatized entities using a relatively large sample of 1500 frim years of both private as well as 
State Owned Enterprises. The results of the study showed substantial increase in profitability and 
also a decrease in the leverage and size of labour forces in the short and the long term.  The results 
also showed that the operating profits had increased only in the period preceding the privatization 
of the State Owned Enterprises. In addition, the stock return analysis resulted in considerable 
positive long-term abnormal returns. Those results were rigours in developing countries like 
Hungary, Poland, and a developed country, the UK. 
Boardman, A. E., Claude L., and Aidan R. (2003) in their research work have examined the change 
in performance of nine companies privatized during the period from 1988 to 1995 in Canada. The 
researchers have compared financial and operating ratios for pre and post privatization 
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performance of the nine companies. Also, they have computed the 5 years stock returns for the 
nine privatized companies. The results showed that the profits have increased by more than double 
and the operating efficiency as well as the sales has increased drastically. In addition, the leverage 
and the employment levels have considerably decreased while the capital expenditure has 
increased. The nine privatized companies have outpaced the stock market over long-term. 
Martin, S. and David P. (1995) in their research have examined the effect of privatization on the 
overall performance of the companies by examining the profitability and efficiency pre and post 
privatization transaction. The data set used in the study included 11 privatized British companies 
during the period from 1981 to 1988. To assess the profitability of the company, the researchers 
used return on invested capital and the annual growth in value added per employee hour to assess 
the efficiency gains. The result of the study showed that less than 50% of the sample has performed 
better after being privatized. They discovered evidence that the many of the companies have 
improved their performance before the privatization announcement but didn’t maintain the trend 
after privatization. 
Researchers Saal, D. and David P. (2003) in their study also examined the effect of privatization 
on the performance and productivity of UK privatized companies. The study observed the 
productivity level and price performance of water and sewage privatized companies. The studies 
also observed the impact of introducing a new regulatory regime in 1989.They have used the Total 
Factor Productivity to measure the productivity of the companies. The result showed that the 
labour productivity has significantly improved post privatization. Further, outcome showed that 
the productivity growth didn’t improve as a result of privatization. The last outcome of the study 
showed that post privatization the output prices have increased and exceeded the input prices and 
resulted in an increase in economic profit. 
70 
 
Jones, L., Yaha J., and Nilgun C. (1998) studied the performance of the privatized companies in 
Ivory Coast. The research covered 80 privatized companies from the electricity sector as well as 
companies operating agriculture sector and service sector where more competition is evident. The 
conclusion they have reached is that the performance of privatized companies showed a significant 
improvement when compared to the performance pre-privatization. Also, they have observed that 
privatization contributes to economic welfare. 
Rakesh, Garg, (2011), investigated the impact privatization has on four big Indian privatized 
companies pre and post privatization. The study covered a period of ten years. The researcher 
tested the impact of privatization on profitability, liquidity, sales efficiency and solvency position 
of the selected companies. This analysis was done using the ratio analysis, mean, standard 
deviation, coefficient of variation and paired t-test. The results of the study showed that the sales 
efficiency, liquidity ratio has increased while the debt to asset ratio has decreased. The overall 
impact on the privatized companies post privatization is positive. 
Sun, Q., Jin J, and Wilson T. (2003) examined the performance of 634 Chinese State Owned 
Enterprises that were privatized and listed during the period from 1994 to 1998. The study is one 
of the most comprehensive studies done on the Chinese privatization programme. The study 
examined the change in performance as a result of the effect of state versus private shareholding 
level. The researchers used the methodology developed by Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias 
V. to examine the change in performance pre and post privatization. Also, they have used a panel 
data regression test to examine the impact of partial and full privatization on profitability, output, 
and efficiency. The results showed that post privatization there is significant improvement in return 
on sales,real sales, employee productivity, and the level of real profit. Additionally, they found 
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that better performance is evident in the recently privatized companies when compared to those 
privatized long back.  
Boubakri, N. and Jean C. (2003) studied the change in performance due to privatization by 
comparing pre privatization performance to post privatization for 16 African companies privatized 
during the period from 1989 to 1996 though an IPO. They have used also Megginson, W. L., 
Robert C., Matthias V. methodology. The researchers discovered that there is a considerable 
increase capital expenditure and relatively no effect on profitability, efficiency, output, and 
leverage. 
D'Souza, J. and Megginson, W. L (1999) in their research have tested the performance of privatized 
companies from developing and developed countries during the period from 1990 to 1996. The 
sample used included 85 companies from 13 developing countries and 15 developed countries. 
The study was done by comparing the operating performance ratios 3 years pre and post 
privatization. The results showed a proof that the mean and median levels of profitability, real 
sales and operating efficiency increased considerably. Also, the results showed a significant 
decrease in leverage and employment and minor increase in capital expenditure. In addition, the 
results of the study showed also that the privatized company in competitive industries produce 
rapid and stable benefits to the economy.  
Subrata S. and R. Sensarma (2010) studied the impact of partial privatization on 26 banks in India 
over the period from 1986 to 2003. The researchers adopted a methodology to assess the total 
factor productivity and four accounting measure, Operating profit ratio, net interest margin, 
operating cost ratio, and staff expense ratio were used to assess the change in performance pre and 
post privatization for the sample. The result of the study showed that partial privatized banks in 
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India have exhibited improving performance during the period 1986-2003. There was a significant 
increase in the operating profit and the net interest margin with a decrease in operating cost and 
staff expenses post privatization. The results showed that the effect of listing on performance is 
not a temporary phenomenon and is in fact persistent beyond the year of listing. Thus, performance 
of partially privatized banks continues to improve further after listing 
Verbrugge, J., Wanda O., and Megginson, W. L (2000) in their study analysed the change of 
performance pre and post privatization of banks in developed and developing countries. The 
sample used was for 32 banks from developed countries and 5 banks from developing countries 
for the period from 1981 to 1996.further, the study covered also the offering terms and share 
ownership structure for 65 banks that were privatized during the same period. The results of the 
study showed that there are considerable improvements in the privatized banks in the developed 
countries reflected in a significant increase in the ratios of profitability, net income, andcapital 
adequacy; besides a significant decline in leverage.  
Boubakri, N. and Jean C. (1998) examined the how success the privatization program was in the 
developing and developed countries during the period from 1980 to 1992. The sample used by the 
researchers comprised of 79 companies from 21 developing countries and 31 developed countries. 
The researchers compared the financial and operating ratios for a period of 3 years pre and post 
privatization. Further, they have used the binomial tests to measure the per cent of the frim change 
as per the prediction. In addition, they have reach the conclusion that there is a significant increase 
in in real sales, operating efficiency, profitability, capital expenditure and dividend payments, also 
there was significant decreases in leverage for all companies as result of privatization. They also 
have found cogent evidence that there was significant increase in capital expenditure to sales levels 
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and to total assets. Also, they have shown that the there is an increase in the level of output as 
measured by indexed nominal sales. 
Ariff, M., Cabanda, E., & Sathye, M. (2002) studied the efficiency improvements as result of 
privatization programme implemented in Japan, Philippines, Malaysia, and Australia. They have 
tested the operating and the financial performance of telecommunication companies over a period 
of 12 years. They have adopted the Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias V. model and the Data 
Envelopment Analysis to assess the changes. The results of the study showed that the privatized 
companies improved productivity of 3% to 50%. Also, they have shown that in Japan, Philippines, 
and Australia there was a considerable increase in total factor productivity. In addition, the results 
showed that there was an increase in profitability for companies in Malaysia, and Australia 
Omran (2001) in his study examined the performance in 69 privatized Egyptian companies 
privatized during the period from 1994 to 1998. The data set used by the researcher included 
companies privatized with different methods. It included 33companies privatized through a 
majority sale, 18 companies privatized through partial sales, 12 companies privatized through sales 
to Employee Shareholding Associations, and finally 6 companies privatized though sales to anchor 
investors. The research applied the Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias V. model to study the 
sample. The results showed that profitability, operating efficiency, capital spending, dividends, 
and liquidity increased. On the other hand, the leverage, employment, and financial risk decreased. 
EI-Shahat, A. (2003) in his study performed a comparison of the financial and operating 
performance of Egyptian construction companies. He used a t- test to measure the change in the 
operating and financial indicators. The results of the study showed that there was an increase in 
profitability and labour productivity and an improvement in financial risk (measured by the debt 
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ratio and the inverse times interest earned). Further, the results showed that there is a decrease 
account receivable after privatization and an increase in liquidity of inventory. 
Habib A., Z. Abbas, and Zulfiqar A. Shah, (2011) studied the impact of privatization on the 
performance of 11 Pakistani companies over a period of 11 years. The researchers used financial 
ratios to examine the change in performance pre and post privatization.  The methodology used in 
the study was paired sample t-test. The results of the research work indicated that the p value of 
EPS and Tobin’s Q is below 0 .05 and also the mean post privatization is higher than mean pre 
privatization for both. This result indicates that the Market value of company to Total Assets value 
and the earning per share increased as a result of the privatization transaction taking place. The 
cost of capital and unsystematic risk also slightly increases with privatization but that increase is 
not proportionate to the returns. 
Sun, Q., Jin J, and Wilson T. (2002) examined the effect of privatization on the performance of 24 
companies privatized through public offering in Malaysia in the year 1997. The researchers 
compare the financial and operating performance ratios pre and post privatization. The 
methodology adopted to analyse the sample was Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias V. 
methodology. Also, they have used panel data regression to test the sources of performance 
changes. The researchers found that the privatised companies increased profits by 300% and 200% 
increase in real sales and also reduced the leverage. Further, the results of the study also showed 
that the returns of the stocks were normal. All of the results shown that privatization affected the 
performance positively.  
The empirical studies shown above shed light on the research done to compare the performance of 
privatized entities pre and post privatization, the finding of all the research showed that the 
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privatization transaction affected positively the profitability, output, efficiency, leverage, and 
dividend payments. The results of the studies also exhibited significant performance advances 
using both the Wilcoxon (median) and binomial (proportion) tests. Also, it should be noted that 
most of the studies used the Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias V. methodology. The 
researchers agreed to the fact that this methodology tends to examine and compare samples of 
companies from different industries, in different counties, and over different time periods. Further, 
the methodology is strong in examining the Initial Public Offerings and thus eliminates any 
selection bias for instance considering privatization cases where political influence is evident.  
It is also evident from the research work done that the studies didn’t inspect the effect of the 
privatization method on the performance of privatized companies’ pre and post privatization.  
4.3. Privatized Company Performance or Private Company Performance 
 
This section of the literature review will consolidate the research work done on comparing the 
performance of the privatized companies’ pre and post privatization with the performance of 
private companies. Many empirical researches were done in this area and the following will show 
a summary of the key literature done to examine this subject. 
Boutchkova, M. and Megginson, W. L. (2000) in their study examined the stock ownership 
methods for privatized companies. They have compared the stockholders numbers for privatized 
companies against the stockholders numbers of private companies in the same markets. The match 
between privatize company and private companies was done based on comparable market value 
between the two. They applied a condition for selection, that the company should have at least 
250,000 shareholders. The final sample after applying the section criteria consisted of 86 couples 
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of privatised and private companies. The sample was analysed using the Wilcoxon signed rank test 
to test if the mean of shareholders numbers of privatized companies is higher than that of the 
private matching companies. The results showed that the privatized companies tend to have more 
shareholders than the pears in the private sector.  
Omran (2007) in his study examined the impact of ownership and privatization on the bank 
performance in Egypt. The researcher used a sample of 12 banks that were partially or fully 
privatized during the period from 1996 to 1999. The researcher in his study examined Pre and post 
privatization performance of banks, and he assessed the change in performance in privatized banks 
with private owned and mixed-ownership banks on matched adjusted basis. Additionally, he 
studied the post privatization performance of privatized banks in comparison with other group 
equivalents. In the analysis he used fixed-effect regressions over the study period. The results of 
the study showed that certain profitability and liquidity ratios declined while the asset quality, 
capital risk, operating efficiency, and asset growth didn’t change much. The comparison between 
the relative changes in performance of privatized banks compared with private owned banks and 
mixed ownership with majority private ownership showed similar results. While, the relative 
performance changes of privatised banks are significantly better than majority state-ownership 
banks and it is poorer than state-owned banks. Therefore, it clear that the performance is directly 
related to the level of ownership of the private sector in the banking sector in Egypt. 
Laurin, C. and Yves B (2001) have studied the productivity and profitability of two rail carriers in 
Canada pre and post privatization. In the study they used financial ratios for a period of 17 years 
starting from 1981 to 1997. They then split the analysis into three blocks, the first from 1981 to 
1991 and this represents the State Owned period. The second from 1992 to 1995 this represents 
the pre-privatization period and lastly the period from 1995 to 1997 which represent for the post 
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privatization period. The results of the study showed that the productivity of State Owned 
Enterprise was less than that of the private owned company in the first period. The second period 
showed similar performance between the two. While the third period showed that the privatized 
company outperformed the privet frim which clear indications of efficiency. 
4.4. Ownership Structure and Privatized Frim Performance 
 
This section of the literature review is related to Hypothesis 2 of this research. It will summarize 
the research done on the impact of ownership structure on the performance of privatized 
companies. 
Grigorian, D.  (2000) deliberated on the connection between the different ownership types and the 
company performance in the Soviet Republics. The researcher investigated the impact of 
privatization on both the financial and operating performance of privatized entities. The sample 
used in the study included 5300 Lithuanian companies ranging from small to large privatized 
companies over a period of 3 years from 1995 to 1997.  The financial data was analysed using a 
regression analysis to study the relationship. The results of the study showed that privatization 
through different ownership types positively affected the performance of privatized companies.  
Villalonga, B. (2000) examined the impact of ownership change on the efficiency level of fully 
privatized Spanish companies over the period of 9 years from 1985 to 1993. The data set included 
the financial data for the 24 Spanish companies fully privatized over the period.  The results of the 
study showed that there were no material change in the efficiency level post privatization. 
However, there was a significant increase in business life cycle efficiency and improvement for 
the capital intensity and the foreign ownership. The researcher’s results showed that the 
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privatization leads to inefficient results in the short term of 5 years and conversely, it leads to high 
efficiency gains on longer term of 7 years.  
Earle, J. S., (1998) investigated the effects of ownership structure types with the productivity of 
companies in Russia. The study used the data from 86 State Owned Enterprises, 299 partially 
privatized companies and 45 private companies to study the impact of ownership types on the 
performance. The researcher used Ordinary least Squares Regression method to analyse the data. 
He also adjusted for the tendency of insiders to dominant the ownership of the privatized company 
with the highest performance. The results of the study showed that there is a direct relationship 
between the private ownership on productivity when compared to the state ownership. In addition, 
the results showed that the outsider ownership significantly affects the improvement in 
productivity.  The study concluded that the insider control will tend to have a negative effect on 
the performance of privatized companies in Russia over the long run. 
Claessens, S., (1997) examined the effect of ownership style on the share prices in Czech and 
Slovak Republic for privatized companies. The data set used included 1491 privatized companies 
and was analysed using regression analysis. The results of the study showed that the share prices 
increases when traded in secondary market and the majority of the shareholders are nationals. The 
fact that nationals own the majority of shares put pressure on the change of management style 
within those companies. Further, the outcomes of the study show that privatization results in 
changing and improving the management style of these companies to match their peers in the 
private sector. The improvement in the management style leads to increase efficiency and profits 
and thus result in the increase in share prices.  
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Boardman, A. and Aidan R. (1989) examined the change in performance between forging 
industrial companies operating in the United States with various types of ownership structure, 
government owned, privately owned and partial privatized companies. The data set used for the 
study covered 500 largest foreign companies operating in the United States in 1983. The researcher 
used profitability ratios and X-efficiency measures. The results of the study showed that 
government owned and the partially privatized companies are less productive when compared to 
eh private companies. Also, the profitability of government owned companies and partially 
privatized companies is almost the same. The study concluded that it is crucial to have fully 
privatized companies in order to achieve improvements in efficiency and profitability.  
Ehrlich, I., Georges G., Zhiqiang L., and Randall L. (1994) examined the difference in productivity 
between the State Owned Enterprises and privately owned companies. The data set used for the 
study covered 23 international airlines with different ownership structures for the period from 1973 
to 1983. The results of the study showed that there is a significant relationship between ownership 
and rate of productivity growth. Also, the private ownership results in higher rate of productivity 
growth and a decrease in the costs over the long term. The results showed the shift from fully 
government owned to fully privately owned will lead in the long term to the increase of the annual 
rate of productivity by around 2% and will also lead to the decrease in unit cost by 1.95%. Further, 
the partial privatization has no effect on the rate of productivity growth. The study concluded that 
the fully private ownership results in better rate of productivity when compared to the partially and 
State Owned Enterprises.  
Jones D. and Niels M (2002) studied the possible relationship between the ownership structure and 
the production efficiency for Estonian companies. The researchers used the fixed-effects 
production functions to examine the relationship between the ownership level and the productive 
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efficiency for a set of State Owned Enterprises, privatized and privately owned companies. The 
data set used included 660 companies over a period of 5 years from 1993 to 1997. The results of 
the study showed that the privatization programme in Estonia resulted in a diverse ownership 
structure. Also, the results showed that the privately owned companies when compared to the State 
Owned Enterprises are more efficient by 13% to 22%. Further, the private foreign ownership when 
compared to the private domestic ownership showed that the former is more productive by 21% to 
32%. 
Laura Cabeza Garcıa and Silvia Gomez Anson (2012) examined the impact of ownership structure 
and concentration, whether internal or external, on performance of privatized companies. Also the 
study tested the impact of foreign ownership and concentration, competitiveness of the market and 
the economic condition on performance of privatized companies.  The data set used for the study 
covered 70 Spanish companies over the period of 15 years from 1985 to 2000. The researchers 
used the pooled cross-sectional time series regression using a generalised least squares model to 
test the hypotheses. The result of the study showed that the greater the renunciation of government 
control and the lower the ownership percentage owned and controlled by managers and/or 
employees, the better the companies’ performance after the privatization taking place. Further, 
privatisations of companies that are accompanied by liberalisation programmes and taking place 
during resilient economic cycles turn out to be more successful. 
Kocenda, E. and Jan S., (2003) in their study examined the impact of ownership on performance 
in privatized companies in the Czech Republic. The data set used by the researchers covered 
around 2,949 measures in an unbalanced panel of 1,540 medium and large Czech companies 
inspecting six different categories of ownership. The results of the study showed that the foreign 
ownership will result in an improvement in the performance of the privatized companies when 
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compared to the State Owned ones. Further, the study showed that the domestic ownership will 
not result in improving the performance of the privatized companies when compared to the foreign 
ownership, as the latter tends to bring a different strategic approach that increase profits and cut 
costs. As a result, the study confirmed the relationship between performance of privatized 
companies and the ownership.     
I. Iwasaki, M. Szanyi, P. Csizmadia, M. Illessy, C.Makos (2010) Used yearly census  data of 
Hungarian companies covering a period of four years starting from 2002 to examine the impact of 
ownership structure on the financial and operating performance of privatized companies. Also they 
studied the impact of level of concentration and foreign investors’ possession on the overall 
performance of the privatized companies. The researchers used a panel data regression modelling 
using different performance measures as dependent variables and then produce these estimates 
using meta-analysis techniques to observe the hypotheses under study. The results of the study 
exhibited that in order to perceive the effects of ownership transformation, it is essential to 
distinguish the probable bases of privatization advances. Further, the results showed that foreign 
investors overtake domestic investors faster for medium and small-sized State Owned Enterprises 
sold in the early 2000s. 
Christian Wolf (2009) investigated the effect of ownership on the performance of the global oil 
and gas industry companies and assessed the methodical performance and efficiency discrepancies 
between State Owned Oil Companies and International Oil Companies. The data set used covered 
130 companies over the period from 1987 to 2006 comparing output efficiency, revenue generation 
and profitability. The panel-data regression analysis was used to analysis the data. The resulted 
showed that the, state-owned companies have been significantly underachieving when compared 
to the private equivalents, by 21%. The results on the revenue generation to the output do not 
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specify a steady advantage of any ownership structure. As for the profitability, the private 
companies are significantly higher.  
D'Souza, J. and Megginson, W. L, Nash R. (2007) investigated the effects of restructuring and 
changes in corporate governance post-privatization operating performance of privatized 
companies. The sample used covered 161 companies which were privatized over a period of 38 
years from 1961 to 1999. The researcher used multivariate OLS regression to inspect the impact 
of restructuring, governance changes, and supplementary factors are influencing the post-
privatization performance. The result of the study confirmed that reform is an important factor 
affecting the post-privatization performance. Also the results showed that restructuring enhance 
efficiency. Further, the improved corporate governance as a result of privatization of companies 
also complements the enhancement of performance. Another outcome of the study indicates that 
the foreign ownership result in overall improvement in performance and a decline in the 
employment level. Moreover, there is a negative relationship between government ownership 
levels and the overall performance.  As a final point, the outcomes showed that profitability 
declines due to the rise in the employees’ ownership share.  
Laura Cabeza Garcıa and Silvia Gomez Anson (2011) analysed the relationship between the 
private ownership concentration and overall efficiency of the privatized company. The data used 
in the study covered a range of 126 Spanish privatized companies over a period 8 years. The study 
was carried using a regression model. The results of the study indicated that three important factors 
explains the privatization impact on the  private ownership level which are, the privatization mode, 
the industry, the size and the risk. Further, the study proved the direct relationship between 
company efficiency after privatization and the level of private ownership.  
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Omran (2009) examined the post-privatization corporate governance for a data set of 52 newly 
privatized Egyptian companies covering a period of ten years. The study observed the ownership 
structure as a direct outcome of privatization and its development. Further, two other aspects were 
also tested to assess their impact of the overall performance of privatized companies, first the 
concentration of the private ownership, and second the board of directors composition. The results 
of the study indicated that the government tend to lower its control over time; however, 
government in Egypt still holds one third of the control of those companies. The study also 
recognized a tendency in private ownership concentration over time towards foreign ownership. 
In addition, the study concluded that the size, sales, industry, and timing and mode of privatization 
play a vital role in setting private ownership concentration level. 
Ownership concentration and identity of the private owner ownership, particularly the foreign 
investors, showed a positive impact on privatized company performance; on the other hand 
employee ownership concentration has an adverse impact. Additionally, the higher the number of 
the independent and professional directors and the change in the board structure post privatization 
will have positive impact on the overall performance of the privatized company.  
The results of the study indicated important policy inferences where the private ownership of any 
foreign investors tends to increase the value addition for any privatized company. While on the 
contrary, the higher the employee share the lower the performance of the privatized companies. 
Also, governments are recommended to abandon their control level and permit changes in the 
board of directors post privatization taking place as this will enhance the overall performance of 
the privatized companies.  
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Kwoka, J. (2002) examined the influence of ownership structure on the performance of companies 
in the United States of America. The data set used by the researcher included data from hundred 
and forty seven privately owned utilities and three hundred and sixty nine state owned utilities in 
1989. His study tried to prove if there are any differences in efficiency levels between the privately 
owned and the publicly owned utilities. The results of the study showed that there were differences 
between publicly owned and privately owned utilities as the publicly owned utilities had less cost 
advantage when compared to the privately owned utilities that owned the generation facilities. On 
the other hand the publicly owned utilities had a competitive advantage in distribution business. 
The study concluded that there is no connection between ownership and the performance of the 
privatized companies. 
4.5. Discussion of the Literature Review: 
 
All of the studies documented above in this section of the thesis indicated clearly that the 
privatization result in an overall improved performance. In these studies, several hundreds of firms 
from more than forty countries have been examined covering most of the industries present in any 
economy. Villalonga, B. (2000) in his study where the privatization literature was reviewed 
concluded that there is a discrepancy between the privatization in theory and the evidence in the 
research approach. In the Villalonga research, he reviewed more than 150 publications to reach 
this conclusion.  
On the other hand, the studies reviewed above considering the privatization as an event comparing 
the pre and post privatization performance, (Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias V., 1994; 
Boubakri, N. and Jean C. 1998 and D'Souza, J. and Megginson, W. L.1999) indicated a consistent 
improvement in the performance of the privatized firms. The research also indicated that the 
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performance improved at a higher pace in the more developed countries compared to the less 
developed ones. This might be attributed to the fact that the legal system in those countries is more 
developed. The improvement in performance is also higher in the natural monopoly businesses 
and highly regulated sectors like the telecommunications and the utilities sectors. This might be a 
direct result of the incentive schemes that the regulators usually put in place to enhance 
performance.  
Pre and Post Privatization Performance  
Further, the empirical studies shown above shed light on the research done to compare the 
performance of privatized entities pre and post privatization, the finding of all the research showed 
that the privatization transaction affected positively the profitability, output, efficiency, leverage, 
and dividend payments. The results of the studies also exhibited significant performance advances 
using both the Wilcoxon (median) and binomial (proportion) tests. Also, it should be noted that 
most of the studies used the Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias V. methodology. The 
researchers agreed to the fact that this methodology tends to examine and compare samples of 
companies from different industries, in different counties, and over different time periods. Further, 
the methodology is strong in examining the Initial Public Offerings and thus eliminates any 
selection bias for instance considering privatization cases where political influence is evident.  
It is also evident from the research work done that the studies didn’t inspect the effect of the 
privatization method on the performance of privatized companies’ pre and post privatization. This 
study will examine the impact of the privatization type, partial or full privatization, on the 
performance indicator set in the Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias V. study. Further, the 
results of the studies also showed that there was a positive impact on the performance of the 
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privatized firms after the new management team is appointed post privatization. This is mainly 
due to the fact that the new management replacing the public management will usually have more 
appetite to take risk and they tend to be more profit driven.  
Ownership Structure and Size 
The same positive results will also be achieved when the ownership of the privatized companies 
will be majority private sector; which indicate an important element in improvement of the 
performance of the privatized firms.  This is a direct result of the controlling shares which allow 
the private investors to drive the investments in the right direction and will also allow them to take 
more aggressive commercial decisions which the public management usually avoids. This will 
lead to the conclusion that the concentrated ownership of the private sector will result in better 
performance when compared to the defused ownership structure. The concentrated gives more 
controlling power and focus to one private owner to drive the companies into a higher level of 
efficient operations. The foreign ownership is another important element that enhances the 
performance of the privatized firms. This is mainly due to the fact that the technical know-how 
will usually bring better efficiency measures that can drive better performance. In the developing 
economies this will tend to bring even more enhancement of the performance due to the lack of 
advance management techniques in the public management team and also due to the transfer of 
knowledge that usually takes place. 
The size is another measure that the literature reviewed above indicates that it plays a vital role in 
the enhancement of the performance of the privatized companies. This measure plays a key role 
in enhancing the financial performance of the privatized companies. The size tends to give the 
privatized companies a competitive advantage over other smaller companies. The ability to have 
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better international relationships to exports the products was found to be a key advantage for those 
privatized firms with bigger asset base. All of those factors will enable the privatized companies 
to enhance their financial performance by leveraging their size. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from the above discussion is that the privatization as a conceptual 
framework has been a debated topic among politicians and economists. The empirical studies 
shown above summarize some of the empirical work done on privatization.  It is clear that some 
researchers were able to explain the performance of privatized companies by comparing financial 
and operating performance pre and post privatization. The studies of Megginson, W. L., Robert 
C., Matthias V., 1994; Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; and D'Souza and Megginson, W. L, 1999 were 
able to show that the privatization will lead to clear increase in profitability, efficiency, and capital 
investment spending, output, and dividend paid. Furthermore, their studies showed also that there 
is a significant decrease in leverage. Nevertheless, their results didn’t agree on the impact of 
privatization on the employment levels. On the other hand, the studies of Boardman, A. E., Claude 
L., and Aidan R. (2003), Saal, D. and David P. (2003), Sun, Q., Jin J, and Wilson T. (2003), 
Verbrugge, J., Wanda 0., and William M. (2000), and Omran (2001) didn’t agree whether the 
positive results achieved were mainly a direct result from the privatisation process or due to 
different reasons. Boubakri, N. and Jean C. (1998) in their study tested if the change in 
performance can be justified by economic effect. 
Further, some scholars have associated the performance of State Owned Enterprises with the 
performance of privately owned companies to assess the change in performance. Dewenter, K. and 
Paul H. M. (2001) study concluded that privately owned companies are considerably more 
profitable with less debt, and labour than State Owned Enterprises. Further Tian, G. L. (2000) 
showed that the Chinese privately owned companies performed better than companies with mixed-
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ownership. Additionally Vining, A. and Boardman, A (1992) and (1989) shown that privately 
owned companies are more profitable and efficiently run when compared with State Owned 
Enterprises or even mixed-ownership enterprises. In addition, La Porta, R. and Lopez-de-Silanes, 
F. (1999) in their study documented that the privatized companies have improved their output and 
sales efficiency which bring the performance to nearly that of the private companies in a controlled 
group.  
Further, the studies shown above highlighted the impact of ownership on the overall performance 
of the privatized companies. Most studies evidently support the fact that the ownership structure 
affects the performance of privatized companies when compared with the performance pre-
privatization. Further, the outside investor ownership significantly impacts the performance of the 
privatized companies and particularly when foreign investors take role in the ownership structure. 
In addition, the private ownership structure always improve the performance when compare with 
the partial state ownership.  Further, the concentration of the private ownership also plays as crucial 
role in improving the overall performance of privatized entities when compared with diffused 
ownership structure. 
4.6. Originality of the Study 
 
From an empirical perspective, many of the studies carried earlier that compared pre privatization 
to post privatization financial and operating performance shed light on the comparison with SOE 
performance.  Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias V., 1994; Boubakri, N. and Jean C., 1998; 
and D'Souza, J. and Megginson, W. L.., 1999 in their studies established that privatization 
transaction results in a significant improvement in profitability, efficiency, and capital investment 
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spending, output, and dividend pay-out. Further, the privatization as a transaction results in 
significant decrease in leverage and the studies didn’t confirm the impact of employment level.  
Nevertheless, all of these studies and several other studies like the work done by Boardman, A. E., 
Claude L., and Aidan R. (2003), Saal, D. and David P. (2003), Sun, Q., Jin J, and Wilson T. (2003), 
Verbrugge, J., Wanda 0., and Megginson, W. L. (2000), and Omran (2001) didn’t establish the 
fact that the results achieved were a direct result of the privatization process or maybe due to other 
factors. This was mainly due to the fact that the studies referred to above, didn’t consider 
establishing a benchmark of control group of companies matched to the privatized companies. 
Some of the empirical studies like the one done by Boubakri, N. and Jean C. (1998) examined if 
some of the performance results were attributed to the economic effect by using market adjusted 
financial performance measures. However, in the study, they didn’t consider the industry 
performance benchmark due to data limitation.  
According to Megginson, W. L., and Jeffry N. (2001), it is hard to compare SOEs to privately 
owned firms due to two methodological difficulties. The first difficulty is related to the problem 
of determining the appropriate set of benchmarks, especially in developing economies with a 
limited private sector. The second difficulty is that, generally, there are fundamental reasons why 
certain industries are government-owned and others are privately owned. 
By mapping all the studies reviewed above, it is clear that most of empirical studies related to the 
privatization companies’ performance have examined the change in performance without 
comparing the change in values to the change in indicator values of the  private companies’. This 
thesis will test the performance change of the IPO privatized Egyptian companies after matching 
them with a control group of private owned companies based on the relative size and industry. The 
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originality of work is to evaluate the values of each of the performance indicators based on the 
privatization type, partial or full privatization. This will be done using data from a developing 
country, Egypt, which has an overall different environment from the other studies and hasn’t been 
studied earlier. In addition, this examination will be the first to study in Egypt that assesses the 
performance of the privatized companies with the performance of the private companies and also 
examine the impact of size, leverage, and ownership level on the performance of privatized 
companies. As a last word, even though the privatization transaction has been extensively studied 
in literature, the privatization as transaction is till different in the developing countries due to the 
differences in economic, social and legal aspects and in particular Egypt. 
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Chapter 5: Research Methodology 
5.1. Introduction: 
 
“Research” as a word means "to know" in ancient Latin. In order to perform research the researcher 
will tend to perform several rounds of scientific procedure that will result in setting clear definition 
of any problem. The scientific procedure will result in data that can be used for further analysis 
and investigation.  
Further, the word methodology is defined to be the hypothetical examination and testing of 
techniques and process related to the area of research. The methodology of research has several 
models that include the set of theory, notations, comparing several methodologies, and the 
assessment of individual methods (Creswell, J. W., 2003). 
To understand the notion of "Research Methodology", it is clear from the above mentioned 
definitions that it refers to a pre-defined method that will be followed to prove the ultimate goal of 
the research.  
The previous chapter on Literature review has clearly shown that most of the empirical researches 
done on the performance of the privatized companies have adopted the Meginnson, Nash and 
Rederbourgh method.  In addition, the research already shed light on how to measure the difference 
if any between the pre-privatization performance and the post- privatization performance.  
This chapter of the thesis will set the research methodology to be used to assess the performance 
of the privatized companies’ pre and post privatization and it will also define the contribution to 
the body of knowledge that will be achieved by performing this research.  
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This chapter will cover 9 sections, the 2nd of which will shed more light on the research 
methodology to be used to achieve the overall objective of this research work. The third section 
will clearly frame the objective of the research. Then the next section will discuss the methodology 
to be used to perform the research and the statistical methods that will best achieve the overall 
objective of the research.  The next section will define the measures to be used to assess the 
performance of the privatized companies in the period pre and post privatization. The next section 
will describe the data set to be used and how it was sourced. Finally, a summary section will 
summarize the key points discussed in the chapter.  
5.2. Research Methodologies 
 
There are two major research methodologies known to be used in research, the quantitative and 
the qualitative. Each methodology has its own strengths and the usage of each differ based on the 
area of research. The quantitative research methods are used mainly in social sciences where 
models, theories and hypotheses are being developed and tested using empirical data. This research 
method is ideal for assessing the attitude and performance by designing a precise and consistent 
measure that allow for further statistical analysis of the data using different statistical techniques 
(Hancick, B., 1998). This research method can forecast the way a model will react to the change 
in certain variables. There are certain definite advantages and disadvantages of this research 
method. The advantages of this research method include the possibility of comparing different sets 
of data , to measure the certain variables and control for others, and capability of generalizing the 
results to the population.  On the contrary, the quantitative research method has disadvantages that 
include the inability to capture the social dimension, the need for more observations to allow for a 
robust modelling and results and it is not adaptable to any changes if data gathering starts.   
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The other known research method is the qualitative research method. This research method is used 
widely in the social sciences where data is collected through interviews, reviewing documents and 
observation. The gathered data is used to analyse a given social phenomena. The analysis of this 
social phenomenon using the qualitative research method will shed light on the commonalities and 
strength of the responses. Therefore, this research method is strong in areas where the enhancement 
and fine-tuning of theory is required. Unlike the quantitative research method, this research method 
doesn't require any statistical skill. However, there is a strong need to have a clear theoretical 
framework that will result in capturing the correct and precise results and analysis for the system 
under consideration.  As the quantitative research method, qualitative research has both advantages 
and disadvantages. As for the advantages, this research method provide a clear answer for the " 
how " as well the " why" while adapting to any changes that might occur during the research. 
Further, it enables the communication between different groups and allow for analysing the social 
process that accompany any study. As for the disadvantages, the data to be gathered for the 
qualitative research tends to be extensive with a tough analysis process.  
This research work will adopt the quantitative research method to evaluate the effect of 
privatization on the performance of privatized companies’ pre and post privatization. Further, this 
study will model the impact of privatization, size and gearing on the performance of privatized 
companies to performance compared to the private companies. This research method is used, given 
that the empirical data to assess the performance is available and the model is predictable. Further, 
this research method will allow for testing the different hypotheses to assess and predict the 
performance of privatized companies.  
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5.3. Panel Data 
 
The rise of the panel data studies has been on the increasing since Hsiao’s (1986) first edition of 
Panel Data Analysis was published. As per the records of the Social Sciences Citation index the 
studies listing the key word “panel data or longitudinal data” has reached more than 1500 
publication in 2015 compared to almost 30 studies in 1986. This increase in the applied studies 
and the development of Panel Data as econometric tool is remarkable since the early publications 
done by Balestra and Nerlove (1966). This increase in the usage of panel data was mainly due to 
three contributing factors, the availability of the data to be analysed, the ability of the model to 
capture the complex human behaviour and the challenging methodology used to do the analysis. 
The panel data analysis is used in many studies as it prevent some distortions in terms of size that 
can take place in the time series analysis due to the limited number of the observations used. The 
reason for that is the fact that the panel data uses both the cross section dimension as well as the 
time series dimension. The use of this method has a number of advantages and a number of 
disadvantages. Hsiao (2003), and Baltagi (2001) identified several benefits of panel data analysis, 
including: 
• Providing a large number of observations 
• Increasing the degrees of freedom 
• Reducing the co-linearity among explanatory variables 
Panel data, by combining the inter-individual differences and intra-individual dynamics have 
several advantages over cross-sectional or time-series data: 
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1. It has a more accurate inference of the model parameters. The Panel data typically contain 
more degrees of freedom and less multicollinearity than cross-sectional data which can be 
observed as a panel with T = 1, or time series data which is a panel with N = 1, therefore, this will 
enhance the efficiency of econometric estimates, Hsiao, Mountain and Ho-Illman (1995). 
2. The Greater capacity panel data has to capture the complexity of human behaviour than a 
single cross-section or a time series data. As per Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Toda (1997), 
Hsiao, Shen, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) , the panel data analysis is more effective than the  
cross-sectional as the latter usually suffers from the fact that those receiving treatment are different 
from those without receiving the treatment. In other words, it is not possible to observe what will 
simultaneously happen when the unit that receives the treatment or when it didn’t. The unit will 
be observed as either receiving the treatment or not receiving the treatment. In the case of using 
the difference between the treatment group and the control group the difference between the 
treatment group and control group might suffer from two causes of biases, the first id the selection 
bias due to differences in observable factors between the treatment and control groups and the 
second is the selection bias due to endogeneity of participation in treatment. 
a. The panel data also allows controlling the impact of the omitted variables. It is often 
argued that the real cause a researcher finds, or not, certain effects is due to disregarding 
the effects of certain variables in the model specification which are correlated with the 
incorporated explanatory variables. The panel data includes information on the inter-
temporal dynamics and the individuality of the entities which will allow controlling the 
effects of missing or unobserved variables MaCurdy’s (1981). 
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b. Further, the panel data analysis enables the uncovering dynamic relationships. 
According to Nerlove (2002), the Economic behaviour is inherently dynamic so that most 
econometric relationships are explicitly or implicitly dynamic. Nevertheless, the estimation 
of the time adjustment trend using the time series data usually has to rely on some sort of 
arbitrary restrictions beforehand, Griliches (1967). Using the panel data, relying on the 
inter0indivdual differences can reduce the collinearity between current variables as well as 
the lag variables in order to estimate unrestricted time-adjustment patterns, Pakes and 
Griliches (1984). 
c. The panel data is also capable of generating more accurate predictions for the 
individual outcomes. This takes place usually by pooling the data and not generating the 
predications of the outcomes using the data on the individual question.  Further, if the 
individual behaviours are similar, then the panel data will provide the chance to learn the 
individual behaviour by observing and taking into consideration the behaviour of others. 
Therefore, it will be possible to acquire a more precise description of the individual’s 
behaviour by complementing the observations of the individual in the question with the 
data from other individuals, Hsiao, Chan, Mountain and Tsui (1989). 
d. The panel data also provides for a micro foundation for the aggregate data analysis 
which usually invokes a representative agent as an assumption. Nevertheless, if the units 
used are heterogeneous, then the time series properties of the aggregate data will be 
different from the disaggregate data and the policy evolution based on it will be very much 
inaccurate, Granger (1990); Lewbel (1994); Pesaran (2003). In addition, the prediction of 
the aggregate outcomes is usually less precise if compared to the prediction using micro-
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equations,   Hsiao, Shen and Fujiki (2005). The panel data with time series observations 
will be perfect to examine the “homogeneity” versus “heterogeneity”.  
3. Panel data simplify the computation and the statistical the statistical inference. This is due 
to the fact that the panel data include a minimum of two dimensions for a cross-sectional and time 
series. Nevertheless, in some cases the availability of the panel data will tend to simplify the 
computation and inferences.  
a. This is the case when the time series data used is not stationary; in the large sample 
approximation in the distribution of the least squares and the maximum estimators will not 
be normally distributed, Anderson (1959), Dickey and Fuller (1979, 81), Phillips and 
Durlauf (1986).  However, in the case of the panel data, the observations will tend to be 
part of the cross-sectional units and independent, thus it is possible to invoke the central 
limit thermo on the cross-sectional units to highlight the limiting distributions of the 
estimators will continue to be asymptotically normal (Binder, Hsiao and Pesaran (2005), 
Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2004), Phillips and Moon (1999)). 
b. Further, the measurement errors will result in a possible under-identification of an 
statistical model Aigner, Hsiao, Kapteyn and Wansbeek (1985). The several observations 
for any given individual or at any given time period allows the researcher to achieve several 
transformations to induce different and deducible changes for the estimators resulting in 
an identification of unidentified model Biorn (1992), Griliches and Hausman (1986), 
Wansbeek and Koning (1989).  
c. In the case that the variable is reduced, the actual realized value will not be 
observed. If the outcome variable depends one way or the other on the previous realized 
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value and it is not observed, then there should be integration over the truncated range to 
get the probability of observables. In the dynamic framework where the missing data is 
big, the multiple integration will not be achievable. However, in the panel data, the problem 
can be addresses and minimized by concentrating on the subsample where the previous 
realized values are observed Arellano, Bover, and Labeager (1999). 
5.4. The Objectives of the Study 
 
The objective of this study is to examine the performance of Egyptian privatized companies’ pre 
and post privatization. And also, to model the impact of, size, gearing and ownership on the 
privatized companies’ performance compared to the matched private companies.  As it is shown 
above in the literature review, all empirical studies have focused on observing the performance of 
privatized companies alone or to compare their performance with that of the State Owned 
Enterprises. Some studies also, have compared the performance of the State Owned Enterprises to 
the performance of private companies to test for the viability of privatization. In this study, the 
researcher will observe the change in performance of the Egyptian privatized companies by 
matching them to a control group of fully private companies. By performing this, the research 
study will not only test for the change in performance variables, but also will answer the question 
whether the performance of privatized companies compares with that of fully private companies.  
5.5. The Research Hypotheses of the Study 
 
The Egyptian government has adopted the privatization programme in the early nineties to help 
rescue the State Owned Enterprises from the poor management and financial position that has 
affected directly the performance and efficiency of those enterprises. This made the financial 
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viability of those enterprises a debatable issue at that time. The need for market forces to affect the 
performance of those State Owned Enterprises and also the IMF pressure for economic reforms, 
paved the way for the privatization programme to take place. We first do a number of bivariate 
comparisons between privatised companies pre- and post-privatisation and between privatised 
companies and private companies’ post-privatisation (of the privatised companies). Since these 
comparisons do not control for all possible variables that may explain the outcomes, this procedure 
is then followed by a multivariate analysis using the Difference in Differences (DID) approach 
(Michael Lechner, 2010). 
The following hypothesis will test for the improvement in performance post privatization: 
Hypotheses 1: Privatization of Egyptian companies through IPO will result in the improvement 
of the performance of those companies following privatization. 
Bivariate Comparisons  
1. Privatization increase  the profitability of companies 
This will be examined by testing whether Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), return on sales 
(ROS), return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) increase post privatisation 
2. Privatization enhances operating efficiency of  companies 
This will be examined by testing whether sales and income efficiency increase post privatisation 
3. Privatization enhances output of  companies 
This will be examined by testing whether the Sales will increase post privatization. 
 
4. Privatization improves Leverage Ratios of companies 
This will be examined by testing whether total debt to total assets (TD/TA) or total debt to total 
equity (TD/TE) decrease post privatisation1 
                                                          
1 These hypotheses are not independent as by definition we have E=TA-TD so that E/TD=TA/TD-1. 
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5. Privatization enhances efficiency of  companies by lowering the number of Staff 
This will be examined by testing whether the number of Staff will decrease post privatization   
Multivariate Comparisons 
As mentioned above, in order to relate any improvement in performance specifically to the 
privatization programme, it is necessary to use a multivariate approach. A powerful way for doing 
this is to model the impact of size, gearing and ownership on the performance of privatized 
companies compared to a set of matched private companies (control group). We performed a 
matching based on similar industry and comparable size of the control group companies.  The 
following hypotheses compare the difference in performance between those two sets of companies. 
Hypotheses2: Privatization results in an improvement of performance relative to private 
companies' performance   
To test this hypothesis, the following hypotheses will be examined: 
1. The Profitability Ratios of Privatized and Private companies are not significantly 
different. 
 
This will be examined by testing whether the EBIT, ROS, ROA and ROE are significant. The Null 
hypothesis is that they are not. 
1. The Operating Efficiency of Privatized and Private companies are not significantly 
different. 
 
This will be examined by testing whether the sales and income efficiency of privatised and private 
companies are significantly different. The Null is that they are not. 
2. The Output of Privatized and Private companies are not significantly different. 
 
This will be examined by testing whether the sales of privatised and private companies are 
significantly different. The Null is that they are not. 
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3. The Leverage Ratios of Privatized and Private companies are not significantly different. 
 
This will be examined by testing: whether the leverage ratios, (Total debt/Total Assets and Total 
Debt / Total equity) are significantly different. The Null is that they are not. 
4. The number of Staff of Privatized and Private companies are not significantly different. 
 
This will be examined by testing whether the Staff numbers of privatized and private companies 
are significantly different. The Null is that they are not 
5.6. The Analysis Methodology of the Study 
 
Our multivariate methodology as mentioned above is similar to the methodology used by 
Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias V. (MNR, 1994), to examine the privatized companies’ 
performance. In addition, this study will examine the same variables used in Megginson, W. L., 
Robert C., Matthias V. (MNR, 1994), Boubakri, N. and Jean C. (1998), Chen, G.; Michael F.; and 
Oliver R. (2005), and D'Souza, J. and Megginson, W. L. (2000). This will generate results that can 
be compared to the results of those studies. Further, adopting this methodology will enable testing 
and evaluating large statistical sample of companies from across different industries and privatized 
over a long period of time, 16 years. Further, given the fact that this study is limited to companies 
privatized through Share Issuance that might yield some selection bias, it is also factually correct 
that this method of privatization is the most politically driven privatization (Megginson, W. L., 
and Jeffry N., 2001).  The Share Issue Privatization represents around 2/3 of the total revenue 
generated from privatization programmers between 1977 and 2001 (Megginson, W. L., and Jeffry 
N., 2001). 
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Methodology for Hypothesis 1  
We use financial performance measures that are based on the International Accounting Standards, 
IAS.   The same financial measures and methodology will be used to compare the performance of 
privatized firms post privatization to the performance of   the fully private matched companies.  
Methodology for Hypothesis 2: DID General Model 
This hypothesis relates to causal the impact of privatization on companies.  In other words, it 
examines whether the changes that are observed are actually the result of privatisation or 
something else.  
Experimental design 
We  recall from my previous section that the dataset used include cover 65 privatized companies 
in a variety of industries and have been matched on size and industry.  The most general form of 
experimental design is that ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ membership is assigned randomly.  This is 
usually not possible ex post with economic or firm data.  There are pluses and minus to various 
matching techniques, but the DID method is the most appropriate to our task.   
The DID model estimates the impacts of a ‘treatment’ on ‘units’.  In this research study, ‘treatment’ 
is privatization and units are companies, either that received the treatment, i.e., were privatized, or 
were already private (the control).  There may be also unobserved company level and time-
invariant effects that must be accounted for, as well as time-varying-firm invariant impacts that 
are unobserved and should be accounted for.  The DID method effectively sorts these effects out 
in how the coefficients are interpreted.  The following discussion follows closely that of Villa, 
Juan (2012). 
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Villa, Juan (2012) describes the DID method as the impacts on an outcome variable.  In our case, 
the outcome variables are a group of company performance measures.  We will test the hypotheses 
of H2 as described above, and the outcome variable will be the ones described, e.g., EBIT, ROS, 
ROA, ROE, NIEFF, SALEFF, SALES, EMP, etc. 
Without inclusion of independent explanatory variables as covariates the DID method is 
effectively a dummy variables regression, where the coefficient’s can be interpreted as the 
differences in the means of the dependent variable under different states of the world. Our general 
equation is of the form: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡----------------- (1) 
Where period and treated are dummy variables. In our case, period is a zero-one variable, which 
takes the value of 0 during the pre-privatisation period, and 1 otherwise; this is the same for each 
of the privatized and already-private-matched companies. The variable ‘treated’ is also a zero-one 
dummy variable.  It takes the value of zero for the companies that are not private, and 1 if private.   
We include an interaction term to allow for the fact that treatment effects may be influenced by 
period effects. 
The correct interpretation of the coefficients in the standard DID setup is also described in Villa, 
Juan (2012).  The mean outcome, say, mean EBIT, is equal to the estimate of 0.   
The estimated mean outcome of the control group, in our case the private companies, in the 
follow up or post-privatisation period is:  0+ 1; the estimate(s) of: 
 is the impact of difference between the privatized and the control group at the baseline 
(privatization date). 
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0+  is the mean outcome for the privatised group at the privatisation date. 
0+  +  + is the mean outcome for the privatized group in the post-privatisation period. 
 is the impact of privatization. 
Villa, Juan (2012) presents a table that summarizes the above nicely in how the STATA 
command outputs the above results: 
Table 4  DID Standard Setup 
Number of Observations in the DIFF-IN-DIFF: #       
  Baseline Follow-up       
Control:  # #        
Treated:  # #        
           
R-square:  0.0         
   Base Line  Follow Up    
Outcome 
Variable  Control Treated 
Diff 
(BL)  Control Treated 
Diff 
(FU)  
DIFF-IN-
DIFF 
Outcome 
Variable  𝛽0 𝛽0 + 𝛽2 𝛽2  
𝛽0
+ 𝛽1 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1
+ 𝛽2+𝛽3 𝛽2 + 𝛽2  𝛽2 
Std. Error           
t/z           
P>I t/z I           
* Means and Standard Errors are Estimated by Linear Regression    
** Inference: p<0.01 ;**p<0.05; *p<0.1        
 
DID Set up 
In the model, the estimate of the coefficient on the interaction term between the treatment 
dummy and the period dummy is the estimate of the treatment impact.  This can be interpreted as 
the estimated difference due to the treatment effect, in our case privatisation. 
Inclusion of other independent variables is straightforward; the variables we have are size or log 
of size, percent of the industry that is in government ownership, which may be proxying for a 
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variety of factors such as the degree of competition or the degree of regulation, openness, etc.  
Also in some cases a measure of total debt to total assets was included, as debt raising may 
enable the company to raise more capital, increase earnings, etc. Model (1) then becomes: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 +  𝛽2𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 +  𝛽3𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽4𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + ⋯ + 𝜀𝑖𝑡--------------- (2) 
The models are estimated using STATA2.  This program also enabled us to collect and graph 
residuals from the basic models and use these for standard diagnostics. 
5.7. Defining the Variables and How to Measure Them 
 
Based on Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias V. (MNR, 1994) methodology, this study will 
examine the performance of the privatized companies through Share Issuance in Egypt using 
financial variables. The variables to be used will test five different key areas to be assessed which 
are, profitability, operating efficiency, output, staffing and leverage.  The study will test whether 
the privatization transaction will increase profitability, operating efficiency, and output and 
decrease the staffing and leverage. This study will use several measures to assess each area. The 
normalized indexed Earnings Before Interest and Tax, Return on Sales, Return on Assets and 
Return on Equity will be used to measure the profitability of each company. As for the operating 
efficiency, it will be measured using the Sales Efficiency and the Income Efficiency proxies. Those 
two proxies represent the Sales per staff and the Earnings Before Interest and Tax per Staff. 
Further, the Output of privatized companies is assessed using the normalized indexed Sales of each 
privatized company. The Staffing level is calculated using the number of staff in each company. 
                                                          
2 STATA contains a specific command to implement the DID model and this is used for 
convenience as the outputs are readily arranged into a handy table.   
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In addition, the Leverage is measured using two measures, the Total Debt to the Total Asset proxy 
and the Total Debt to the Total Equity.  The following table will summarize the Financial Ratios 
to be used and their definition and formula used to calculate them: 
Table 5 Financial Ratios & Definitions 
Performance Measure Ratio Definition and Formula 
Profitability  Earnings Before 
Interest and Tax 
It is the normalized and Indexed 
Earrings Before Interest and Tax. 
Return on Assets It is the normalized and Indexed 
Earrings Before Interest and Tax 
divided by the Total Assets. 
Return on Equity It is the normalized and Indexed 
Earrings Before Interest and Tax 
divided by the Total Equity. 
Return on Sales It is the normalized and Indexed 
Earrings Before Interest and Tax 
divided by the Sales. 
Output Sales It is the normalized and Indexed 
Sales. 
Employment Level Total number of Staff It is the total number of registered 
staff in each company. 
Leverage Total Debt to Total 
Equity. 
It is the Long Term Debt divided by 
the Total Equity. 
Total Debt to Total 
Assets. 
It is the Long Term Debt divided by 
the Total Assets. 
Operating Efficiency Sales Efficiency It is the normalized and Indexed 
Sales divided by the number of staff. 
Income Efficiency It is the normalized and Indexed Net 
Income divided by the number of 
staff. 
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As it is indicated above, this research is based on the methodology of Megginson, W. L., Robert 
C., Matthias V. (MNR, 1994), and the financial ratios shown above are calculated based on the 
same methodology. The data used for each company is based on the financial performance for a 
maximum of three years pre privatization and for 3 years post privatization.  
Based on the Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias V. (MNR, 1994) methodology the median 
and mean were calculated for the proxies. As for the year when the privatization transaction took 
place, the hybrid structure of state owned and privatization was present; therefore, the researcher 
excluded this year from the analysis. All the ratios were indexed based on the Consumer Price 
Index. 
Bivariate Comparisons 
An underlying Normal distribution is assumed in the mean comparison tests. In order to assess 
whether the financial ratios are normally distributed or not, the researcher applied standardized 
skewness and the standardized kurtosis tests. It is anticipated though that the financial ratios don't 
form a normal distribution. Therefore, to assess the difference, if any, between the medians of the 
performance financial ratios, the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used. Furthermore, 
the parametric-test to test for any significant change in the mean of the privatized and private 
companies was also used. Those two non-parametric tests are the best tool to analyse the data given 
that the data doesn't form a normal distribution (Barber, B. and Lyon, J, 1998). In order to assess 
significance of the change that has happened to the proportion of privatized companies, the 
proportion test was used.  
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To analyse the privatization effect on the performance of the privatized companies more deeply, 
this research work, will compare the performance of the privatized companies with a private set of 
match companies, control group. The matching process is based on the total asset base and industry 
of the privatized and the private companies. The comparison will be done for the post privatization 
performance of those companies with the matched private ones. The researcher used the DID 
methodology to achieve this objective and to test the hypothesis.  
5.8. Data Used and its Basis 
5.8.1. Data Set 
5.8.1.1. Secondary Data Sources Used 
 
The data set used was collected from different sources. The data set was obtained from two main 
sources. The first subset of data related to the pre-privatization period. For this period the data was 
obtained from General Authority for Investment and Capital Market Authority. For the pre 
privatization data, the prospectus of each company was also an important resource of reliable data. 
Pre privatization data was limited to three years to ensure that the published data from the 
prospectus was available.   
Post privatization performance and the private company data were gathered from the Capital 
Market Authority, the Kompass Egypt Financial year book and the Cairo & Alexandria Stock 
Market Exchanges.  
5.8.2. The Sample Used 
 
As highlighted in the Literature Review chapter, all the studies done studied the performance of 
the privatized companies by comparing the pre and post privatization performance. However, none 
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of these studies compared the performance of the privatized companies with those of the fully 
private companies. They are therefore subject to the criticism that they cannot identify the causal 
effects of privatisation.  To remedy this in the present thesis, the researcher matched the privatized 
companies with a private set of companies of equivalent size and from the same industry. 
5.8.2.1. The Privatization Data Set: 
 
Background to privatisation in Egypt 
The Egyptian Economy went through the restructuring phase in the early 1990s. However, it 
should be noted that the privatization hype that started then didn't proceed as planned and it faced 
several obstacles. The last few years of the old regime faced lots of difficulty in putting the 
programme back on track. Further, after recent revolution which took place in 2011, the new 
regime announced officially that the privatization programme was cancelled and they would try to 
find other ways to restructure the remaining companies of the public sector. To date, the number 
of the companies that have been privatized through an IPO is 61. Table 1 below shows the split of 
different methods of privatization used and the number of companies privatized till the programme 
was put on hold in 2010. 
Table 6   Privatization Programme from 1990 to 2010 
Fiscal Year Total Number of Privatization 
Operations 
Value of Sale in Million EGP 
1991 – 1994 11 418 
1994 – 1995 14 867 
1995 – 1996 12 977 
1996 – 1997 29 4595 
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1997 – 1998 23 2487 
1998 – 1999 33 1824 
1999 – 2000 40 4708 
2000 - 2001 18 370 
2001 – 2002 10 952 
2002- 2003 7 113 
2003 – 2004 13 543 
2004 – 2005 28 5643 
2005 – 2006 65 14612 
2006 – 2007 53 13607 
2007 – 2008 22 3984 
2008- 2009 4 1653 
Total until 
End of 2009 
382 57353 
Source: Egypt Stock Market Bulletin September 2011 
The chronological representation of the privatization programme shows clearly that the start of the 
privatization programme in Egypt was a bit slow. Nevertheless, from the beginning of the year 
1994 the programme started to gain momentum; however, it was not permitted by the government 
to sell more than 20% of the shares of any company. By the year 1996, the programme gained 
more momentum and the new cabinet appointed at that time headed by Kamal Ganzouri. One of 
the important agenda items for the cabinet at that time is to start publicizing the privatization 
programme internationally to attract foreign investors. This initiative resulted in selling more than 
50% of the government share in the State Owned Enterprises through the stock market.  
In the early 1990s, around 314 State Owned Enterprises were classified to be under 27 holding 
companies each one looking after one major sector in the economy. By early 2007, around 73% of 
all of these State Owned Enterprises were privatized.  The Focus of the Cabinet at that time was 
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to fully privatized those companies and improve the performance of the Stock Market by 
increasing the number of stocks supplied to the Egyptian Stock Market. This policy has resulted 
in an increase in those stocks prices by the year 2000. 
Toward the end of the year 2000, the programme again faced challenges which led to some delays 
in implementation, due to the foreign currency crises and money supply which negatively affected 
the performance of the Stock Market.   
Data used in this study 
The data to be used in this study will cover fully and partially privatized companies through IPO 
issuance for the period from 1991 till 2010 when the privatization programme was put on hold. 
The data of the IPO privatized companies will tend to be more reliable and will have equivalent 
audited financial results.  In addition, privatization through IPO is used to privatize huge 
companies within any privatization programme.   
For all companies the data set includes pre and post privatization financial data. For the pre 
privatization, the data is limited to a maximum of three year pre privatization performance data for 
which was acquired mainly from the prospectuses. 
The data set used in this study will cover the period from 1991 to 2010. It consists of a balanced 
panel with three years pre and three years post the privatization event taking place.  
Based on the data shown in Egypt Stock Market Bulletin September 2011, the number of fully and 
partially IPO privatized companies are 61, all of which are included in the study. Table A1, 
included in the Appendix, shows the identities of the 61 firms to be used in the study and their 
sectors per the Egypt Stock Market classification.  
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In order to achieve the objective of this study, all the privatized companies will be matched to 
Private companies of similar size and from the same industry. Therefore, the sample size will 
double based on the matching process used in this study.  
5.8.2.2. Matched Private Data Set 
 
As mentioned above the data set used in this study captures the fully and partially privatized 
companies in Egypt through IPO issuance. The control group of private companies is constructed 
based on the following methodology:  
a) Determine all the companies listed within the Egypt Stock Exchange in each sector. 
b) Calculate the average asset base (using the average total assets) for the private listed 
companies over the period of the study, 16 years or at least 10 years. 
c)  Compare the size of the private companies with that of the privatized company within the 
same sector. 
d) Match the privatized company with a private match of comparable size, 70% to 130% range 
of the size Barber and Lion (1998) and within similar sector.  
All the above-mentioned steps will be applied on all the companies and across different sectors 
mentioned in table A1 in the appendix. The following is a description of the above methodology 
applied on the Food and Beverages sector and the outcomes.  
Step Number 1: Determining all the companies (private and privatised) listed within the Egypt 
Stock Exchange in Food and Beverages sector. 
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The following table shows all the listed fully private companies within the Food and Beverages 
sector along with their Average Asset Base. The following table shows that there are 14 companies 
within the Food and Beverages Sector that are fully private.  
Table 7   List of Food and Beverages Sector (Fully Private) 
Fully Private Company Average Asset Base 
Ismailia National Food Industries       637,451  
Ismailia Misr Poultry          13,279  
Cairo Poultry       629,316  
International Agricultural Products       177,972  
Egypt for Poultry     1,846,665  
El Nasr For Manufacturing Agricultural Crops        118,735  
Cairo Oils & Soap        148,653  
Delta Sugar     1,266,206  
Sharkia National Food           58,409  
Northern Upper Egypt Development & Agricultural Production           56,205  
National company for maize products        754,063  
The Arab Dairy Products Co. ARAB DAIRY        452,551  
Mansourah Poultry           77,590  
AJWA for Food Industries company Egypt       286,256  
 
Step Number 2: Calculating the average asset base (using the average total assets) for the 
private listed companies over the period of the study, i.e. for 16 years or at least 10 years. 
We calculate the average asset base for each of the 14 companies shown above. Each of these 
private companies is listed for the period of the data used in the study or at least 10 years. The 
following formula is used to calculate the Average Asset Base for each of the private companies 
as well as for the privatized companies: 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠
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Step Number 3: Compare the size of the private companies with that of the privatized company 
within the same sector. 
After calculating the Average Asset base for both the Privatized and Private companies, then the 
asset base of the privatized company is compared to all the private companies' asset base to match 
it with private match within the range of 70% to 130% Barber and Leon (1998). The following is 
the formula used to calculate the comparable ratio of both asset bases of the private and the 
privatized companies:  
Percentage Size 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒
 
 
Step Number 4: Match the privatized company with a private match of comparable size,  
Once the Size Ratio between the Privatized companies' Average Asset Base and the Private 
Companies' Asset Base is calculated, the next step is to match the Privatized companies with a 
private company match that is within the range of 70% to 130%.   
The following table shows the results of applying the above equation on the Average Asset Base 
of Both Privatized and Private companies: 
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Matching Process Between Privatized Companies' and the Private Companies 
Table 8 Privatised Matching with Private Companies 
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325,
146  
   
330,
301  
   
331,
259  
   
136,
951  
   
438,
849  
   
341,
154  
   
355,
605  
   
137,
766  
   
207,
554  
   
441,
552  
   
609,
466  
      
12,8
42  
   
157,
325  
   
42,
799  
   
739,
566  
   
309,
015  
Ismailia 
National Food 
Industries 
      
637,4
51  
51% 52% 52% 21% 69% 54% 56% 22% 33% 69% 96% 2% 25% 7% 116
% 
48% 
Ismailia Misr 
Poultry 
         
13,27
9  
2449
% 
2487
% 
2495
% 
1031
% 
3305
% 
2569
% 
2678
% 
1038
% 
1563
% 
3325
% 
4590
% 
97% 1185
% 
322
% 
5570
% 
2327
% 
Cairo Poultry       
629,3
16  
52% 52% 53% 22% 70% 54% 57% 22% 33% 70% 97% 2% 25% 7% 118
% 
49% 
International 
Agricultural 
Products 
      
177,9
72  
183
% 
186
% 
186
% 
77% 247
% 
192
% 
200
% 
77% 117
% 
248
% 
342
% 
7% 88% 24
% 
416
% 
174
% 
Egypt for 
Poultry  
   
1,846,
665  
18% 18% 18% 7% 24% 18% 19% 7% 11% 24% 33% 1% 9% 2% 40% 17% 
El Nasr For 
Manufacturing 
Agricultural 
Crops  
      
118,7
35  
274
% 
278
% 
279
% 
115
% 
370
% 
287
% 
299
% 
116
% 
175
% 
372
% 
513
% 
11% 133
% 
36
% 
623
% 
260
% 
116 
 
Cairo Oils & 
Soap  
      
148,6
53  
219
% 
222
% 
223
% 
92% 295
% 
229
% 
239
% 
93% 140
% 
297
% 
410
% 
9% 106
% 
29
% 
498
% 
208
% 
Delta Sugar     
1,266,
206  
26% 26% 26% 11% 35% 27% 28% 11% 16% 35% 48% 1% 12% 3% 58% 24% 
Sharkia 
National Food  
         
58,40
9  
557
% 
565
% 
567
% 
234
% 
751
% 
584
% 
609
% 
236
% 
355
% 
756
% 
1043
% 
22% 269
% 
73
% 
1266
% 
529
% 
Northern 
Upper Egypt 
Development 
& Agricultural 
Production  
         
56,20
5  
578
% 
588
% 
589
% 
244
% 
781
% 
607
% 
633
% 
245
% 
369
% 
786
% 
1084
% 
23% 280
% 
76
% 
1316
% 
550
% 
National 
company for 
maize products  
      
754,0
63  
43% 44% 44% 18% 58% 45% 47% 18% 28% 59% 81% 2% 21% 6% 98% 41% 
The Arab 
Dairy Products 
Co. ARAB 
DAIRY  
      
452,5
51  
72% 73% 73% 30% 97% 75% 79% 30% 46% 98% 135
% 
3% 35% 9% 163
% 
68% 
Mansourah 
Poultry  
         
77,59
0  
419
% 
426
% 
427
% 
177
% 
566
% 
440
% 
458
% 
178
% 
267
% 
569
% 
785
% 
17% 203
% 
55
% 
953
% 
398
% 
AJWA for 
Food 
Industries 
company 
Egypt 
      
286,2
56  
114
% 
115
% 
116
% 
48% 153
% 
119
% 
124
% 
48% 73% 154
% 
213
% 
4% 55% 15
% 
258
% 
108
% 
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As a result, the following table shows the matched Private company to the Privatized company 
based on the four steps methodology explained: 
Table 9    Food and Beverages Privatized to private Matched Companies 
Privatized Companies Average 
Asset 
Base 
(Privati
zed) 
Mat
ch 
Rati
o 
Averag
e Asset 
Base 
(Privat
e) 
Matched Private Companies 
East Delta Flour Mills    
325,146  
114
% 
286256 AJWA for Food Industries company 
Egypt 
Alexandria Flour Mills    
330,301  
115
% 
286256 AJWA for Food Industries company 
Egypt 
Upper Egypt Flour Mills    
331,259  
116
% 
286256 AJWA for Food Industries company 
Egypt 
Egyptian Starch & Glucose    
136,951  
77% 177972 International Agricultural Products 
Middle & West Delta Flour 
Mills 
   
438,849  
70% 629316 Cairo Poultry 
Extracted Oils    
341,154  
119
% 
286256 AJWA for Food Industries company 
Egypt 
North Cairo Mills    
355,605  
124
% 
286256 AJWA for Food Industries company 
Egypt 
BiscoMisr    
137,766  
77% 177972 International Agricultural Products 
South Cairo & Giza Mills & 
Bakeries 
   
207,554  
117
% 
177972 International Agricultural Products 
Middle Egypt Flour Mills    
441,552  
70% 629316 Cairo Poultry 
Alahram Beverage    
609,466  
97% 629316 Cairo Poultry 
Alnasr for Dehydrating 
Agricultural Products 
     
12,842  
97% 13279 Ismailia Misr Poultry 
El-Wadi for Agricultural 
Export. 
   
157,325  
88% 177972 International Agricultural Products 
Nobaria Agricultural 
Engineering. 
     
42,799  
76% 56205 Northern Upper Egypt Development 
& Agricultural Production  
General Silos & Storage    
739,566  
118
% 
629316 Cairo Poultry 
Misr Oils & Soap    
309,015  
108
% 
286256 AJWA for Food Industries company 
Egypt 
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Based on the above results shown in the matching process, the same four steps were applied to all 
the sectors and all the Privatized Companies to match them with the comparable Private 
companies. The results of this matching process are shown in the below table: 
Table 10   Final Match Privatized Companies and Private Companies 
Privatized Company 
Name 
Privatized 
Company Avg. 
Asset Base 
Match 
Ratio 
Private 
Company 
Avg. Asset 
Base 
Matched Private 
Company Name 
Nile Pharmaceuticals 176,092 127% 138,300 October Pharma 
Memphis 
Pharmaceuticals 
146,299 106% 138,300 October Pharma 
Cairo Pharmaceuticals 176,706 128% 138,300 October Pharma 
Arab Pharmaceuticals 110,265 125% 88,320 Advanced 
Pharmaceutical 
Packaging Co. 
(APP) 
Alexandria 
Pharmaceuticals 
114,727 130% 88,320 Advanced 
Pharmaceutical 
Packaging Co. 
(APP) 
Nile for Kabriet 48,794 128% 38,051 Rubex Plastics 
Kafr El Zayat Pesticides 49,496 130% 38,051 Rubex Plastics 
Paint & Chemicals 
Industries (Pachin) 
277,051 76% 366,892 Sinai Cement 
Misr Chemical 
Industries 
287,805 127% 226,250 El Ezz Porcelain 
(Gemma) 
Construction and 
Consulting Engineering 
140,823 73% 194,214 Cairo Investment 
& Real Estate 
Development 
El Kahera Housing 89,909 103% 87,156 National Housing 
for Professional 
Syndicates 
Misr Duty Free Shops 53,946 72% 74,629 Arab Ceramics 
(Aracemco) 
Alahram Beverage 230,296 122% 188,046 Six of October 
Development & 
Investment 
(SODIC) 
Medinet Nasr Housing 232,462 124% 188,046 Six of October 
Development & 
Investment 
(SODIC) 
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El Shams Housing & 
Urbanization 
79,800 123% 64,993 Delta 
Construction & 
Rebuilding 
Upper Egypt 
Contracting 
97,263 130% 74,629 Arab Ceramics 
(Aracemco) 
Giza General 
Contracting 
105,363 121% 87,156 National Housing 
for Professional 
Syndicates 
Mahmoudia for 
Contracting 
68,395 105% 64,993 Delta 
Construction & 
Rebuilding 
Egyptian Contracting 
(Mokhtar Ibrahim) 
873,371 128% 682,265 Ezz Steel 
Heliopolis Housing 298,381 81% 366,892 Sinai Cement 
Nasr Utilities. 83,452 112% 74,629 Arab Ceramics 
(Aracemco) 
Amiria for Cement 376,576 103% 366,892 Sinai Cement 
Misr Mechanical and 
Electrical Projects 
(Khromika). 
93,283 125% 74,629 Arab Ceramics 
(Aracemco) 
Elnasr for Civil Works. 78,971 106% 74,629 Arab Ceramics 
(Aracemco) 
El Nasr Transformers 
(El Maco) 
82,975 128% 64,993 Delta 
Construction & 
Rebuilding 
Industrial & 
Engineering Projects. 
274,312 75% 366,892 Sinai Cement 
Egyptian Financial & 
Industrial 
228,946 101% 226,250 El Ezz Porcelain 
(Gemma) 
Portland Helwan 446,889 122% 366,892 Sinai Cement 
Alexandria Cement 264,410 72% 366,892 Sinai Cement 
Torah Cement 875,434 128% 682,265 Ezz Steel 
Eastern Tobacco 890,083 130% 682,265 Ezz Steel 
Nile Cotton Ginning 135,365 89% 151,523 Misr 
Conditioning 
(Miraco) 
Arab Cotton Ginning 194,068 128% 151,523 Misr 
Conditioning 
(Miraco) 
United Arab for 
Spinning & Weaving 
375,215 102% 366,892 Sinai Cement 
Bisco Misr 47,845 89% 54,036 International 
Agricultural 
Products 
Extracted Oils 260,791 127% 204,814 AJWA for Food 
Industries 
company Egypt 
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Misr Oils & Soap 264,328 129% 204,814 AJWA for Food 
Industries 
company Egypt 
Alnasr for Dehydrating 
Agricultural Products 
34,797 109% 31,822 Ismailia Misr 
Poultry 
Egyptian Starch & 
Glucose 
67,610 125% 54,036 International 
Agricultural 
Products 
North Cairo Mills 239,361 117% 204,814 AJWA for Food 
Industries 
company Egypt 
Middle Egypt Flour 
Mills 
336,291 129% 261,490 Cairo Poultry 
East Delta Flour Mills 267,263 130% 204,814 AJWA for Food 
Industries 
company Egypt 
Middle & West Delta 
Flour Mills 
330,797 127% 261,490 Cairo Poultry 
Upper Egypt Flour Mills 263,085 128% 204,814 AJWA for Food 
Industries 
company Egypt 
General Silos & Storage 326,987 125% 261,490 Cairo Poultry 
Alexandria Flour Mills 244,399 119% 204,814 AJWA for Food 
Industries 
company Egypt 
South Cairo & Giza 
Mills & Bakeries 
67,278 125% 54,036 International 
Agricultural 
Products 
El-Wadi for 
Agricultural Export. 
70,414 130% 54,036 International 
Agricultural 
Products 
Nobaria Agricultural 
Engineering. 
40,789 128% 31,822 Ismailia Misr 
Poultry 
Arabia & United 
Stevedoring 
163,472 128% 127,509 Egyptian 
Transport 
(EGYTRANS) 
Paper Middle East 
(Simo) 
87,333 120% 72,862 Suez Bags 
Telemisr 242,529 89% 273,233 Misr 
Conditioning 
(Miraco) 
Electro Cable Egypt 244,574 103% 236,802 ELSWEDY 
ELECTRIC 
IDEAL 220,776 93% 236,802 ELSWEDY 
ELECTRIC 
TELECOM Egypt 40,319,346 85% 47,525,427 AL-EZZ 
DEKHEILA 
STEEL 
ALEXANDRIA 
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El Nasr Clothes & 
Textiles (Kabo) 
180,832 119% 151,523 Misr 
Conditioning 
(Miraco) 
Abou Kir Fertilizers 279,735 124% 226,250 El Ezz Porcelain 
(Gemma) 
ARAB POLVARA 
SPINNING & 
WEAVING CO 
134,231 89% 151,523 Misr 
Conditioning 
(Miraco) 
Alexandria Spinning & 
Weaving (SPINALEX) 
391,247 107% 366,892 Sinai Cement 
Egypt Aluminum 511,149 87% 585,937 Ezz Steel 
United Housing & 
Development 
110,605 127% 87,156 National Housing 
for Professional 
Syndicates 
 
5.9. Summary of the Discussion 
 
Most of the studies done on performance of privatized companies focus on the comparison 
between the performances of privatized companies with the performance of the State Owned ones. 
However, this comparison doesn’t necessarily reflect the real change in performance fully. The 
other side that this study will shed light on is the change of performance when compared to the 
private companies and how the performance of privatized companies can be compared to that of 
the private ones.  This chapter covered the methodology to be used to assess the change in 
performance of the privatized companies when compared to the private ones. The methodology 
used will also assess the effect of certain economic factors on the overall performance of the 
privatized companies post privatization. 
The full research done in this study is based on quantitative analysis using secondary data. The 
data used to achieve the set objective of this study is based on the IPO privatized companies in the 
Egyptian economy since the beginning of the privatization programme in the early 1990s.  For 
each company three years pre-privatization is collected from the Prospectuses issued at the time 
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of floating the companies.  The post-privatization data includes a time series until 2010 when the 
privatization programme was put on hold or until the date some companies were delisted. 
Therefore, the data set for each company will include three years data pre-privatization and three 
years’ post-privatization. Accordingly, the panel data set used is balanced panel. The data used for 
this study was gathered from various sources, including the General Authority for Investment, 
Capital Market Authority, the Kompass Egypt Financial year book and the Cairo & Alexandria 
Stock Market Exchanges. The data set includes 61 privatized companies and 61 private matched 
companies; therefore, the full data set is122 companies. 
In order to match the privatized companies with a private match company, four steps methodology 
was used which include: 
a) Determining all the companies listed within the Egypt Stock Exchange in each sector. 
b) Calculating the average asset base (using the average total assets) for the private listed 
companies over the period of the study, 16 years or at least 10 years. 
c)  Compare the size of the private companies with that of the privatized company within the 
same sector. 
d) Match the privatized company with a private match of comparable size, 70% to 130% range 
of the size Barber, B. and Lyon, J (1998) and within the same sector.  
The private match company is then defined and is used in the study to assess the change in 
performance of the privatized companies.  
This study will use a similar methodology to that used by Megginson, et al (MNR, 1994), to 
examine the privatized companies performance and to assess the viability of the Egyptian 
privatization programme. The same indicators used by MNR are used in this study, profitability, 
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operating efficiency, output, employment levels, and leverage In order to achieve these objective 
2 hypotheses will be studied; 
Hypotheses 1: Privatization of Egyptian companies through IPO will result in the improvement 
of the performance of those companies following privatization. 
Hypotheses2: Privatization results in improvement of performance relative to private 
companies' performance   
In order to compare the pre and post privatization performance of the privatized companies, the 
first methodology used included the parametric t-test, the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test, and the proportion test. The second methodology used was DID to model the impact of 
Ownership, Size and Gearing on privatized companies’ performance compared to  performance of 
the private matched companies.  
The following three chapters will shed light on the results of the applying the two methodologies 
to assess the performance of privatized companies pre and post privatization.  
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Chapter 6: Pre and Post Privatization 
Comparative Analysis 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The privatization programme is an economic trend that has been used by many countries for the 
last three decades. Egypt was one of those countries that have adopted an ambitious programme 
to limit the role of the public sector within the economy. The Egyptian privatization programme 
that started in the early 1990s was one of the first in the Middle East and it was used to as an 
economic tool to reform the economy as a whole. 
In order to assess the outcomes of this privatization programme this research will test two main 
hypotheses: 
Hypotheses 1: Privatization of Egyptian companies through IPO will result in the improvement 
of the performance of those companies following privatization. 
Hypotheses2: Privatization results in improvement of performance relative to private 
companies' performance   
This chapter will be testing the first hypothesis by comparing the pre and post privatization 
performance of the fully and partially privatized companies. The statistical analysis used in this 
chapter will compare the change in the financial and operating measures. In order to achieve this, 
the absolute value is calculated for each measure as well as the relative value. The next step used 
is to test the significance of change using statistical tests. 
To test this hypothesis, the following hypotheses will be examined: 
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6. Privatization increase  the profitability of companies 
This will be examined by testing: 
6.1. The EBIT will increase post privatization 
6.2. The ROS will increase post privatization 
6.3. The ROA will increase post privatization 
6.4. The ROE will increase post privatization 
 
7. Privatization enhances operating efficiency of  companies 
This will be examined by testing: 
7.1. The Sales Efficiency will increase post privatization   
7.2. The Income Efficiency will increase post privatization   
 
8. Privatization enhances output of  companies 
This will be examined by testing: 
8.1. The Sales will increase post privatization 
 
9. Privatization improves Leverage Ratios of companies 
This will be examined by testing: 
9.1. The Leverage Ratio (Total Debt to Total Assets ) will decrease post privatization   
9.2. The Leverage Ratio (Total Debt to Total Equity ) will decrease post privatization   
 
10. Privatization enhances efficiency of  companies by lowering the number of Staff 
This will be examined by testing: 
10.1. The number of Staff will decrease post privatization   
The next part of this chapter will cover the Descriptive Statistics of the privatized as well as the 
private matched companies. The second part will present the comparative analysis of the pre and 
post privatization performance data. In order to establish this comparison, the following is the 
description of each of the financial and operational measures to be used to achieve the objective 
of this chapter.  
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Table 11   The Performance Measure 
Performance Measure Performance Indicator 
Profitability Earnings Before Interest and Tax 
Return on Sales 
Return on Assets 
Return on Equity 
Leverage Total Debt to Total Assets 
Total Debt to Total Equity 
Employment Number of Employees 
Operating Efficiency Income Efficiency 
Sales Efficiency 
Output Real Sales 
 
All of the above indictors are calculated for the each of the privatized companies for the period pre 
privatization and for the post privatization periods. Further, the same indictors are also calculated 
for the private matched companies, the control group. 
6.2    The Descriptive Statistics Results  
 
The descriptive statistics is one source used to define the nature of the data set used in any study. 
The results of the descriptive statistics results will shed light on the nature of the data used in this 
study. To assess the central tendency and variability of the data set used in any study the median 
and the standard deviations are always used. Therefore, the next section will show the results of 
the descriptive statistics for the privatized data set. 
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6.2.1 Privatized Companies Results: 
The analysis done in this section will show the results of the descriptive statistics for the pre and 
post privatization performance of the fully and partially privatized companies. The results shown 
in the next table are the standard results given by calculating the median, the mean, the standard 
deviation and the maximum /minimum for the data set used. Further, in order to assess the 
possibility of modelling the performance of the privatized companies as a normal distribution, the 
standardized skewness and the standardized Kurtosis are also calculated. For each of the 
performance indicators, the Descriptive statistics was calculated and is shown in the relevant 
section below. 
The next sections will analyse the results shown in the table for each of the performance indicators.  
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Table 12   Descriptive Statistics Results For the Privatized Companies 
  No of 
Companies 
 Means Medians Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation 
Standard 
kurtosis 
Standard 
Skewness 
    Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
  23 Partial 0.77 0.99 0.72 0.77 0.31 0.27 2.02 3.56 0.44 0.79 3.78 7.85 2.91 4.61 
 EBIT 38 Full 0.73 0.89 0.61 0.84 0.21 0.03 2.14 2.24 0.46 0.43 3.15 4.04 3.55 2.51 
Profitability 61 Total 0.75 0.93 0.63 0.82 0.21 0.03 2.14 3.57 0.46 0.57 3.83 16.0
6 
4.37 7.6 
 ROS 23 Partial 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.12 -0.03 0.03 0.24 0.46 0.07 0.13 0.98 1.51 1.86 2.41 
  38 Full 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.1 -0.05 -
1.29 
0.75 0.85 0.14 0.29 17.2 21.9
3 
8.1 -
7.03 
  61 Total 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.11 -0.05 -
1.29 
0.75 0.85 0.12 0.26 0.25 28.7
5 
10.3 -
8.22 
 ROA 23 Partial 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.16 0.04 0.05 -
0.55 
-
0.54 
0.37 0.72 
  38 Full 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.02 -
0.27 
0.18 0.19 0.05 0.09 0.73 136
0 
2.64 -
6.19 
  61 Total 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.02 -
0.27 
0.18 19 0.05 0.07 0.95 18.7
5 
2.85 -
7.49 
 ROE 23 Partial 0.29 0.32 0.26 0.26 0.16 0.17 0.55 0.79 0.13 0.17 1.5 3.36 2.37 3.2 
  38 Full 0.26 0.28 0.24 0.27 0.1 0.05 0.53 0.56 0.13 0.12 0.15 1.73 1.85 1.26 
  61 Total 0.27 0.29 0.25 0.27 0.1 0.05 0.55 0.79 0.13 0.15 1.85 5.83 3.02 4.26 
Operat
ing 
Efficie
ncy 
Sales Efficiency 23 Partial 1.16 0.92 1.14 0.94 0.56 0.44 1.6 1.37 0.27 0.25 0.34 0.43 -0.6 -
0.78 
  38 Full 1.1 1.12 0.1 0.97 0.35 0.46 1.86 3.79 0.32 0.7 1.35 12.8
1 
1.13 7.67 
  61 Total 1.06 1.06 1.04 0.95 0.35 0.44 1.86 3.79 0.31 0.61 0.76 21.3
3 
0.54 104
1 
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 Income 
Efficiency 
23 Partial 0.78 1.04 0.74 0.8 -0.08 0.29 2.51 3.66 0.58 0.74 4.22 8.9 3 4.85 
  38 Full 0.79 1.02 57 0.92 -0.15 -
14.6 
5.78 16.2 0.94 3.62 29.5 21.0
6 
11.2 -
0.44 
  61 Total 0.79 1.04 0.6 0.94 -0.15 -
14.6 
5.78 16.2 0.84 3.02 36.8 36.5
5 
13.1 -
0.66 
Output Sales 23 Partial 1.13 0.84 1.15 0.86 0.63 0.32 1.53 1.34 0.23 0.25 0.45 1.17 -
0.05 
-
0.46 
  38 Full 1.11 0.89 1.06 0.84 0.37 0.42 2.26 2.82 0.37 0.44 2.57 14.2
4 
2.12 7.24 
  61 Total 1.11 0.87 1.08 0.85 0.37 0.32 2.26 2.82 0.33 0.39 3.56 19.5
3 
2.22 8.6 
Levera
ge 
Total Debt to 
Total Assets 
23 Partial 0.3 0.15 0.3 0.14 0.02 0 0.38 0.36 0.1 0.11 0.75 -
0.11 
-0.7 1.26 
  38 Full 0.23 0.23 0.18 0.21 0 0 0.97 1.27 0.23 0.26 2.94 10.3
7 
3.57 6.23 
  61 Total 0.22 0.22 0.2 0.17 0 0 0.97 1.27 0.2 0.23 5.64 13.3
7 
4.73 7.66 
 Total Debt to 
Total Equity 
23 Partial 0.8 0.39 0.79 0.35 0.04 0.02 1.71 1.19 0.51 0.36 -
0.65 
0.07 0.49 1.36 
  38 Full 0.74 0.25 0.21 0.07 0 0 4.28 3.59 1.14 0.6 5.37 36.0
6 
5.6 12.8
1 
  61 Total 0.74 0.3 0.43 0.11 0 0 4.28 3.59 0.99 0.55 8.17 40.6
5 
6.87 13.9
2 
Emplo
yee 
Level 
Number of 
Employees 
23 Partial 4653 415
7 
405
3 
331
4 
1158 116
4 
136
22 
131
34 
3171 3183 3 34 2.92 3.39 
  38 Full 2744 216
2 
194
6 
144
8 
225 156 748
2 
664
5 
1983 1793 0 0 2 3 
  61 Total 3310 270
2 
284
0 
180
4 
225 156 136
22 
131
34 
2523 2448 7 9 5 6 
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EBIT Results: 
The results shown in table 1 above highlight the results of the profitability indicators, EBIT, ROS, 
ROA and ROE. The EBIT mean and median for the post privatization have examined an increase. 
However, the value of the EBIT pre privatization has shown a result ranging from 21% to 213% 
while the post privatization result ranges from 3% to 214%. Further, the value of the standard 
deviation for the EBIT is scattered which indicates that the value of the EBIT is scattered around 
the average value of the EBIT (Kvali, A., Pavur J., and Keeling K. B., 2006). 
ROS Results: 
The value of the ROS mean indicate an increasing trend post privatization for both of the 
privatization categories. Further, the value of the median has also changed across the privatization 
categories.  As shown in the table of results, the minimum value of the measure is -5% and -129% 
for the pre-privatization period and for the post privatization period respectively. However, the 
maximum value of the indicator showed 24% pre privatization and 84% post privatization which 
indicate that the indicator has increased by 266%. 
ROA Results:  
The mean of the ROA showed an increase across the privatization categories. Further, the median 
for both privatization categories didn’t indicate any change pre privatization; however, it showed 
an increase post privatization. In addition, the value of the indicator ranges from 0.02 % to 18% 
pre privatization. As for the post privatization, the indicator ranges from -27% to 19%. Therefore, 
this clearly indicates that the majority of the privatized companies have a negative returns on asset 
employed. It should be noted also, that the results of the standard deviation of the indicator shows 
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that the values are not scattered around the average as the post privatization value is less than the 
pre privatization value. 
ROE Results: 
The value of the mean of the indicator showed a clear change for all the privatization categories. 
However, the median value indicated a change for fully privatized category post privatization and 
no change for partially privatized companies. The standard deviation values as shown in the table 
of results are the same for all the privatization categories indicating a large dispersion of the values 
of the indicator post privatization.   
The standardized skewness and standardized kurtosis Results:  
The values of the standardized skewness and standardized kurtosis shown in the table indicate that 
the profitability indicators are not normally distributed as they are out of the range of ±2, Keeller 
(2003) for the pre and post privatization periods. The only exception to this is the values of the 
ROA of the partially privatized companies and the ROE for the fully privatized ones as they fall 
within the ±2 range. 
Sales Efficiency Results: 
The mean value for the indicator shows an increase post the fully privatization of the companies. 
On the contrary, the value of the indicator didn’t show any increase for the partially privatized 
companies post the privatization transaction. Further, the median value has decreased for all the 
privatization categories post privatization. Also, the values of the indicator range from 35% to 
186% pre the privatization taking place. Post privatization, the indicator ranges from 44% to 379% 
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which clearly prove a positive Sales Efficiency for the all the privatized companies. The value of 
the standard deviation is largely dispersed which indicate a wide scatter around the mean value. 
Income Efficiency Results: 
The mean and the median for the Income Efficiency indicator have shown an increase for all the 
privatization categories post privatization. The minimum values of the indicator ranged from -15% 
pre the privatization and -1464% post the privatization taking place; while the max values ranged 
from 251% pre privatization to 1620% post privatization. Further, the value of the standard 
deviation is largely dispersed which indicate a wide scatter around the mean value. 
The standardized skewness and standardized kurtosis Results:  
The values of the standardized skewness and standardized kurtosis shown in the table indicate that 
the Operating Efficiency indicators are not normally distributed as they are out of the range of ±2, 
Keller G. (2002) for the pre and post privatization periods. The only exception to this is the values 
of the Sales Efficiency of the partially privatized companies as it falls within the ±2 range. 
Real Sales Results: 
The mean and the median results of the indicator show a decrease for all the privatization 
categories pre and post the privatization. The values of the indicator range from 37% to 226% for 
the pre privatization period. The results also showed that the range of the indicator post 
privatization is 31% to 281%. Those results indicate that there is a positive result achieved by some 
of the privatized companies as well as poor results achieved by other privatized companies. In 
order to assess the significance of the change in performance, further statistical tests will be carried.   
The standardized skewness and standardized kurtosis Results:  
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The values of the standardized skewness and standardized kurtosis shown in the table indicate that 
the output indicators for the fully privatized companies are not normally distributed as they are out 
of the range of ±2, Keeller (2002) for the pre and post privatization periods. The only exception to 
this is the values of the output indicator of the partially privatized companies as it falls within the 
±2 range. 
Total Debt to Total Assets Results: 
The mean results for the Total Debt to Total Assets indicator show a decrease as a result of the 
privatization for the partially privatized companies. However, the post privatization results didn’t 
show any variance for the fully privatized companies. The median results post privatization for the 
indicator showed a decrease for the partially privatized companies.  On the contrary, the indictor 
has increased for the fully privatized companies post privatization 
Total Debt to Total Equity Results: 
The mean and the median for this leverage indicator have shown a decrease for all the privatization 
categories.  The values of the indicator range from 10% to 428% for the pre privatization period. 
The results also showed that the range of the indicator post privatization is 10% to 359%. 
 
The standardized skewness and standardized kurtosis Results:  
The values of the standardized skewness and standardized kurtosis shown in the table indicate that 
the leverage indicators for the fully privatized companies are not normally distributed as they are 
out of the range of ±2, Keller G. (2003) for the pre and post privatization periods. The only 
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exception to this is the values of the output indicator of the partially privatized companies as it 
falls within the ±2 range. 
Employment  Indicators Results  
The mean and median values of the employment indicator showed a decrease for all privatization 
categories. The value of the indicator ranges from a minimum of 1158 pre privatization to a 
maximum of 13622 for the same period. The post privatization results showed a minimum of 1051 
and a maximum of 13134 which clearly indicates a decline in the number of employees as a result 
of the privatization. The standard deviation results showed a dispersion indicating a spread around 
the mean.  
The standardized skewness and standardized kurtosis Results:  
The values of the standardized skewness and standardized kurtosis shown in the table indicate that 
the leverage indicators for the partially privatized companies are not normally distributed as they 
are out of the range of ±2, Keeller (2003) for the pre and post privatization periods. The only 
exception to this is the values of the output indicator of the fully privatized companies as it falls 
within the ±2 range. 
6.2.2 Summary of the results: 
 
Based on the results shown above for the descriptive statistics for the performance indicators, the 
following can be concluded; 
a) There is a clear change in the performance indicators post privatization. 
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b) The significance of the change and its direction, negative or positive, needs further 
statistical analysis.  
c) Some of the indicators have standardized skewness and standardized kurtosis within the 
range of ±2 while others don’t. This indicates the need to use different statistical tests to 
test the significance of the change for the normally distributed data and non-normally 
distributed data. Therefore, the  parametric t-test will be used for a normal distributed 
indicators and the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test will be used for the  non-
normal distributed indicators 
The next section will analyse the statistical results for the private match companies, the control 
group. 
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6.3      Private Companies Results: 
 
The following table summarizes the results of the descriptive statistics of the matched private companies.  
Table 13   Descriptive Statistics Results For the Private Companies 
  No of 
Companies 
Means Medians Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation 
Standard 
kurtosis 
Standard 
Skewness 
   Post Post Post Post Post Post Post 
 Proxy         
Profitability EBIT 61 1.8 1.26 -0.12 8.15 1.56 5.79 7.05 
 ROS 61 0.15 0.12 -0.02 0.37 0.12 1.86 -0.3 
 ROA 61 0.09 0.07 -0.02 0.29 0.08 3.49 1.97 
 ROE 61 0.18 0.13 -0.05 0.55 0.15 1.97 -0.57 
Operating 
Efficiency 
Sales Efficiency 61 1.36 1.16 0.17 8.7 1.2 13.96 47.97 
 Income Efficiency 61 1.47 1.16 -0.12 5.98 1.22 4.57 3.87 
Output Sales 61 1.64 1.27 0.17 14.4 1.93 16.89 55.28 
Leverage Total Debt to 
Total Assets 
61 0.56 0.52 0.1 0.92 0.18 0 0.03 
 Total Debt to 
Total Equity 
61 0.44 0.19 0 2.73 0.66 6.86 7.73 
Employee 
Level 
Number of 
Employees 
61 904 727 29 2888 755 3.28 0.1 
 Log Employees 61 6.36 6.6 3.34 7.87 1.06 -2.22 0.38 
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The same performance indicators are used to measure the performance of the private companies.  
The results clearly show that the standard deviations for the performance indicators are largely 
dispersion. The dispersion is more evident in the Output indicator, the Employment indicator and 
some of the Profitability indicators, the ROS and the ROE. Further, it is also evident that the 
standardized skewness and standardized kurtosis for the same indicators are within the range of 
±2 and thus they are normally distributed; also as it is also shown, the other indicators falls outside 
the range of ±2. 
Further, the results show that the mean and median of the Profitability Indicators and the Operating 
Efficiency Indicators of the privatized companies are much lower than those of the private 
companies. Further, the results indicate that the profitability and the operating efficiency of the 
private companies are greater than those of the privatized companies.  The standardized skewness 
and standardized kurtosis of most of the indicators fall outside the range of the normal distribution.  
6.4  Comparing the Pre Privatization performance to the Post Privatization 
Performance: 
 
The comparison between the pre privatization performance and the post privatization performance 
is the primary hypothesis of this chapter. The aim of this chapter is to test the hypothesis that 
Privatization results in improvement of performance of the privatized companies'. In order to 
achieve the objective of this chapter, the parametric t-test, the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, and the proportion tests will be used, given that some of the indicators are normally 
distributed and others are not. Further, the proportion test is used to determine if (P) of any 
companies having change in any direction is greater than what is expected by chance.  
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As indicated earlier, this research work is based on the Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias V. 
(1994) methodology to compare the pre privatization performance with the post privatization 
performance for fully or partially privatized companies in Egypt. To examine the performance of 
the privatized companies, the mean/median for each of the performance indicators was calculated, 
for the pre privatization period as well as the post privatization. The time period used to calculate 
the change taking place pre and post privatization covered three years pre privatization and three 
year post privatization. Before deciding on the test to be used, the standardized skewness and 
standardized kurtosis tests were applied to test the normality of the distribution of the performance 
indicators. 
This part of the research will test the null hypothesis, that there is no change in mean/median pre 
privatization to post privatization. The parametric t-test will be used to test for the significant 
changes in mean and the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used to test significant 
change in performance using the median values. In order to cater for the different privatization 
categories in the sample used, and in order to avoid the bias that the partially privatized companies 
might still be influenced by government (D'Souza, J. and Megginson, W. L., 2000) the results are 
shown for each category separately. 
6.4.1 The Results for the Profitability Indicators 
 
The Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias V. (1994) studied the pre and post privatization 
performance for 211 companies from over 46 countries. The results of the study showed significant 
improvements in profitability of the privatized companies. From an Agency Theory perspective, 
this result is somewhat expected as private management will tend to be more profit driven. The 
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Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias V. (1994) study used four proxies to measure the change 
in profitability. The proxies used are: 
a) The Earnings Before Interest and Tax 
b) Return on Assets 
c) Return on Sales 
d) Return on Equity 
This section of the study will analyse the results of comparing the pre privatization performance 
to the post privatization performance.  
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Table 14   Pre Privatization Comparison to Post Privatization Results (For All Companies) 
In order to test Hypothesis one three tests are employed to test any significance in the performance of the fully/ partially privatized companies. The results 
shown in this table are for the three tests, t-test, nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test and Proportion test. The t-test, nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-
rank test will test for any significant change in performance measure pre and post privatization. The Proportion test will define the proportion of companies 
examining change in any direction which is greater than what is possible by chance. The value of mean and median is calculated for each performance indicator 
for three years pre privatization and three years post privatization. The results shown will cover any change in the mean or median for each performance 
indicators for the pre privatization and post privatization time period highlighting the t and z statistical results at each significant level. The total numbers of 
companies as well as the number of companies that have experienced an increase or a decrease as result of the treatment taking place are shown in the table. 
Further, the table of results will highlight the percent of companies that have changed as predicted with Z test and p-values.  
i.e for the parametric and non-parametric tests results are listed under null hypothesis (change is equal to zero) versus the alternate hypothesis (change is not 
equal to zero)  
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  Prox Inc. Dec. Mn Med Mn Med Mn Med               
Profitability EBIT 42  19  0.74  0.63  0.92  0.82  0.17  0.27  1.5
1  
0.14  1.7
4  
0.081*
** 
2.01  0.004*
* 
73% 
(+) 
  ROS 45  16  0.10  0.07  0.13  0.10  0.03  0.02  1.0
6  
0.29  3.3
0  
1.00E-
03* 
2.91  0.004* 76% 
(+)  
  ROA 39  22  0.06  0.05  0.07  0.08  0.01  0.02  1.4
0  
0.17  1.6
5  
0.099*
** 
1.80  0.072*
** 
67% 
(+)  
  ROE 37  24  0.26  0.24  0.28  0.26  0.02  0.01  0.7
3  
0.47  0.1
6  
0.87  0.57  0.57  64% 
(+)  
Operating 
Efficiency 
SalesEff 24  37  1.05  1.03  1.05  0.94  0.00  0.08  0.0
5  
0.96  1.5
0  
0.13  1.08  0.24  43% 
(+)  
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  IncEff 43  18  0.78  0.59  1.03  0.93  0.26  0.24  0.2
4  
0.48  3.1
3  
0.002* 3.00  0.003* 74% 
(+)  
Output Sales 16  45  1.10  1.07  0.86  0.84  0.24  0.22  4.7
5  
0* 3.4
0  
6.00E-
04* 
4.36  1.00E-
05* 
30% 
(+)  
Leverage TD/TA 26  35  0.21  0.19  0.21  0.16  0.01  0.03  0.2
3  
0.82  0.9
5  
0.34  2.85  0.53  57% 
(+)  
  TD/TE 18  43  0.73  0.42  0.29  0.10  0.44  0.17  3.4
7  
0.001
* 
3.7
1  
2.00E-
04* 
3.89  9.00E-
05* 
77% 
(+)  
Employee 
Level 
#Emp 11  50  33.0
9  
28.39  2,701.0
0  
1,803.0
0  
608.0
0  
368.50  5.0
7  
0* 5.0
4  
0* 5.09  0* 84% 
(+)  
  LogEmp 11  50  7.79  7.95  7.51  7.49  0.28  0.19  6.0
9  
0* 5.1
3  
0* 5.29  0* 84% 
(+)  
* 1% Significance Level  ** 5% Significance Level  ***10% Significance Level 
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Table 15   Pre Privatization Comparison to Post Privatization Results (Fully Privatized) 
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  Proxie
s 
Inc. Dec. Mn Med Mn Med Mn Med               
Profitab
ility 
EBIT 26  11  0.72  0.60  0.88  0.84  0.15  0.30  1.11  0.27  1.37  0.17  1.44  0.15  71% 
(+) 
ROS 24  13  0.11  0.07  0.12  0.10  0.00  0.02  0.02  0.99  1.79  0.074
*** 
1.35  0.18  66% 
(+) 
ROA 21  16  0.06  0.05  0.07  0.08  0.01  0.01  0.84  0.41  0.81  0.42  1.17  0.24  57% 
(+) 
ROE 24  13  0.25  0.23  0.27  0.26  0.02  0.02  0.55  0.59  0.20  0.84  0.51  0.62  66% 
(+) 
Operati
ng 
Efficien
cy 
SalEff 17  20  1.00  0.99  1.11  0.96  0.10  0.08  0.95  0.35  0.16  0.87  0.09  0.94  47% 
(+) 
  IncEff 25  12  0.78  0.56  1.01  0.91  0.22  0.24  0.44  0.66  2.43  0.01* 2.26  0.002
* 
69% 
(+) 
Output Sales 10  27  1.10  1.05  0.88  0.83  0.22  0.25  3.58  0.000
9* 
2.76  0.006
* 
3.45  0.000
5* 
26% 
(+) 
Leverag
e 
TD/TA 19  18  0.22  0.17  0.22  0.20  0.00  0.02  0.10  0.92  0.16  0.87  0.00  1.00  47% 
(-) 
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  TD/TE 8  29  0.71  0.20  0.24  0.06  0.47  0.13  2.68  0.010
7* 
3.13  0.002
* 
3.16  0.002
* 
79% 
(-) 
Employ
ee Level 
# Emp 4  33 2743.
00  
1945.
00  
2161.
00  
1446.
00  
581.
00  
357.0
0  
4.53  0* 4.70  0* 4.58  0* 89% 
(-) 
  LogE
m 
4  33  7.61  7.57  7.27  7.24  0.33  0.28  5.91  0* 4.83  0* 4.69  0* 89% 
(-) 
* 1% Significance Level  ** 5% Significance Level  ***10% Significance Level 
 
 
Table 16   Pre Privatization Comparison to Post Privatization Results (Partially Privatized) 
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  Proxie
s 
Inc. Dec. Mean Medi
an 
Mean Medi
an 
Mea
n 
Medi
an 
              
Profitab
ility 
EBIT 16  7  0.76  0.71  0.98  0.77  0.22  0.14  0.99  0.38  0.80  0.42  1.38  0.17  67% 
(+) 
ROS 21  2  0.08  0.06  0.14  0.11  0.07  0.07  4.01  0.001
1* 
3.25  0.001
* 
3.23  0.001
* 
94% 
(+) 
ROA 17  6  0.06  0.05  0.08  0.06  0.02  0.02  2.40  0.029
** 
1.75  0.081
** 
2.09  0.036
** 
75% 
(+) 
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ROE 12  11  0.28  0.25  0.31  0.25  0.02  0.00  0.47  0.65  0.00  1.00  0.00  1.00  50% 
(+) 
Operati
ng 
Efficien
cy 
SalEff 4  19  1.15  1.13  0.91  0.93  0.23  0.06  2.72  0.015
** 
2.25  0.024
** 
2.51  0.012
** 
19% 
(+) 
  IncEff 17  6  0.77  0.73  1.03  0.79  0.26  0.16  1.18  0.26  1.75  0.08*
** 
1.89  0.059
*** 
75% 
(+) 
Output Sales 4  19  1.12  1.73  0.83  0.85  0.29  0.16  3.30  0.004
* 
2.25  0.024
** 
2.87  0.004
* 
19% 
(+) 
Leverag
e 
TD/T
A 
7  16  0.20  0.20  0.14  0.13  0.06  0.03  2.11  0.05*
* 
1.25  0.21  1.63  0.10  69% 
(-) 
  TD/TE 6  17  0.79  0.78  0.38  0.34  0.41  0.30  3.26  0.005
* 
1.75  0.08*
** 
2.46  0.014
** 
75% 
(-) 
Employ
ee Level 
# Emp 7  16  4652.
00  
4052.
00  
4156.
00  
3313.
00  
495.
00  
470.0
0  
1.72  0.11  1.25  0.21  1.78  0.074
*** 
69% 
(-) 
  LogE
mp 
7  16  8.23  8.15  8.10  8.10  0.13  0.12  1.80  0.09*
** 
1.25  0.21  1.58  0.11  69% 
(-) 
* 1% Significance Level  ** 5% Significance Level  ***10% Significance Level 
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6.4.1.1 EBIT Results 
 
Table 17   Hypothesis1_EBIT 
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Prox Inc. Dec. Mn Med Mn Med Mn Med         
EBIT 42.0
0  
19.00  0.74  0.63  0.92  0.82  0.17  0.27  1.51 
[0.1
4 ]  
1.74 
[0.081***
]  
2.01 
[0.004**
]  
73% 
(+) 
* 1% Significance Level  ** 5% Significance Level  ***10% Significance Level 
Mn=Mean; Med=Median 
 
The table above shows the results of comparing the EBIT pre and post privatization. As 
shown in the table, the mean of the EBIT for all the privatized companies has shown an 
increase of 18.4%, from 75% pre privatization to 93.4% post privatization. Also, the 
median of the EBIT has examined a similar increase of 19%, from 63.5% pre 
privatization to 82.5% post privatization. Around 71% of the privatized companies have 
examined an increase in the EBIT while 8 maintained the same median level post 
privatization and 14 companies showed a result lower than the median. 
By testing the null hypothesis, that the change in the mean/median of the EBIT is zero, 
and given that the p-value is 5%; therefore, null hypothesis is rejected with a 95% 
confidence level. Further, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test p-value is equal to 8%, and 
then it is evident that with a 90% confident, there is a significant (slight) improvement 
in the EBIT results for the majority of the companies. The table also shows the results 
for each privatization category, the partially and the fully privatized. The results 
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indicate that both categories witnessed an increase in the EBIT level. However, it 
should be noted that the partially privatized companies realized higher EBIT than the 
fully privatized companies. In conclusion, the tests didn’t indicate any significance at 
any given level. 
The results of the EBIT as shown in above  table indicates that around 73% of the 
privatized companies examined a significant improvement in their EBIT margins post 
the privatization transaction taking place.  
This result is coming in line with the predicting statement in the sub hypothesis. 
However, the value of the improvement in the EBIT margin is low this might be 
explained mainly by two reasons. The first reason is time, the privatization of those 
companies is still new and more time is needed to start observing the changes happening 
and taking place evidently. Also the time factor is important to allow change 
management to take place and to allow the newly appointed management to affect the 
culture and start injecting commercial practices within the companies by changing 
policies and procedures. It cannot be denied that the privatization is also new to the 
management team. The second reason for this slight improvement is the fact that 
management team post privatization will be more incentivized to increase revenue as 
well as increase collection and reduce receivables position. This factor in itself will 
eventually lead to more improvement in the EBIT margin over time. 
The results of the analysis are supported by the results of Megginson, W. L., Robert C., 
Matthias V. (1994) and Sun, Q., Jin J, and Wilson T (2003). The argument of the 
researchers states that the privatized companies will tend to have equivalent  EBIT 
margins for a maximum of two years post privatization; later down the line the results 
of the privatized companies will way out perform that of the state owned company. 
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The EBIT margin analysis done on the partially privatized and the fully privatized 
companies indicates that the companies with higher government share had higher EBIT 
margins than those with less government share. By further analysing the sector in which 
government owned a higher share the analysis showed that this was predominantly 
evident in the pharmaceutical sector. This sector enjoys the protection of the 
government till early 2000s. This fact is also supported by literature done by DeWenter, 
Kathryn L., and Paul H. Malatesta (2001) who observed that the privatized companies 
will tend to have higher margins if they operate within a monopolistic market setup 
when compared to those companies operating in an open market structure.  
6.4.1.2    The Change Results for the Return on Sales 
Table 18   Hypothesis1_ROS 
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Proxies Inc. Dec. Mn Med Mn Med Mn Med     
ROS 45 16 0.10 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.03 0.02 1.06 
[0.29 ] 
3.30 
[1.00E-03*] 
2.91 
[0.004*] 
76% 
(+) 
* 1% Significance Level  ** 5% Significance Level  ***10% Significance Level.  
Mn=Mean; Med=Median 
 
The results table indicates that the mean of the Return on Sales indicator for the 
privatized companies has improved by 3%, up from 11% pre privatization to 14% post 
privatization. The median also has examined an increase of 3% from 8% pre 
privatization to 11% post privatization. 40 companies have examined this change which 
represents 74% of the total privatized companies. Therefore, the privatization has 
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directly led to the Return on Sales increase by 30 percent for 74% of the privatized 
companies. 
By testing the null hypothesis, that the change in the mean/median of the Return on 
Sales is zero, and given that the p-value for the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test and proportion test are less than 1 %; therefore, null hypothesis is rejected with a 
99% confidence level. Based on this fact, it is evident that there is a significant change 
in the Return on Sales median post privatization for the majority of the privatized 
companies. 
By examining the results of the privatization categories, it is evident that the Return on 
Sales mean of the partially privatized companies increased by 7.5% from 8.5% to 15%. 
Also the median has increased by 4.9% from 7.3% to 12.2%. These results were 
achieved by 15 companies representing 94% of the partially privatized companies. 
Further, the fully privatized companies witnessed an improvement in the Return on 
Sales levels. Also, it is should be noted that by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test the increase in the median is considered significant with a 10% 
confidence.  
The results of the analysis showed that ROS ratio for the privatized company examined 
an increase as a result of the privatization transaction for almost 76% of the companies. 
In addition, the post privatization performance for companies with higher government 
ownership showed a higher ROS ratio. This is mainly due to poor marketing and sales 
of activities with companies’ pre privatization that resulted in high inventory levels that 
materialized as sales upon privatization. Also, this could be contributed to the cultural 
change happening within the privatized companies toward being a more competitive 
and market driven. All of those factors contributed directly to the overall improvement 
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in the ROS ratio post privatization which is in line with literature in this area 
Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias V. (1994) and Boubakri, N. and Jean C. (1998).  
6.4.1.3    The Change Results for the Return on Assets  
 
Table 19   Hypothesis1_ROA 
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Proxies Inc. Dec. Mn Med Mn Med Mn Med     
ROA 
39  22  0.06  0.05  0.07  0.08  0.01  0.02  
1.40 
[0.17 ]  
1.65 
[0.099***]  
1.80 
[0.072***
]  
67
% 
(+)  
* 1% Significance Level  ** 5% Significance Level  ***10% Significance Level.  
Mn=Mean; Med=Median 
 
 
The Return on Assets ratio is measuring how effectively a company is using its assets to 
generate Earning before Interest and Tax. The results shown in the table shows that the 
all the privatized companies has achieved an improvement in managing this returns. 
The mean value of the Return on Assets has increased by 1% up from 7% to 8% post 
privatization. Further, the median of the Return on Assets has increased also by 3%, 
from 6% to 9% during the same period. The results also show that the 62% of the 
privatized companies have examined an increase in the Return on Assets.  
The non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test and the proportion test results showed a 
significant change at the 10% level. This was achieved although the change from pre to 
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post privatization was 1.2% only. The null hypothesis that there was zero change in the 
mean/median of the Return on Assets from pre to post privatization was thus partially 
rejected with a 90% confidence level.  Therefore, the change in Return on Assets was 
evident for the majority of privatized companies post privatization.  
The results showed also the privatization impact on Return on Assets for each 
privatization category. It is shown that the fully privatized companies achieved an 
increase in their Return on Assets for 57% of the sample. The three tests used didn’t 
yield any significant result at any level. 
The partially privatized companies Return on Assets has increased significantly post 
privatization based on the results of the three statistical tests used. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis is rejected with a 95% confidence for the change in mean. Also, the null 
hypothesis for the change in median of the Return on Assets was rejected with a 90% 
confidence.  
The ROA ratio showed an increase for the post privatized companies’ performance 
when compared to the pre privatized performance, as shown in above table .The results 
indicate that 67% of the companies improved their asset utilization post privatization. 
This can mainly be contributed to the asset replacements or refurbishments that usually 
take place upon privatization to modernize the assets and machinery that result in an 
enhanced ROA. This fact is also supported by the views of Megginson, W. L., Robert 
C., Matthias V. (1994) and Laurin, C. and Yves B. (2001) who observed this fact in 
their research.  
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6.4.1.4    The Change Results for the Return on Equity 
Table 20  Hypothesis1_ROE 
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Proxies Inc. Dec. Mn Med Mn Med Mn Med     
ROE 37  24  0.26  0.24  0.28  0.26  0.02  0.01  
0.73 
[0.47 ]  
0.16  
[0.87] 
0.57 
[0.57 ]  
64
% 
(+)  
* 1% Significance Level ** 5% Significance Level ***10% Significance Level.  
Mn=Mean; Med=Median 
 
 
The results of the statistical test shows that the mean for the Return on Equity has 
increased from 27% to 28% post the privatization. Further, the results show also that 
the median as increased by 2% from 25% to 27% post privatization. 61% of the 
privatized companies showed an increase in Return on Equity. Also, the median has 
increased by 1.7% for the fully privatized companies and by 0.02% for the partially 
privatized ones. The p-value results for all the three tests used were greater than 10%. 
This clearly indicates that the change in the Return on Equity for privatized companies 
is not significant.  
Further, by investigating the results of each privatization category, it is evident that the 
Return on Equity for the fully privatized companies has increased post privatization for 
66% of the companies. However, this change didn’t indicate any significance at any 
given level using the three statistical tests. The partially privatized category showed an 
increase in the Return on Equity also. This increase was evident in 50% of the sample; 
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however, all the statistical tests didn’t show any statistically significant change in the 
Return on Equity for the partially privatized companies.  
The ROE ratio did not show any statistically significance at any level for the privatized 
companies post privatization, as shown in above table. This was the case also for the 
partially and fully privatized companies. The negligible improvement in the ROE post 
privatization for partially privatized companies can be interpreted by the fact that the 
government owns governing share in those companies and still influence the decisions 
to serve social goals. The access that those partially privatized companies still enjoy to 
the government funds might be another reason for the ROE results. Unlike the partially 
privatized companies, the fully privatized companies showed a relatively improved 
level of ROE due to the lack of government backing and contradicting objectives which 
is in line with the literature of D'Souza, J. and Megginson, W. L. (1999) who observed 
the same. 
The results of the profitability ratios indicated that there is a significant improvement 
in performance of the privatized companies post privatization except for the ROE. 
Those results are in line with the literature done by Sun, Q., Jin J, and Wilson T. (2003), 
Dewenter, K. and Paul H. M. (2001), Boubakri, N. and Jean C. (1998), Laurin, C. and 
Yves B. (2001), and D'Souza, J. and Megginson, W. L. (1999). The majority of the 
improvement in profitability is a direct result of the objective change toward 
shareholder wealth maximization and thus elimination of the effect of agency cost of 
equity. Further, the exposure to the market competition and possible penalties is an 
influential motivator for management to act in an efficient way. 
6.4.1.5 The Change Results for the Operating Efficiency 
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In order to assess the operating efficiency of any company, it is critical to ensure that 
the company is using the available resources to produce the maximum outcome 
possible. An important resource that needs to be utilized efficiently to produce the 
maximum output is the labour force. By controlling this input, companies will tend to 
have higher level of sales and higher operating income per staff member. In order to 
achieve the ultimate objective of any privatization programme which is to maximize 
profits, utilizing the available resources including the labour force in an efficient 
manner continues to be an obstacle. It is therefore, a presumption for the success of any 
privatization programme.  
To this end, the research has employed two measures to assess the efficiency level of 
privatized companies; the Sales Efficiency which is the sales per staff member, and the 
Net Income Efficiency which is equal to the net Income per staff member. As per the 
Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias V. (1994) methodology, the two ratios are 
calculated as an index with the year of privatization being 1 and all the other years are 
calculated relatively. 
In order to test this hypothesis, two sub hypotheses were examined as shown below: 
 The Sales Efficiency will increase post privatization   
 The Income Efficiency will increase post privatization   
Each of the following sections will discuss thoroughly the results of each of the sub 
hypothesis.  
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6.4.1.6    The Change Results for the Sales Efficiency 
Table 21  Hypothesis1_Saleff 
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Proxies Inc. Dec. Mn Med Mn Med Mn Med     
SalEff 24  37  1.05  1.03  1.05  0.94  0.00  0.08  
0.05  
[0.96 ]  
1.50 
[0.13 ]  
1.08  
[0.24] 
43
% 
(+)  
* 1% Significance Level  ** 5% Significance Level  ***10% Significance Level.  
Mn=Mean; Med=Median 
 
The results shown in the table indicates that the Sales Efficiency mean has increased by 
0.39% points for the privatized companies post privatization. However, the median has 
decreased by 8.22% points for the privatized companies also post privatization. Out of 
the full sample, only 21 companies showed an increase in the Sales Efficiency post 
privatization. 
The null hypothesis to be tested is that the change in the mean/median of the Sales 
Efficiency post privatization compared to the mean/median of the Sales Efficiency pre 
privatization is equal to zero. The statistical tests used indicate that the p-value for any 
given level is greater than 10% therefore, it is not statistically significant. At the 
privatization category level, the fully privatized companies have the same results. 
However, the partially privatized category shown that the mean of the Sales Efficiency 
has decreased by 23.5% points and the median has decreased also by 7% points. This 
was the result for 81% of the partially privatized companies with statistical significance 
with a 95% confidence level.  
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The results of the Sales Efficiency as shown in above table indicate that 43% of the 
privatized companies examined a decrease in their Sales Efficiency post privatization 
with no significant change.  As for the partially privatized companies, they have 
examined as per the statistical results of 81% decrease in this efficiency ratio. Further, 
the results of the partially privatized companies also showed drop in the Sales 
Efficiency post privatization. The privatization core concepts of operating on 
commercial and profit driven basis is not still injected within the company. The time 
factor might be an issue in truly implementing business practices within the companies. 
The literature also support this approach as highlighted in the work done by Boubakri, 
N. and Jean C. (1998) 
6.4.1.7     The Change Results for the Income Efficiency 
Table 22   Hypothesis1_Incomeff 
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IncEff 43  18  0.78  0.59  1.03  0.93  0.26  0.24  
0.24 
[0.48 ]  
3.13 
[0.002*]  
3.00 
[0.003*]  
74
% 
(+)  
* 1% Significance Level  ** 5% Significance Level  ***10% Significance Level.  
Mn=Mean; Med=Median 
 
The Income Efficiency is calculated as the income per staff member. The results of this 
proxy show that the mean for the privatized companies has increased post privatization 
by 25% points. Also, the median has increased for the privatized companies by 34% 
points post privatization. Those results were achieved for 71% of the privatized 
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companies. The null hypothesis tested in the section is that the change in the 
mean/median of the Income Efficiency post privatization to pre privatization is equal 
to zero.  The p-value results for the proportion test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
is less than 1%; therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected with a 95% confidence level. 
By investigating the results for each of the privatization categories, the statistical test, 
proportion test and the Wilcoxon signed rank test for the fully privatized companies 
indicates a p-value of less than 1%; therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected with a 95% 
confidence level. 
On the other hand, the partially privatized companies’ results show a significant 
increase in the median of the Income Efficiency with a 90% confidence level. However, 
the p-value for the parametric t-test gave a result of more than 10%; therefore the 
change in the mean of the Income Efficiency is not significant at any level. 
Results of the Income efficiency on the contrary to the Sales Efficiency measures 
showed a significant change post privatization, as per above table. This is clearly 
indicating that the new management within the privatized companies tended to reduce 
costs. This is normal in such situations as management of newly privatized companies 
is always under the impression that there are efficiency gains that can be easily achieved 
by reducing expenses. This is unlike the fact that the increase in sales needs more 
marketing and sales tools to be implemented to gain more market share. Also, in Egypt 
they tend to perceive the product and services offered by the government companies to 
be of less quality. This taboo needs more time to change as a perception. Nevertheless, 
this is not inline though with the literature which indicates that all the Operating 
Efficiency Performance Measures will improve due to privatization Boardman, A. E., 
Claude L., and Aidan R. (2003).  
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6.4.2 The Change Results for the Output 
In order to implement a successful privatization programme, there are more dimensions 
to be explored in addition to the profitability and efficiency. The output is one of those 
important dimensions. In this study, the output is measured using the sales data of the 
privatized companies. This proxy is also based on the Megginson, W. L., Robert C., 
Matthias V. (1994) methodology, where the proxy is calculated as an index with the 
year of privatization being 1 and all the other years are calculated relatively. The 
research is expecting that the output will tend to increase post privatization due to the 
market forces. The following section will shed light on the results of testing the change 
in output pre privatization and post privatization using Sales as a proxy. 
For this hypothesis, this study examined a sub-hypothesis as shown below: 
 The Sales will increase post privatization 
The following section will discuss thoroughly the results of the sub hypothesis. 
6.4.2.1      The Change Results for the Sales 
Table 23  Hypothesis1_Sales 
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Proxies Inc. Dec. Mn Med Mn Med Mn Med     
Sales 16  45  1.10  1.07  0.86  0.84  0.24  0.22  
4.75  
[0*]  
3.40 
[6.00E-04*]  
4.36  
[1.00E-
05*] 
30
% 
(+)  
* 1% Significance Level  ** 5% Significance Level  ***10% Significance Level.  
Mn=Mean; Med=Median 
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The results shown in the table indicate that the mean for the Sales decreased by 24% 
points and also, the median of the Sales has decreased by 23% points post privatization. 
As shown in the results table, 265 of the privatized companies had increased their sales 
as a result of privatization, while all the remaining companies have decreased their as a 
result of privatization.  
The null hypothesis to be tested in this study is that the change in mean/median of the 
Sales of privatized companies post privatization compared to pre privatization is equal 
to zero. The three statistical tests were used to test the change in Sales. The results of 
the test as highlighted in the table showed that there is a statistically significant change 
with 99% confidence. This indicates that the privatization transaction has an adverse 
impact on the output of the privatized companies post privatization. The results showed 
that 80% of the privatized companies suffered a decrease in Sales of 23.8%.  
A more detailed approach is adopted by looking into the privatization categories test 
results. The results shows that the mean of the partially privatized companies declined 
by 29% post privatization. Also, the median has declined for the same privatization 
category by 52% post privatization.  Those results are examined for 82% of the partially 
privatized companies. The statistical tests, parametric t-test, and proportion test show 
that the decrease in Sales is significant with 99% confidence level. While the p-value 
of the Wilcoxon signed rank test is less than the 5% level; therefore, this indicates that 
with a 95% confidence level there is significant change in Sales post privatization. The 
fully privatized companies test results indicates that the Sales has increased for 27% of 
the companies; While, 73% of the fully privatized companies have examined a decrease 
in Sales due to privatization. The results of the three tests showed a significant change 
with a 95% confidence interval. 
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The results of the analysis showed that the Sales of the privatized companies post 
privatization have fallen as shown in above table. This drop in the sales is explainable 
due to the fact that the implementation of privatization will affect how management 
reacts, in absence of any influence from government to increase output in an inefficient 
manner. As per the literature, Boycko, M., Ahleifer. A, and Vishny, R. (1996) and 
Boubakri, N. and Jean C (1998), this is a normal effect; the new management will try 
to optimize Sales to an effective level. This decline in Sales also had a direct effect on 
the Sale Efficiency measure as shown above.   
6.4.3 The Change Results for the Leverage 
The gearing level of any company is used to assess the financial risk associated with 
this business. The purpose of assessing the leverage of the privatized companies in this 
study is to investigate the movement of the debt financing from the state owned 
companies to the privatized companies and to spot any change in the capital structure 
of those companies as a result of the privatization. Also, the risk associated with the 
fund raising in the presence of the government backing the fund raising for the State 
Owed Companies. Therefore, the cost of borrowing for both companies might differ. 
Nevertheless, the private companies will be in a better position to approach the equity 
markets (Bradley, M. J. and Kim, H., 1984). Therefore, there is a high tendency that 
the debt ratio will decrease post privatization. 
This study will test the null hypothesis that the change of the mean/median of the 
Leverage post privatization to the pre privatization is zero. Therefore, to test the 
hypothesis two proxies will be used, the Total Debt to Total Assets and the Total Debt 
to Total Equity. The next section will shed light on the results of the tests used.  
In order to test this hypothesis, two sub hypotheses were examined as shown below: 
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 The Leverage Ratio (Total Debt to Total Assets) will decrease post privatization   
 The Leverage Ratio (Total Debt to Total Equity) will decrease post privatization   
Each of the following sections will discuss thoroughly the results of each of the sub 
hypothesis.  
6.4.3.1      The Change Results for the Total Debt to Total Assets 
 
Table 24  Hypothesis1_TDTA 
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Proxies Inc. Dec. Mn Med Mn Med Mn Med     
TD/TA 26  35  0.21  0.19  0.21  0.16  0.01  0.03  
0.23  
[0.82] 
0.95 
[0.34 ]  
2.85  
[0.53] 
57
% 
(+)  
* 1% Significance Level  ** 5% Significance Level  ***10% Significance Level.  
Mn=Mean; Med=Median 
 
The results table shows that the mean of the Total Debt to Total Assets declined post 
the privatization by 0.01%, while the median has also declined by 3%. Those results 
are evident in 58% of the companies privatized. The parametric t-test, Wilcoxon signed 
rank test, and proportion test indicated that there is an insignificant decrease in the mean 
and median values at all given levels. 
The results of each privatization category showed that the mean of the Total Debt to 
Total Assets for the fully privatized companies improved by 2.5%. However, the results 
for the median showed a decline of 1.8% for the same privatization category post 
privatization. The p-value for the three statistical tests is greater than 10% indicating a 
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statistically insignificant   change at all levels and thus accepts the null hypothesis for 
this privatization category. The partially privatized companies’ results showed a 
decrease of 5.9% post privatization for 70% of the partially privatized companies. 
Further, the median showed a decrease of 8% for 70% of the partially privatized 
companies. The p-value for the parametric t-test showed a result of 5% and therefore, 
the null hypothesis is rejected with 95% confidence. The p-value of the Wilcoxon 
signed rank test is greater than the 10%; this indicates an insignificant change in median 
of the Total Debt to Total Assets for the partially privatized companies. 
The results of the Total Debt to Total Assets ratio showed that 57% of the companies 
had examined significant drop. 
6.4.3.2     The Change Results for the Total Debt to Total Equity 
Table 25   Hypothesis1_TDTE 
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TD/TE 18  43  0.73  0.42  0.29  0.10  0.44  0.17  
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[0.001*
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[2.00E-04*]  
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* 1% Significance Level  ** 5% Significance Level  ***10% Significance Level.  
Mn=Mean; Med=Median 
 
 
The table of results shows that the median of the Total Debt to Total Equity for the 
privatized companies declined post privatization by 45%. Also the median has 
decreased by 33% due to the privatization. The decline of the mean and median is for 
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79% of the sample studied. The p-value for the three statistical tests showed a value of 
1%; therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected with a 99% confidence.  
By investigating the results of the different privatization categories, the results show 
that the Total Debt to Total Equity for the partially privatized companies has declined 
by 30.8% and the median has decreased also by 31%. The p-value for the parametric t-
test for the partially privatized companies is 1%; therefore the change in mean is 
significant with 99% level of confidence. Also the p-value of the Wilcoxon signed rank 
test and proportion tests are 10%, and 5%; therefore, the change in median is significant 
with 90% confidence level. The results of the p-value for the three statistical tests 
showed a value of 1%; therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected with a 99% confidence 
for the fully privatized companies.  
As for the Total Debt to Total Equity ratio, 77% of the companies performed in the 
same manner, as per above table. The results as shown above highlighted that the 
declining pattern was evident in both data sets, the partially and the fully privatized 
companies. This result is expected as privatized companies are no more in a position to 
get funds that are backed by the government as a guarantor. Further, the privatization 
has given those companies the chance to raise funds through equity markets for the first 
time. All of these factors along with the new management in place will for sure affect 
how the decision are taken to structure funds to the company and to assess any 
associated risks in a better way to avoid defaulting. Even for the partially privatized 
companies, all of the above argument hold true also, as the government as a governing 
shareholder for those companies will tend to change the capital structure to increase the 
value of those companies for possible future selling opportunity.  The research work 
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done by D'Souza, J. and Megginson, W. L. (1998), Sun, Q., Jin J, and Wilson T (2003), 
Laurin, C. and Yves B. (2001) and Omran (2001) articulate the same results. 
6.4.4 The Change Results for the Employment Level 
 
The final proxy as per the Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias V. (1994) 
methodology is the Employment Level. The Employment Level plays an important role 
in the success of any privatization programme. The inefficiency and the over staffing 
of the State Owned Enterprises is one of the obstacles in achieving the desired outcomes 
of privatization due to the social dimension of any layoffs. Therefore, achieving 
efficiency in any of the privatized companies will require a certain reduction of 
employment levels. Most of the studies done on the employment level change due to 
the privatization programmes didn’t conclude with nay solid conclusion on the relation 
between privatization and level of employment (Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias 
V., 1994). The ambiguity in reaching a conclusion is due to the fact that both decisions 
might be taken simultaneously, to layoff employee and to expand the business later on. 
The research study will calculate the average level of employment pre and post 
privatization to test the null hypothesis that the change in the mean/median of 
employment post privatization to pre privatization is zero. The next section will show 
the results of the comparison. 
For this hypothesis, this study examined a sub-hypothesis as shown below: 
 The number of Staff will decrease post privatization   
The following section will discuss thoroughly the results of the sub hypothesis. 
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6.4.4.1    The Change Results for the Employment Level 
Table 26   Hypothesis1_Staff 
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Proxies Inc. Dec. Mn Med Mn Med Mn Med     
# Empl 11  50  
33.0
9  
28.39  
2,70
1.00  
1,803.0
0  
608.0
0  
368.
50  
5.07  
[0*] 
5.04 
[0*]  
5.09 
[0*]  
84
% 
(+)  
LogEm
pl 
11  50  7.79  7.95  7.51  7.49  0.28  0.19  
6.09 
[0*]  
5.13 
[0*]  
5.29 
[0*]  
84
% 
(+)  
* 1% Significance Level  ** 5% Significance Level  ***10% Significance Level.  
Mn=Mean; Med=Median 
 
 
The table of results shows that the mean of the Level of Employment for the privatized 
companies has decreased by 608 employees; also, the median of the Level of 
Employment has declined by 369 employees post privatization. Those results are shown 
for 85% of the privatized companies. The p-value for the three statistical tests was less 
than 1%; therefore with a 99% confidence the null hypothesis is rejected.  
The detailed analysis of each privatization category shows that the parametric t-test and 
the Wilcoxon signed ranked test showed an insignificant mean/median decline of the 
employment level for the partially privatized companies.  
There might not be a direct relationship between employment level and privatization in 
other countries; however, in Egypt and based on the results shown above that with 99% 
confidence there is a significant change in mean/median of the employment level pre 
and post privatization for around 85% of the sample.  
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Examining the staff number for the privatized companies as shown in above table, 
indicates that 84% of the privatized companies examined a significant decrease in the 
number of staff for both partially and fully privatized companies. This usually happens 
as a direct output of the privatization programmes as newly privatized companies tend 
to undergo a restructuring to enhance efficiency. Further, in some of the cases this 
downsizing and restructuring is accompanied by early retirement plans offered by the 
government to help absorb some of the redundant workers. The literature on done by 
LaPorta, R. and Lopez-de-Silanes, F. (1999), D'Souza, J. and Megginson, W. L. (1999), 
Sun, Q., Jin J, and Wilson T (2003), Laurin, C. and Yves B. (2001) and Omran (2001) 
showed the same results.  
6.5     Summary: 
 
This chapter has shed light on the performance of the Egyptian privatized companies 
post privatization against the pre privatization performance. The chapter tested the 
hypothesis 1 “Privatization of Egyptian companies through IPO will result in the 
improvement of the performance of those companies following privatization”. The 
methodology used to test the hypothesis was the Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias 
V. (1994) methodology. 
The chapter has covered two major parts of the thesis, part one addressed the 
Descriptive Statistics for the Privatized companies as well as the private matched 
companies. The data set used in this chapter covered the Egyptian IPO privatized 
companies and their matched private companies over the period from 1994 to 2010 
when the privatization programme of Egypt was put on hold. 
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The results of the descriptive statistics of the privatized companies indicated that the all 
the financial indicators have changed post the privatization taking place. Further, the 
descriptive analysis covered the standardized skewness and a standardized kurtosis for 
all the indicators to check for the normality of distribution if within the range of ±2. 
However, the mean of most of the variables fall outside the range of ±2; therefore they 
were not normally distributed (Keller G., 2003). Therefore, the research study used the 
non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test to test the significance of the changes in the 
median for all the indicators for the period pre privatization and post privatization as 
well. Further, in order to test the significance of change between the privatized 
companies and the matched private company, the Mann-Whitney test will be used to 
test the significance of the difference. 
The outcome of the chapter indicates that the Egyptian privatization programme affects 
positively the performance of the privatized companies in different key areas. The 
summary of the results are as follows: 
a) The profitability indicators have improved a lot except for the Return on Equity.  
b) The Income Efficiency showed a statistically significant increase. 
c) On the other hand, the change in the Sales Efficiency didn’t show any statistical 
significance.  
d) The Operating Efficiency has shown a statistically significant change. 
e) The Employment level has shown statistically significant decrease. 
The concluding question that can be raised at this point is whether or not privatization 
programme is a success. The analysis done till this point in the research will not provide 
the results that can support any of the two answers. Therefore, it is crucial at this stage 
to investigate the reason behind the change of the performance of the privatized 
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companies. It is not factually correct at this stage to contribute all the changes that took 
place post privatization to the privatization transaction itself. Therefore, further analysis 
will be done in the next chapter to assist in answering this question by, comparing the 
relative performance of the privatized companies’ to that of private companies.  
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Chapter 7: Privatized and Private 
Companies  
 
7.1  Introduction: 
 
In the last chapter the study tested the first hypothesis “Privatization of Egyptian 
companies through IPO will result in the improvement of the performance of those 
companies following privatization“. The methodology used was similar to the 
Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias V. (1994) methodology. Three statistical tests, 
non-parametric Wilcoxon signed, the parametric t-test and the proportion test were used 
to assess the changes that took place due to the privatization. The results of the tests 
were positive and indicated that the privatization programme of Egypt has improved 
the performance of the privatized companies. However, it is not yet clear if the positive 
changes that took place can be attributed only to the privatization transaction or not. 
This chapter will shed more light on the privatization performance by testing the second 
hypothesis of this research work. 
As a first step, a matching was done between the private companies and the privatized 
companies (61 companies) based on the size of the asset base. After matching the 
companies based on the size of asset base, it was taken into consideration the timeframe 
over which the private company had been operating as a listed company. Therefore, 
two requirements were needed to match the privatized companies to the private 
companies: 
1. The size of the Asset base to be between 70% to 130% (Barber, B. and Lyon, 
J., 1998). 
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2. The private company should have historic data as a listed company during the 
same period the pre and post privatization. 
In case the best match was not listed at the timeframe of the privatized company, the 
second best match is considered. After performing the matching process, the DID 
methodology was used to test the following Hypothesis and sub hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2  
Privatization results in improvement of performance relative to private companies' 
performance   
To test this hypothesis, the following hypotheses will be examined: 
2. The Profitability Ratios of Privatized and Private companies are not 
significantly different. 
 
This will be examined by testing: 
4.1. The EBIT of privatized and private companies are not significantly different 
4.2. The ROS of privatized and private companies are not significantly different 
4.3. The ROA of privatized and private companies are not significantly different 
4.4. The ROE of privatized and private companies are not significantly different 
 
5. The Operating Efficiency of Privatized and Private companies are not 
significantly different. 
 
This will be examined by testing: 
5.1. The Sales Efficiency of privatized and private companies are not significantly 
different 
5.2. The Income Efficiency of privatized and private companies are not 
significantly different 
 
6. The Output of Privatized and Private companies are not significantly 
different. 
 
This will be examined by testing: 
6.1. The Sales of privatized and private companies are not significantly different 
 
7. The Leverage Ratios  of Privatized and Private companies are not 
significantly different. 
 
This will be examined by testing: 
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7.1. The Leverage Ratio (Total Debt to Total Assets ) of privatized and private 
companies are not significantly different  
7.2. The Leverage Ratio (Total Debt to Total Equity ) of privatized and private 
companies are not significantly different 
 
8. The numbers of Staff in Privatized and Private companies are not 
significantly different. 
 
This will be examined by testing: 
8.1. The number of Staff of privatized and private companies are not significantly 
different 
The following section will present the results of the DID model used and as highlight 
in chapter 5 on the methodology.  
7.2 The Profitability Models 
7.2.1 Model 1 LogEBIT 
 
 
Table 27   Model_EBIT 
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES WITH COVARIATES     
        
Number of observations in the DIFF-IN-DIFF: 720     
 
Baseline Follow-up 
     
Control: 183 174 357 
    
Treated: 183 180 363 
    
 366 354  
    
R-square: 0.35442       
Covariates and coefficients:      
Variable(s) Coeff.    Std. Err.  t     P>|t|    
govown 1.207 0.291 4.15 0    
logsize 0.907 0.087 10.477 0    
tdta 0.402 0.043 9.403 0    
 
DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCES ESTIMATION    
        
Outcome Variable  
DIFF-IN-DIFF BASE LINE   FOLLOW UP  
 Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) DIFF-IN-DIFF 
logebit 4.58 3.262 -1.318 5.276 4.368 -0.907 0.41 
Std. Error 0.49 0.5 0.148 0.466 0.478 0.15 0.208 
t 9.34 1.94 -8.93 6.07 4.82 1.42 1.98 
P>|t| 0 0 0.000*** 0 0 0.000*** 0.049** 
* Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression    
**Inference: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1     
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The above results show a reasonable fit for a DID model given a 35% R-squared.  The 
Gov-ownership variable is moreover positive and significant suggesting that market 
power plays a role in generating superior returns; the impact of size is positive and 
significant (either market power or economies of scale in play), and the impact of 
TDTA (total debt/total assets) is positive and significant on the performance variable, 
LogEBIT. This last could relate to the financial engineering aspects of leverage in 
raising the return on equity. But we shall have more to say on this later. 
These results are interesting. However, the key feature we are testing in this analysis is 
the treatment impact of privatization.  In this model, the coefficient on Difference in 
Differences (beta3) is positive and significant at 5%. Thus privatization appears to have 
brought about a rise in EBIT that would not have occurred in its absence.  In the log 
model, the impact is interpretable as a % change or increase in this case; so the 
privatization treatment is clearly raising the EBIT by about 41%.  So not only are the 
effects on profitability statistically significant; they are also quantitatively important. 
This indicates that the cost efficiency has started gaining within the operations of the 
company that resulted directly in the improvement in the EBIT. This might be a direct 
result of the enhanced competition within the markets that has forced the cost efficiency 
to take place or enhanced revenues.  
The Sales analysis of Hypothesis 1 shows that there is a dip in sales in the initial years 
post privatization in line with literature done by Boycko, M., Ahleifer. A, and Vishny, 
R. (1996) and Boubakri, N. and Jean C. (1998). Which is a normal effect for any change 
that will initially lower the overall sales as a result of the privatization and then the sales 
will pick up overtime.  This will be achieved internally by enhancing the management 
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and product/services to the level required by the market and offered by private 
competitors.  
7.2.2 Model 2 ROS  
 
Table 28  Model_ROS 
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES WITH COVARIATES     
        
Number of observations in the DIFF-IN-DIFF: 720     
 Baseline Follow-up  
    
Control: 183 180 363 
    
Treated: 183 180 363 
    
 366 360  
    
R-square: 0.10175       
        
Covariates and coefficients:      
Variable(s) Coeff.    Std. Err.  t     P>|t|    
govown -0.053 0.079 -0.667 0.505    
logsize -0.021 0.024 -0.876 0.381    
tdta 0.079 0.012 6.778 0.000  |  
        
                                DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCES ESTIMATION   
        
Outcome 
Variable  DIFF-
IN-DIFF BASE LINE   FOLLOW UP  
 Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) DIFF-IN-
DIFF 
ROS 0.401 0.275 -0.126 0.406 0.296 -0.110 0.016 
Std. Error 0.134 0.137 0.040 0.127 0.131 0.041 0.056 
t 3.000 -0.520 -3.130 0.440 0.400 0.260 0.280 
P>|t| 0.003 0.044 0.002*** 0.001 0.024 0.007*** 0.779 
* Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression 
**Inference: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1     
 
The model has a reasonable fit with 10.2% R-squared, though only about one third of 
that for EBIT.  The impact on ROS of Gov-ownership is now negative but not 
significant; the impact of size is negative but not significant, and the impact of more 
indebtedness per asset base is positive and significant. 
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While there are significant differences between the control group (private) and treated 
group (privatized) as between the initial and the baseline periods, the treatment effect 
of the privatization on ROS is not estimated to be significant. 
The result of the government ownership impact is in line with the studies that 
highlighted a negative impact of government ownership on the ROS post privatization 
(Grigorian, D. (2000); Kwoka, J. (2002); Kocenda, E. and Jan S. (2003); and Boubakri, 
N. And; Jean C.; and Omrane G. (2005). 
 This clearly indicates that the majority shareholding of the government even after 
partial privatization has a negative impact on the efficiency that can be implemented 
within privatized companies. This might be due to the reason that government still has 
its own social agenda that is passed through those companies unlike the fully private 
companies where the shareholders will place more pressures and demand to achieve 
shareholder value maximization.  
7.2.3 Model 3 ROE 
 
Table 29 Model_ROE 
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES WITH COVARIATES     
        
Number of observations in the DIFF-IN-DIFF: 720     
 
Baseline Follow-up 
     
Control: 183 180 363     
Treated: 183 180 363     
 366 360      
R-square: 0.01866       
        
Covariates and coefficients:      
Variable(s) Coeff.    Std. Err.  t     P>|t|    
govown -0.119 0.203 -0.588 0.557    
logsize -0.037 0.061 -0.6 0.549    
tdta -0.035 0.065 -0.546 0.585    
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                                DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCES ESTIMATION   
        
Outcome 
Variable  DIFF-
IN-DIFF BASE LINE FOLLOW-UP  
 Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) DIFF-IN-DIFF 
ROE 0.548 0.624 0.075 0.484 0.806 0.322 0.247 
Std. Error 0.346 0.352 0.106 0.328 0.337 0.104 0.147 
t 1.590 0.760 0.710 0.35 1.29 2.45 1.68 
P>|t| 0.113 0.077 0.476 0.141 0.017 0.002*** 0.092* 
* Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression 
**Inference: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1     
 
The model is showing a low fit.  The Gov-ownership variable is now negative but not 
significant; the impact of size is negative but not significant, and the impact of more 
indebtedness per asset base is negative but not significant on the dependent variable, 
ROE. This shows clearly that the rise in EBIT is not due to financial engineering as we 
should have found a significant effect of tdta on ROE. 
The treatment impact of privatization is only significant at the 10% level, but indicates 
ROE rises by 0.247%-points as a result of privatization. The tax implication might be 
another reason for the change in gearing for the privatized companies which is a 
limitation in this study.  
7.2.4 Model 4 ROA 
 
Table 30     Model_ROA 
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES WITH COVARIATES     
        
Number of observations in the DIFF-IN-DIFF: 720     
 
Baseline Follow-up 
     
Control: 183 180 363     
Treated: 183 180 363     
 366 360      
R-square: 0.41681       
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Covariates and coefficients:      
Variable(s) Coeff.    Std. Err.  t     P>|t|    
govown 0.111 0.095 1.169 0.243    
logsize -0.055 0.028 -1.957 0.051    
tdta 0.235 0.014 16.820 0.000    
        
                                DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCES ESTIMATION   
        
Outcome 
Variable  
DIFF-IN-DIFF BASE LINE   FOLLOW UP  
 Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) DIFF-IN-DIFF 
ROA 0.623 0.208 -0.415 0.686 0.303 -0.383 0.032 
Std. Error 0.160 0.164 0.048 0.152 0.156 0.049 0.068 
t 3.880 -1.910 -8.580 1.040 0.470 0.230 0.470 
P>|t| 0.000 0.203 0.000*** 0.000 0.053 0.000*** 0.641 
* Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression 
**Inference: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1     
 
The model is showing a reasonably good fit for DID of 42%.  The Gov-ownership 
variable is now positive but not significant; the impact of size is negative and 
significant, and the impact of more indebtedness per asset base is positive and 
significant on the dependent variable, ROA. 
The treatment effect of privatization is not significant, while there are significant 
differences between the treated and the control groups in the baseline and follow up 
periods. 
7.3 Operating Efficiency Models 
 
In order to test this hypothesis, the Operating Efficiency of Privatized and Private 
Companies are not significantly different; the following sub hypotheses will be 
examined: 
1.       The Sales Efficiency of privatized and private companies are not significantly 
different 
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2.       The Income Efficiency of privatized and private companies are not significantly 
different,  
Each of the following sections will discuss thoroughly the results of each of the sub 
hypothesis.  
7.3.1 Model 5:  Saleff (sales efficiency) 
 
Table 31    Model_Saleff 
Number of observations in the DIFF-IN-DIFF: 720     
 
Baseline Follow-up 
     
Control: 174 173 347     
Treated: 180 177 357     
 354 350      
R-square: 0.21117       
        
Covariates and coefficients:      
Variable(s) Coeff.    Std. Err.  t     P>|t|    
govown -0.234 0.340 -0.689 0.491    
logsize -0.020 0.100 -0.197 0.844    
tdta 0.532 0.049 10.793 0.000    
        
                                DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCES ESTIMATION   
        
Outcome 
Variable  
DIFF-IN-DIFF BASE LINE   FOLLOW-UP  
 Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) DIFF-IN-DIFF 
Saleff 2.023 1.202 -0.822 1.825 1.171 -0.653 0.168 
Std. Error 0.572 0.582 0.173 0.541 0.554 0.173 0.242 
t 3.540 0.610 -4.760 1.660 1.310 0.150 0.700 
P>|t| 0.000 0.039 0.000*** 0.001 0.035 0.000*** 0.487 
* Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression 
**Inference: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1     
 
The model is showing a reasonably good fit for DID of 21%.  The results of the model 
as shown in above table indicate that the Gov-ownership variable is negative but not 
significant; the impact of size is negative but not significant, and the impact of more 
indebtedness per asset base is positive and significant on the dependent variable, Saleff. 
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These results are in line with the results of the Jones and Mygind (2002) indicating that 
the output of privatized companies tends to improve overtime.  
The treatment effect of privatization is not significant, while there are significant 
differences between the treated and the control groups in the baseline and follow up 
periods. 
The result indicate that the government ownership still plays a vital role in addressing 
efficiency as they might be unable or unwilling due to social/political aspects to lay off 
unproductive staff members to enhance efficiency.  The time factor also will eventually 
lead to the enhancement of staff skills and competency that will have a positive impact 
on the efficiency of privatized companies compared to the private.   
7.3.2 Model 6 Net Income Efficiency 
 
Table 32     Model_NIeff 
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES WITH COVARIATES     
        
Number of observations in the DIFF-IN-DIFF: 720     
 Baseline Follow-up      
Control: 183 180 363     
Treated: 183 180 363     
 366 360      
R-square: 0.21117       
        
Covariates and coefficients:      
Variable(s) Coeff.    Std. Err.  t     P>|t|    
govown -0.515 0.43 -1.198 0.231    
logsize 0.153 0.128 1.195 0.233    
tdta 0.060 0.063 0.942 0.347    
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                                DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCES ESTIMATION   
Outcome 
Variable  
DIFF-IN-DIFF  BASE LINE FOLLOW-UP  
  Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) DIFF-IN-DIFF 
NIeff 1.534 0.650 -0.884 0.823 0.905 0.082 0.965 
Std. Error 0.728 0.742 0.219 0.691 0.71 0.221 0.307 
t 2.110 0.340 -4.030 0.51 1.3 3.49 3.14 
P>|t| 0.035 0.381 0.000*** 0.234 0.203 0.712 0.002*** 
* Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression 
**Inference: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1     
 
 
The results of the model as shown in above table indicate that the Gov-ownership 
variable is negative but not significant; the impact of size is positive but not significant, 
and the impact of more indebtedness per asset base is positive and but not significant 
on the dependent variable, NIeff. The negative impact of the government ownership is 
mainly because of the role that the government continue to play in privatized companies 
to serve political agendas rather than profit maximization, which is in line with the 
results of the study done by Boubakri, N. And; Jean C.; and Omrane G. (2005). 
The treatment effect of privatization is now significant, while there are significant 
differences between the treated and the control groups in the baseline but not the follow 
up periods.  The interpretation is that net income per employee has increased by 0.965 
EGP as a direct result of privatisation. 
7.4 Leverage Model 
 
In order to test this hypothesis, the Output of Privatized and Private companies are not 
significantly different; the following sub hypothesis will be examined: 
1.       The Leverage Ratios (Total Debt to Total Assets) of privatized and private 
companies are not significantly different  
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2.       The Leverage Ratios (Total Debt to Total Equity) of privatized and private 
companies are not significantly different 
Each of the following sections will discuss thoroughly the results of each of the sub 
hypothesis. 
7.4.1 Model  7 Total Debt/Total Assets 
 
Table 33   Model_TDTA 
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES WITH COVARIATES     
        
Number of observations in the DIFF-IN-DIFF: 720     
 Baseline Follow-up      
Control: 183 180 363     
Treated: 183 180 363     
 366 360      
R-square: 0.0487       
        
Covariates and coefficients:      
Variable(s) Coeff.    Std. Err.  t     P>|t|    
govown -0.777 0.251 -3.1 0.002    
logsize 0.166 0.075 2.209 0.028    
        
                                DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCES ESTIMATION   
Outcome 
Variable  
DIFF-IN-DIFF  BASE LINE FOLLOW-UP  
  Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) DIFF-IN-DIFF 
TDTA 0.592 0.1 -0.492 0.117 -0.334 -0.451 0.041 
Std. Error 0.427 0.436 0.127 0.406 0.417 0.129 0.18 
t 1.390 -0.54 -3.86 -0.58 -0.28 -0.17 0.23 
P>|t| 0.166 0.819 0.000*** 0.772 0.423 0.000*** 0.821 
* Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression 
**Inference: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1     
 
 
The model is showing a low fit for DID of 4.9%.  The Gov-ownership variable is now 
negative and significant; the impact of size is positive and significant, and the impact 
of more indebtedness was dropped as this could be correlated with the dependent 
variable, which is a similar measure of indebtedness. 
 180 
 
The treatment effect of privatization is not significant, while there are significant 
differences between he treated and the control groups in the baseline and the follow up 
periods.   
The results of the model as shown above table indicate that the Gov-ownership variable 
is now negative and significant; the impact of size is positive and significant, and the 
impact of more indebtedness was dropped as this could be correlated with the dependent 
variable, which is a similar measure of indebtedness. 
The treatment effect of privatization is not significant, while there are significant 
differences between he treated and the control groups in the baseline and the follow up 
periods. 
As mentioned above, the impact of taxation is not considered here which might affect 
the TD/TA results.  However, the results indicate that the shift in mind set didn’t take 
place yet as the management of the newly privatized entities, might be still reluctant to 
borrow, or even not being able to borrow due to the economic reasons.  
7.4.2   Model 8 Total Debt / Total Equity 
 
Table 34   Model_TDTE 
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES WITH COVARIATES     
        
Number of observations in the DIFF-IN-DIFF: 720     
 Baseline Follow-up      
Control: 183 180 363     
Treated: 183 180 363     
 366 360      
R-square: 0.0817       
        
Covariates and coefficients:      
Variable(s) Coeff.    Std. Err.  t     P>|t|    
govown 0.176 0.117 1.509 0.132    
logsize 0.066 0.035 1.888 0.059    
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                                DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCES ESTIMATION   
Outcome 
Variable  
DIFF-IN-DIFF  BASE LINE FOLLOW-UP  
  Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) DIFF-IN-DIFF 
TDTE -0.283 0.071 0.355 -0.235 -0.136 0.099 -0.255 
Std. Error 0.199 0.203 0.059 0.189 0.194 0.06 0.084 
t -1.42 1.46 5.97 -0.03 -1.19 -3.91 -3.04 
P>|t| 0.155 0.726 0.000*** 0.215 0.485 0.098* 0.002*** 
* Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression 
**Inference: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1     
 
 
The results of the model as shown in above table indicate that the Gov-ownership 
variable is now positive and not significant; the impact of size is positive and 
significant, and the impact of more indebtedness was dropped as this could be 
correlated with the dependent variable, which is a similar measure of indebtedness. 
The treatment effect of privatization is now significant, while there are significant 
differences between the treated and the control groups in the baseline and the follow up 
periods.  The interpretation is that privatization lowers debt to equity ratios thus making 
the privatized firms less financially risky. This is an interesting result and probably 
follows from the fact that flotation enables the firm to raise new equity and/or to 
substitute equity for debt. Also, this might be due to the backing of the government in 
the mixed ownership companies that enable those companies to borrow at lower rate. 
7.5 Model 9 log employment 
 
In order to test this hypothesis, the numbers of Staff in Privatized and Private 
Companies are not significantly different; the following sub hypothesis will be 
examined: 
1.       The numbers of Staff in Privatized and Private Companies are not significantly 
different. 
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 The following section will discuss thoroughly the results of the sub hypothesis. 
 
Table 35    Model_LogEmpp 
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES WITH COVARIATES     
        
Number of observations in the DIFF-IN-DIFF: 720     
 Baseline Follow-up      
Control: 183 180 363     
Treated: 183 180 363     
 366 360      
R-square: 0.9072       
        
Covariates and coefficients:      
Variable(s) Coeff.    Std. Err.  t     P>|t|    
govown 0.724 0.154 4.7 0    
logsize 0.38 0.046 8.25 0    
tdta 0.054 0.023 2.377 0.018    
        
                                DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCES ESTIMATION   
Outcome 
Variable  
DIFF-IN-DIFF  BASE LINE FOLLOW-UP  
  Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) DIFF-IN-DIFF 
logEmpl 0.429 5.074 4.644 0.848 5.279 4.431 -0.214 
Std. Error 0.261 0.266 0.079 0.248 0.254 0.079 0.11 
t 1.65 17.9 59.11 2.12 4.65 1.94 -1.94 
P>|t| 0.1 0 0.000*** 0.001 0 0.000*** 0.053* 
* Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression 
**Inference: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1     
 
 
The model is showing a very high fit for DID (or indeed any model) of 91%.  The Gov-
ownership variable is now positive and significant; the impact of size is positive and 
significant, and the impact of more indebtedness is positive and significant. Thus 
government ownership raises employment in the years subsequent to privatization. 
Bigger firms employ more people after privatization than smaller ones, and greater 
financial risk is associated with taking on more staff. 
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However, privatization lowers employment (for given government ownership etc), by 
a massive 21%, a finding consistent with the idea that there are barriers to reducing 
staff in government-owned industry. There are also significant differences between the 
treated and the control groups in the baseline and the follow up periods.   
The results of the model as shown in above table indicate that the Gov-ownership 
variable is positive and significant; the impact of size is positive and significant, and 
the impact of more indebtedness is positive and significant. Thus government 
ownership raises employment in the years subsequent to privatization. Bigger firms 
employ more people after privatization than smaller ones, and greater financial risk is 
associated with taking on more staff. 
However, privatization lowers employment (for given government ownership etc.), by 
a massive 21%, a finding consistent with the idea that there are barriers to reducing 
staff in government-owned industry. This contradicts with the results of the studies 
done by Ramamurti, R. (1997), Bos, D., and Nett L., (1991), La Porta, R., Florencio L., 
Andrei S., and Robert V.  (1999), and Megginson, W. L., Robert C., Matthias V. (1994), 
that indicates the there is no change in staff number as a result of privatization. This 
might be a result related to this part of the world where lying off is not an easy affair.  
There are also significant differences between the treated and the control groups in the 
baseline and the follow up periods.   
7.6 Output Model 
 
 In order to test this hypothesis, the Output of Privatized and Private companies are not 
significantly different; the following sub hypothesis will be examined: 
 184 
 
1.       The Sales of privatized and private companies are not significantly different 
 The following section will discuss thoroughly the results of the sub hypothesis. 
 
7.6.1 Model 10 sales  
 
Table 36    Model_Sales 
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES WITH COVARIATES     
        
Number of observations in the DIFF-IN-DIFF: 720     
 
Baseline 
Follow-
up      
Control: 183 180 363     
Treated: 183 180 363     
 366 360      
R-square: 0.1165       
        
Covariates and coefficients:      
Variable(s) Coeff.    Std. Err.  t     P>|t|    
govown 4766.010 1773.424 2.687 0.007    
logsize 2733.261 529.872 5.158 0.000    
tdta 1444.223 261.809 5.516 0.000    
        
                                DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCES ESTIMATION   
Outcome 
Variable  
DIFF-IN-
DIFF  BASE LINE FOLLOW-UP  
  Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) DIFF-IN-DIFF 
Sales 
-1.5e+04| -1.60E+04 
-
1.10E+03 -1.0e+04| 
-
1.40E+04 
-
3.60E+03 -2.50E+03 
Std. Error 3003.184| 3061.069 904.563 2851.100| 2928.201 910.686 1266.72 
t 
-4.85 -1.50E+04 -1.19 -1.5e+04| 
-
1.10E+04 -1083.47 -1.98 
P>|t| 0.000 0.000 0.233 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.048** 
* Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression 
**Inference: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1     
 
The results of the model as shown in above table indicate that the Gov-ownership 
variable is now positive and significant; the impact of size is positive and significant, 
and the impact of more indebtedness is positive and significant. 
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The treatment effect of privatization is now significant, while there are significant 
differences between the treated and the control groups in the follow up period.  The 
interpretation is that privatization lowers sales, and is consistent with growing 
monopoly power in the privatized industries. So eventually those privatized companies 
will tend to be more efficient and innovative offering new services and products that 
will capture more of the market share and enhance the overall sales.  
7.7 Summary: 
 
All the empirical studies done on privatization will tend to compare the privatized 
companies performance with the performance of the State Owned Enterprises to justify 
the privatization transaction. However, this study to compare the privatized companies’ 
performance with that of private companies. This study will give more insight on the 
benefits of privatization and the possible short comes. It will also help in showing the 
real attributes of privatization and not the one caused by the economic environment.  
This chapter of the research work studied the relative performance of the privatized 
companies with the performance of a private matched group of companies from the 
similar industry and size. This chapter helped in studying the second hypothesis of this 
thesis” Privatization results in improvement of performance relative to private 
companies' performance". Based on the results shown and discussed in the chapter, the 
privatization has resulted in improving the performance of the privatized companies.  
 
 
 
 186 
 
Chapter 8: Conclusion  
8.1 Conclusion: 
 
This study covered the privatization programme implemented in Egypt for a period over 
17 years to assess the impact of the privatization transaction on the overall performance 
of the companies. An extensive literature review was done to cover all the studies done 
on the impact of privatization on privatized companies. Further, the dataset collected 
was used to test the two hypotheses under consideration to achieve the objective of the 
study. The assessment was done on the privatized companies themselves to assess the 
impact of the privatization transaction o the overall change in performance over a period 
of 6 years, 3 years pre and 3 years post privatization. In addition, by testing the second 
hypothesis, the study examined the real impact of privatization by studying the 
performance of the privatized companies relative to a matched set of private companies. 
Therefore, this research work studied the impact of privatization programme as an 
economic reform tool using the dataset of Egypt where limited research work was done 
to study the Egyptian experience in privatization.  
As highlighted earlier, most of the studies that were done in this area were focusing on 
the impact of privatization on the State Owned Enterprises per say; however, this study 
will offer another dimension of assessment by relating the change in performance to 
fully private companies. This will further define the impact of privatization on 
privatized companies.   
This study in its 8 chapters offered an extensive review of the Egyptian experience in 
privatization and restructuring the economy. The first three chapters of this study 
covered the privatization transaction from its different angles as a modern tool of 
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economic reform. The different methods of privatization were also studied as well as 
the advantages and disadvantages of privatization Also, the three chapters offered a 
thorough analysis of the Egyptian economy overtime and it captured all the different 
phases the economy went through and many of the reform programmes that were done 
at that time. This all was then concluded by the literature review chapter which covered 
empirical studies done on privatization overtime. The literature review covered a wide 
range of studies from different developed and developing countries over the last 30 
years showing vast experiences. All the studies studied the impact of privatization on 
privatized companies concluding that privatization has a significant impact on the 
performance of privatized companies. 
The following three chapters covered the methodology used to test the two hypotheses 
of this study and the empirical results of applying the statistical methods. The first 
empirical chapter assessed the impact of the privatization on privatized companies’ pre 
and post privatization for a set of 61 IPO privatized companies. The results of this 
chapter showed that the privatized companies examined a significant positive change 
in profitability, and operating efficiency. On the other hand, the leverage and 
employment level were negatively impacted with no effect on the output of the 
privatized companies. The results reached in this chapter are in line with the all the 
results of empirical results done in other studies except for the employment levels and 
the output.  
In order to assess further the impact of privatization on the privatized companies’ 
performance, a model was developed to relate the performance of the privatized 
companies to private matched companies. This model will be able to relate the changes 
in performance to the privatization transaction by assess the impact in the change in 
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ownership, gearing and size. A DID model was developed to examine the hypothesis 
of this chapter. The results of this chapter indicated that the privatization brought in a 
significant increase in EBIT and ROE while not having significance for ROS, and ROA 
for the profitability measures. Further, privatization treatment was not significant for 
Sales Efficiency and significant for the Income Efficiency; While the results of the 
leverage measures indicated that the privatization treatment TD/TA to be not significant 
and to the contrary to the results of the TD/TE. The results of the Employment measures 
and Sales were significant. The comparison relative to the private gave interesting 
results where the DID coefficient was significant for the EBIT, ROS, ROE, ROA.   In 
addition, the DID model results for the Sales Efficiency and the Income Efficiency were 
also significant in baseline and follow-up periods. The leverage, employment and sales 
results showed also significant differences between treated and controlled groups.  
8.2 Policy Recommendation 
 
Based on the outcomes of this study, there are a number of policy recommendations 
that can be used to shape the Egyptian government future privatization transaction and 
those recommendations can also work as lessons learned for other countries in the 
process of privatizing their State Owned Enterprises. The privatization programme in 
Egypt is currently put on hold post the revolution in 2011. All the government officials 
are not currently in a position restart the programme due to political pressures. 
However, the deteriorating economic conditions ,that Egypt is suffering from for the 
last 3 years, is calling for an urgent economic policy reform taking into consideration 
the huge potential privatization can play. However, there are certain outcomes of this 
study that indicate the need for a cautious restart of the programme and also some 
changes in the implementation approach. 
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On the top of those priorities that should be done before restarting the programme is 
the issues of workers. The result of the study showed that the employment level is 
decreasing post privatization. In a country like Egypt where the unemployment level is 
double digits with a low GDP per capita reaching the level of 1566 USD in 2014, the 
creation of additional job opportunities should be the outcome of any privatization 
programme. However, given that the companies to be privatized are over staffed, then 
laying off workers might be unavoidable Nevertheless, creating a fund that will take 
care of those workers should be a priority. Also, there should be a comprehensive plan 
to retrain those workers to meet the change in the labour market and also to assist them 
to find other jobs. In a country like Egypt, this should not be left to market forces; a 
government support in this regard will help in solving the structural unemployment 
issue that might result from the privatization of some of the companies.  
8.3 Possible Future Work 
 
This study investigated the impact of privatization on IPO privatized companies in 
Egypt and also interpreted the change in performance by comparing it to private 
matched companies. This study can further be extended to examine the organizational 
level of those companies to offer a better understating of what is happening within the 
companies that can enable or halt the efforts to improve the performance as a result of 
privatization. This can be done by employing the agency theory to assess the employees 
and management as key enablers for such a change.  Also, this study can be extended 
to examine other methods of privatization and comparing and contrasting it with private 
companies as well as the IPO privatized companies.  
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Moving to more regional level this study can be extended to compare the outcomes 
with regional experiences of other countries and especially with the Gulf countries 
where minimal of research was done. 
There is also another possibility of extending the work by assessing other variables and 
specifically the ones related to investment, dividends and the overall direct investments 
to Egypt as tool to improve the overall economic performance and to enhance job 
creation. 
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